Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/2/q/bon-sent-I-d2-a1-q4
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### Question IV

*Whether there are only three divine persons.*

Fourth and finally, it is asked whether a trinity is to be posited in the divine persons. And that this is not so — but rather a duality — is shown thus:

**1.** The Father gives to the Son all that he can; but one who gives all that he can give cannot give any more: therefore neither can he produce another person, since that would be a giving.

**2.** Likewise, the Father begets the Son as a Word, in all things equal to himself and in all things saying and expressing himself; but the multiplication of persons is for the declaration of power: therefore it seems superfluous to produce another.

**3.** Likewise, it is shown that there ought to be a quaternity there, by an argument from emanation. For since the Son emanates by generation and not by procession, therefore, even though he does not generate, he nonetheless produces by spirating; by the same reasoning it seems that the Holy Spirit, even though he does not produce by spirating, could generate or does generate, since he is not generated.

**4.** Likewise, since in divine things there is a twofold mode of producing — one by way of nature, and the other by way of will — and since there ought to be a complete account of production there, it seems also that there ought to be a third mode of producing, by way of art. And if so, a fourth person would have to be posited according to this mode of producing.

*On the contrary:* That there is only a trinity there is shown from the suppositions made above, because it is necessary that in that Trinity there be beatitude, perfection, simplicity, and primacy.

**1.** From the first supposition it is shown thus: if there is supreme beatitude there, then there is supreme concord; therefore supreme kindredship, supreme charity. But if there were more than three, there would not be supreme kindredship; if fewer, there would not be supreme charity: therefore there are only three. Proof of the minor: if there is a fourth person there, it proceeds either from one, from two, or from three. If from one or from two only, then it does not agree perfectly and equally with all; but if from three, then the two intermediate persons agree more with one another than with the extremes — because they are both produced and produce — and thus there is not a perfect bond there. — Likewise, if there were fewer than three, there would not be perfect charity, because perfect love is both generous and shared: because it is generous, it tends toward another; because it is shared, it wills that the beloved be loved by another, and that the other be loved as itself and by itself: therefore there is love and *co-love*; but this cannot exist with fewer than three.

**2.** From the second supposition thus: if there is supreme perfection there, then the producing person produces perfectly both with respect to the mode of producing and with respect to the one produced. But there is found only a twofold noble mode of producing; «for every agent acts either by way of nature or by way of will», as the Philosopher holds. Therefore it produces by these two modes and only by these; but the person produced by either of these modes is most perfect: therefore, since everything beyond perfection is superfluous and what is below it is deficient, it is necessary that there be only two persons emanating and no more nor fewer, and one from whom they emanate: therefore, only three.

**3.** Likewise, from the third thus: if there is supreme simplicity there, the Father gives the whole to each: therefore those proceeding or emanating are not distinguished according to what they receive, but according to the mode of receiving or emanating; but there are only two modes of emanating: therefore there can be only two persons emanating and a third producing: therefore, etc.

**4.** Likewise, from the fourth thus: if by reason of primacy there is supreme fruitfulness there, no person can produce by any kind of producing by which it itself is produced, because with respect to that it is not prior: therefore, since two persons emanate according to the two modes of emanating, it is impossible that they produce by these modes, and there are no other modes: therefore they cannot produce another person: therefore there are only three.

### Conclusion

> *That there are only three divine persons is both taught by the Catholic faith and persuaded by reason.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Catholic faith declares, one must posit only three persons — neither more nor fewer. And for this there is taken a reason of *necessity* and a reason of *congruence*.

**The reason indeed of necessity** why there cannot be fewer than three is *supreme beatitude* and *supreme perfection*. For supreme beatitude demands love and co-love; supreme perfection demands a twofold emanation — namely of nature and of liberality — and for this at least three persons are required. — Likewise, the reason of necessity why there cannot be more is *supreme simplicity*, which does not allow the persons to be distinguished except by the modes of emanating; and again *principal fruitfulness*, which does not permit a person to produce by any kind of emanation unless he is prior to the one produced according to the account of understanding. Hence the first person, because he is unborn and unspirable, both generates and spirates; the second, because he is unspirable but begotten, does not generate but spirates; the third person, because he is spirated and proceeds from one who generates, neither generates nor spirates. And therefore it is impossible that there be more than three.

