Dist. 20, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/20/q/bon-sent-I-d20-dubia
----------------------------------------
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt concerning the first reasoning which the Master places: *All things that the Father has, the Son has: therefore as great a power as the Father has, the Son has*. This argument does not seem to be valid, because *quid* is changed into *quantum*: for *all things* distributes with respect to substance, while *quantum* states quantity.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although such a manner of arguing would not be valid if quantity and substance differed, nevertheless where they are the same, it has every kind of necessity; and because this is so in divine matters, therefore the argument is good.

It can yet be said, however, that the aforesaid argument is good in any matter. For someone is not said to *have* only substantial things, but also properties: therefore it follows, since *all things* distributes for all things had, that he also has properties: therefore since one [person] has no power that the other does not have, therefore one can do nothing that the other cannot: therefore if one is omnipotent, the other [is] also; and so it is clear that here there is no figure of speech, because *all things* distributes here for things of all genera.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *He who has received cannot be unequal to him who has given*. For it appears to say wrongly, because if this [were so], since every creature is a receiver, none would be unequal to God; but this is false: therefore so is the first.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine does not speak generally of every receiver or of every mode, but of him who receives all things; and such a receiver cannot be unequal.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about another reasoning: *If he could not, therefore he was impotent*. For it seems to argue wrongly, because similarly it could be argued of the Son and the Holy Spirit: if he could not produce an equal Son: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said to this that generation does not pertain except to the hypostasis of the Father, as has been touched on elsewhere; therefore [the inference] is not valid, nor is it similar.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is doubted concerning another part of the authority, because that argument does not appear to be valid: *He could produce an equal, and did not produce or beget: therefore he was envious*; because similarly it can be argued: he could make this creature better, and did not make [it so]: therefore he envied. If you say that envy always regards an equal or a superior, as Gregory says on that [verse] of Job, chapter 5: *Envy slays the little one*; it is then objected that, if he had begotten a lesser Son, envy would not have had a place there: therefore it appears that this solution does not solve [the problem]. Likewise, in creatures it does not hold: this craftsman could have made this thing better and did not: therefore he was envious; why therefore does it hold in God?

**I respond:** It must be said that the envy of the producing craftsman is not regarded in the production of an unequal or less good thing, except where the thing of its own nature demands such being; for then it is necessarily concluded that either the producer could not, or he envied, if he could and did not produce, because he did not do as he ought. And since a son, by the very fact that he is a son, is born to imitate perfectly, if he did not beget a son in perfect imitation, it is concluded that either the producer was impotent, or he envied. And therefore it is clear that it is not similar in the case of the Creator and the creature, the chest and the craftsman.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is doubted concerning the third reasoning which he makes: *If a man as father could beget a son equal to himself, therefore so could God too*, because that argument is not valid: a man has another man equal to himself, or can have [one]: therefore so also God; because God has from his nobility that no one can be equal to him; and so the reasoning of Augustine seems not to be valid.

**I respond:** It must be said that if equality posited of necessity in equals diversity in nature, then it would not be valid. But, supposing that God begets a Son connatural to himself, it follows of necessity that if a man begot an equal, then God much more strongly. For although it pertains to imperfection to be equalled by [something] diverse in nature, yet to be equalled by [something] connatural is of perfection; otherwise the divine nature would be in some respect imperfectly; and since this is impossible, it is clear, etc.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the question of equality is "of what kind" or "how great"* (*qualis aut quantus*). For it appears to say wrongly, because *quale* states quality, and according to it likeness is regarded, not equality, since «*it is proper to quality that according to it like or unlike are said*».

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of quality in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is said to be denominating;

in another way, insofar as it is a disposition of nobility; and according to this greater and lesser nobility is regarded, and so a thing is said to be better. And because «*in spiritual things the same thing is greater and better*», therefore the question of equality looks to quality, not from the proper account of the name, but as a consequence, as has been seen.

---