Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/2/q/bon-sent-I-d2-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God.*

Secondly it is asked whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God. And that it is so, is shown by supposing four things concerning God: the first is, that in him there is the highest beatitude; the second, the highest perfection; the third, the highest simplicity; the fourth, the highest primacy.

1. From the first supposition it is argued thus: if there is the highest beatitude; but wherever there is the highest beatitude, there is the highest goodness, the highest charity, and the highest joy. But if there is the highest goodness, since it belongs to goodness to communicate itself in the highest degree, and this is most of all in producing from itself an equal and giving its being: therefore etc. If the highest charity, since charity is not a private love but [is directed] to another: therefore it requires plurality. Likewise, if the highest joy, since "of no good is the possession joyful without a companion," therefore for the highest joy a society and so a plurality is required.

2. Likewise, from the second supposition thus: if there is the highest perfection; but "it belongs to perfection to produce one such as it itself is in nature": therefore it is necessary that there be multiplication there; but this cannot be according to another essence: therefore it must be according to another person or supposit.

3. Likewise, from the third supposition thus: if there is the highest simplicity; but it belongs to simplicity that some nature be in many, as is clear in the universal, but it is from a defect of simplicity that it is numbered in those: therefore if in God there is simplicity deficient in nothing, there will be in many an essence not numbered: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, from the fourth supposition thus: if there is the highest primacy; but the prior something is, the more fecund it is and a principle of others: therefore just as the divine essence, because it is first, is the principle of other essences, so the person of the Father, since he is first, because from no one, is a principle and has fecundity in respect of the [other] persons; but fecundity in God in respect of God cannot be except joined to act: therefore it is necessary that there be several persons.

**On the contrary:**

1. It seems that from the same suppositions the contrary could be argued, and so the reasons and the conclusion are destroyed. For if there is the highest beatitude, since the blessed by essence is sufficient unto itself for beatitude: therefore it is not necessary to posit another person for beatitude or joy.

2. Likewise, against the second supposition it is objected thus: if there is the highest perfection: therefore the essence is equally fully and perfectly in one person and in many. If therefore beyond perfection any addition is superfluous, plurality is superfluous; and if this, since in divine matters nothing is superfluous, plurality is not in divine matters.

3. Likewise, against the third reason thus: if there is the highest simplicity, since plurality is opposed to simplicity, and "opposites cannot be about the same thing": therefore if God is one and in him is simplicity, then not plurality, since he is in all respects simple.

4. Likewise, against the fourth supposition thus: if there is the highest primacy; therefore since rest is in the first principle, and rest is in unity: therefore primacy does not posit plurality but unity: therefore it seems that there is only one person.

### Conclusion.

> That a plurality of persons is to be posited in divine matters, both faith teaches and is persuaded by arguments of congruence.

**I respond:** It must be said that in divine matters a plurality of persons is to be posited, as faith says and the foregoing reasons show, if one considers without contradiction. For by reason of *simplicity* the essence is communicable and able to be in many. By reason of *primacy* the person is born to produce another from itself; and I here call primacy innascibility, by reason of which, as the ancient opinion says, there is in the Father a fontal fullness toward every emanation; and this will be made clear below. By reason of *perfection* it is fit and prompt for this; by reason of *beatitude and charity*, voluntary. With these conditions posited, it is necessary to posit a plurality of persons.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that the blessed by essence is sufficient unto itself, therefore does not need [another] etc; it must be said that it is true that it does not need; nor is another posited on account of need, nor as one beatifying, but as communicating in beatitude.

2. Similarly to that which is objected, that the deity is equally fully in one and in many; it must be said that although it is equally fully, yet it is not so fully declared. And *moreover*, by the very fact that it is fully in the Father, it overflows into the other persons by an overflowing of perfection.

3. To that which is objected, that plurality is repugnant to simplicity; it must be said that there is a certain plurality by *addition*; and this is repugnant; another by *origin*; and this neither adds nor composes nor is repugnant to simplicity, but rather to solitude; and so it is in divine matters, as will be clear below.

4. To that which is objected, that rest is in the first; it must be said that just as among essences there is one first essence, from which the others are and toward which, so also among the persons there is one person, from which the others are and toward which; and in him is the rest of origin, because he is from no one, and this is the person of the Father. Hence Augustine appropriates to that person unity, saying: "In the Father is unity," etc.

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