Dist. 20, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/20/q/bon-sent-I-d20-a2-q2
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### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in divine things there is an order of nature.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in divine things there is an order of nature. And that there is, seems [to be the case]:

1. By Augustine, who says in the *littera*, that «when the Son is said [to be] from the Father, an inequality of substance is not signified, but an order of nature».

2. Likewise, where there is a natural origin, there is a natural order; but in divine things there is a natural origin, therefore also a natural order: therefore there is there an order of nature.

3. Likewise, where there is cause and effect, there is prior and posterior; but wherever this is, there is an order of nature: therefore since in divine things it happens that cause and effect are found, as Chrysostom says on the opening of [the Letter] to the Hebrews, and the Damascene in the first book, chapter eight: «The Father is the cause of the Son», it is plain etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Of whatever there is an order, that thing itself is ordered: therefore if in divine things there is an order of nature, the nature is ordered; but what is ordered is distinguished and numbered: therefore in divine things the nature is distinguished and numbered; but this is false: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in divine things nature and essence are the same, because the name *nature* is essential; but in divine things in no way is an order of essence posited: therefore neither of nature.

3. Likewise, where there is order, there is prior and posterior; therefore if in divine things there is an order of nature, there is there prior and posterior according to nature; but this in no way is admitted: therefore neither an order of nature. That however in divine things there is no prior and posterior according to nature, is shown thus: «Relatives are simultaneous in nature»; therefore the Father and the Son, insofar as they are Father and Son, are simultaneous in nature; but the Father, according to that which He is and according to the fact that He is Father, is simultaneous in nature, because the relations in divine things are not supervenient, nor are they only the ground of referring, but also of existing: therefore the Father and the Son according to their hypostases are simultaneous in nature; therefore there is not there an order of nature.

4. Likewise, in created causes we see degrees, in that the more swiftly a created substance can [act], the more rapidly it operates; whence some operate in time, some abruptly, some all at once; and that cause which operates all at once sometimes does not precede in time, but in nature. If therefore God produces the Son according to every nobility and virtue of His power, and the virtue of His infinite power is greater than [that] of finite [power]: therefore He produces [the Son] not only simultaneously in duration, but also simultaneously in nature: therefore there is not there an order of nature.

5. Likewise, we see in things knowable that some have cognition and thought of themselves by investigation and later in time — and I am speaking of actual, not habitual [cognition] — as the human soul; and some simultaneously in duration, as the Angel: therefore if God's cognition and uttering or speaking is not an accident, but much more noble and virtuous than every creature, He has the word of intelligence not only simultaneously in duration, but also in nature: therefore etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> In divine things there is rightly said to be an order of nature, that is, an order of natural origin.

**I respond:** It must be said that an order is said to be of something in two ways: either as of the things ordered, or as of the ground of ordering. An order in divine things, as of the things ordered, is said of the persons of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; as of the ground of ordering, it is said of the nature. For *nature* expresses a productive force, in the sense in which the Philosopher says that it «is a force implanted in things, generating like from like». But in divine things there is an order according to production; therefore there is said to be there an order of nature, that is, of natural origin. Whence that genitive is not construed subjectively, as when one says *the whiteness of Peter*, but by force of declaration of essence, as when one says *the whiteness of brightness* or *the man of authority*. And therefore it is resolved into two, so that the sense is: order of nature, that is, of natural origin.

**To 1.** From this is plain the first thing that is objected, because it objects as if order were said to be of nature as of an ordered thing. Likewise the second is plain, because *essence* is said in altogether absolute fashion, not as the principle of another; but *nature* expresses [something] as the principle of another, whence it expresses a comparison to natural production or emanation.

Whence further it must be noted that order according to natural origin in these inferior things expresses two things, namely emanation and antecession. And the reason for this is that emanation in these inferior things posits substantial diversity. Whence everything that emanates in these inferior things is an effect, and what produces is a cause; and therefore that is called a cause, of which the being follows another; and because [it is] another in nature, therefore [it is] posterior in nature. But in divine things there is an emanation upon which there does not follow diversity of essence or of nature; therefore neither prior nor posterior in nature, but simultaneous in nature. And therefore in divine things the account of cause or effect is not admitted according to the Latins, but [only] the name of *principle*, although the Greeks, with the term extended, use the name of *cause* in place of the name of *principle*. And therefore in divine things there is an order of nature, not such that one is posterior to the other, but such that one is from the other. And this is what Augustine says in the *littera*.

**To 3.** And from this is plain what is objected thirdly; for although in creatures order posits posteriority of nature, yet not in God. And therefore although there is not there posteriority, it does not follow but that there is well there an order.

From these things the objections on either side are plain. It must therefore be granted that in some manner an order of nature is found in divine things, as the first reasons show; the third however fails, because the name of *cause* is not properly found in divine things according to the Latins.

**To opp. 1.** What is objected on the opposite [side] is plain, because order is not of nature as of an ordered thing.

**To opp. 2.** Likewise plain is what is objected concerning the divine essence, because it is an absolute name and does not import the account of origin.

**To opp. 3.** The last is plain, because there is not there an order of nature such that one is prior to the other, but such that one is from the other.