Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/21/q/bon-sent-I-d21-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I. *On exclusive words added to a substantial term.*

### Question I. *Whether it is truly said: God alone is the Father.*

That [an exclusive word] is truly added to this term *God* on the side of the subject is shown in this way: God has something proper [to Himself]; but the proper is what belongs to one alone: therefore etc. And since it is established that an exclusion is truly added to a substantial term in respect of an essential predicate — whence it is well said: *God alone creates* — it is asked whether it is truly added to it in respect of a proper predicate, that is, of a relative term: namely, whether it is truly said: *God alone is the Father*. And that it is so seems to be the case:

1. By its own exposition, which is: *God alone is the Father*, that is, *no other than God is the Father*: therefore *God alone is the Father*. And that this is its exposition is had both from common usage and from the Philosopher, who says that «*alone* is the same as *not with another*».

2. Likewise, this is seen from the convertible: since these two are converted: *nothing besides Peter runs*, therefore *Peter alone runs*: therefore also these two: *nothing besides God is the Father*, and *God alone is the Father*. But the first is true, since this is false: *nothing is the Father*, and it has no instance except in God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, from whatever there is removed that which is in the more, there is removed that which is in the less; but to be God is in the more than to be the Father: therefore from whatever God is removed, the Father also is removed. But whatever things so stand, that from whatever the one is removed, the other also is removed, the one is precisely predicated of the other, nor has any [counter-]instance: therefore Father is precisely predicated of God; but if precisely, therefore with exclusion: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. An accidental term implies its own thing concerning its subject — as is plain when it is said: *the white man runs*, concerning this term *man* whiteness is implied — therefore likewise when it is said: *God alone is the Father*, concerning God solitude is implied. But Hilary says that «God is not to be confessed as solitary»: therefore etc. And this reason concludes that it cannot be truly added either with a proper or with a common predicate.

2. Likewise, it is shown that it cannot be truly added in respect of a common predicate, as when it is said: *God alone creates*. For this name *God* of itself has, as it were, an indefinite supposition with respect to the persons; therefore it makes the locution true for some [one]; but for any one whatever it is false — for this is false: *the Father alone*

*is* — therefore, since every essential predicate belongs to the whole [Trinity], and not to one alone, in no way can an exclusive word be added in respect of such a predicate to a common subject.

3. Likewise, that [it cannot be truly added] in respect of a proper [predicate], it seems, since if this is true: *God alone is the Father*, then by simple conversion this also: *the Father alone is God*; but that is false: therefore etc. *If you say* that it is not converted simply; *on the contrary*: it has the sense of a universal negative and of a particular affirmative, and each is converted simply: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *The term* solus *in divine matters is not said categorematically, so as to have the same sense as* solitarius; *but it is well said syncategorematically with respect to a predicate, both substantial and personal.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this word *solus* can be a *categorema* or a *syncategorema*. Insofar as it is a *categorema*, it is then an adjectival noun, absolutely positing its own thing concerning its substantive, and its thing is solitude. Hence *solus* taken thus has the same value as *solitarius*. And since solitude is in no way received in divine matters as to substance, since it [the substance] is in many persons, this name *solus* is not received in divine matters with substantial terms, as the first reason shows.

If, however, it is taken insofar as it is a *syncategorema*, in this way it deprives [of] association and imports some negation. And thus, since some predicate, both substantial and personal, is precisely said of a substantial name, in this way it is truly said in divine matters both with respect to a substantial predicate, as when it is said: *God alone creates*, and with respect to a personal one, as when it is said: *God alone is the Father*.

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning *the white*, that it posits its own thing concerning the substantive; it must be said that it is not similar, insofar as this name *solus* is taken syncategorematically; since *whiteness* is an absolute disposition of the subject, whence it absolutely posits its own thing concerning the term, but *solus* by reason of negation [does so] not absolutely; and therefore it does not posit solitude, but precision.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that a substantial term ought to render the locution true for some person; it must be said that the term to which an exclusion is added has a relation to the predicate, and has a relation to the exclusion; and although in respect of the predicate it can have personal supposition, as when it is said: *only a man runs*; nevertheless the rule among the sophists is that, by comparison to the exclusive word, such a term has *simple* supposition, whence in no way is it permitted to descend [to instances]. And this is what is said in the book *On the Rules of Faith*, that an exclusive word makes exclusion as to the *genus of the thing*, not as to the *thing of the genus*, since [it operates] by reason of the common form, which is the genus of the thing, not by reason of the supposit, which is the thing of the genus.

3. To that which is objected last, that the converse is false; it must be said that that is not its converse; since this: *God alone is the Father*, has the sense of an affirmative, namely *God is the Father*, and this is converted simply; and it has the character of this negative: *no other than God is the Father*, and this likewise is converted simply; but this is not its converse: *no other than the Father is God*, but rather this: *nothing which is the Father is other than God*. For the same [term], which was placed as subject in the first, ought to be predicated in the second; and so that is plain.