**The reason of congruence** is taken from the *sufficiency of combinations* and from the *perfection of the ternary number*.

*From the sufficiency of combinations*, because since, as Richard says, «love is in all the persons», and there are only three kinds of love — namely, *gratuitous, owed, and mixed of both* — there will be only three persons: one who only gives, in whom there is gratuitous love; another who only receives, in whom there is owed love; and a middle one, who both gives and receives, in whom there is the love mixed of both. — Likewise, in another way they can be combined according to the account of origin; and the sufficiency of this kind of combination consists in three. For one can understand a person who is a principle of a person and is not a principiate, and again a person who is a principiate and is not a principle of a person, and in a third mode a person who is both principiate and principle. But a fourth mode — that one be neither principle nor principiate — is altogether impossible and unintelligible.

*The reason of congruence from number* is that this number — namely, the ternary — has the first perfection and the supreme, whether it is considered in itself, or in continuous quantity, or in a creature.

**In itself** it has the first perfection, because the ternary is the first number that consists of all its parts — namely, unity and duality, which joined together make three. But the senary (six) is called the first of the *perfect* numbers, because it consists of all its aliquot parts — namely, three, two, and one. — Likewise, the supreme perfection is in it, because unity, which is the principle and completion of every number, when reflected upon itself by perfect reduplication — such as occurs in a solid square — is tripled in the account of reason, while remaining one in reality; as if one should say: *once one once* (*semel unum semel*). And this is very like the uncreated Trinity,

in which in the unity of substance there is a trinity of accounts; nevertheless it is not altogether similar, because there, together with unity of substance, there is a trinity of accounts and of *things* — that is, of persons — whereas here there is only a trinity of accounts.

**Likewise**, if this number is considered in *continuous quantity*, it has in itself the first perfection and the supreme: the first, because every quantity has a beginning, a middle, and an end; the supreme, because the perfection of continuous quantity supremely consists in threefold dimension, namely length, width, and height. And this is what the Philosopher says at the beginning of *On the Heavens*: «For we say that everything perfect is in three, and by this number we have employed ourselves to magnify the one God, the creator of all things, eminent in the properties of those things which are created».

**Likewise**, if this number is considered in a creature, it has in itself the first perfection and the supreme: the first, because a trinity of vestige is found in every creature, however small, however least; the supreme, because according to the trinity of image — reformed and made deiform — the supreme and most noble perfection of the creature, namely beatitude, is attained.

**1.** To the objection, then, that *the Father gives to the Son everything he can*: it must be said that this is true, but he does not give in every mode in which he can. And so in the inference there is the fallacy of *accident*: «he cannot give more, therefore he cannot produce another person either»; for this is not to give more, but to give in another mode.

**2.** Similarly, the following objection is clear, because the Son does not declare [the Father] in every mode; for although he does so according to the account of nature, nevertheless he does not do so according to the liberality of the will, except insofar as from the Word himself the Spirit proceeds.

**3.** To the objection that *the Holy Spirit ought to generate*: it must be said that it is not similar, because the person of the Son precedes spiration, and therefore has the account of primacy; the person of the Holy Spirit follows generation, and therefore does not generate, because he is not unborn.

**4.** To the objection about a third mode of emanating — namely, *by way of art*: it must be said that art has no fruitfulness for emanating or producing except through the will; and therefore that mode is not to be distinguished from the mode of producing by way of liberality or will.

Or — differently and better — the mode of producing by art agrees with the mode of producing by nature in this: that in both cases something similar is produced. But it differs, because in natural production what is produced is similar in substance and nature, but another in person; in the production of art, however, what is produced is similar according to the account of the exemplary form, but dissimilar in substance and nature. But such a mode of producing is incompossible with the divine essence, which does not suffer a diversity of essences.