Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/21/q/bon-sent-I-d21-a2-q2
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### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether the exclusive word* solus *is truly added to a personal term in respect of a common predicate.*

Secondly it is asked whether the exclusive word is truly added to a personal term in respect of a common predicate, so that it is truly said: *the Father alone is God*. And that this is so seems [to be the case] by authority and by reason.

1. By authority thus: the Church sings: «Thou alone [art] Most High, Jesus Christ»; and that [verse]: «To God the Father be glory and to His only Son»; and many similar [formulae] are found.

2. Likewise, Matthew eleven: *No one knows the Son except the Father*; but *no one except the Father* and *the Father alone* are convertible: therefore *the Father alone knows*, and this predicate is essential: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [thus], because an exclusive word added to something does not exclude anything except another; but the three persons do not have otherness in respect of a substantial predicate: therefore added to one it does not exclude another in respect of such a predicate; but if it does not exclude, the locution is true: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, an exclusive word added to something does not exclude what is in it as a part, just as added to *Peter* it does not exclude *the foot of Peter*: therefore since the Son is in the Father with greater identity than the foot is in Peter, added to *the Father* it does not exclude *the Son*.

**On the contrary:**

1. Neither the Father alone nor the Son alone nor the Holy Spirit alone is God: therefore it is not truly added in respect of a common term.

2. Likewise, every proposition in which the predicate is more common than the subject, with an exclusion added to the subject, is false, because no such [predicate] precisely belongs to the subject; but such is this and similar [propositions]: *the Father alone is God*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, an exclusive word added to something excludes everything that posits association with the term; and this is plain, because it deprives [it] of association; but the Son posits association with the Father: hence *the Father with the Son* is *the Father with another*.

4. Likewise, an exclusive word excludes everything else, and most of all the opposite; but relatives are one differentia of opposition; therefore added to one relative it excludes the other: therefore added to *the Father* it excludes *the Son*; and if so, all such [propositions] are false.

### CONCLUSION.

> An exclusive word added to a personal term in respect of a common predicate can then be admitted, if it removes the form of the subject from others; but not if it removes the form of the predicate.

**I respond:** It must be said that here there is a twofold position. For some without qualification and without distinction concede these and similar [propositions]: *the Father alone is God*; and their position is that an exclusive word added to one of relatives does not exclude the other. And the reason for this position is that it does not exclude what follows upon the term and is understood in the term, just as added to *man* it does not exclude *animal*. But one of relatives is understood in the other and follows upon the other: therefore added to one it does not exclude the other. And if it be objected that *solus* excludes the opposite, they say that relatives both are differentiae of opposition and of being: of opposition, insofar as [referred] to the same; and

so added to one it excludes the other; whence it follows: *this one is only Father, therefore he is not Son*. Insofar as they are compared to diverse [things], they are differentiae of being; and so when one is posited, the other also is posited; and therefore one is not excluded by the other, because the exclusive word excludes only that other [thing] which does not necessarily accompany [it].

But this position does not seem fitting. For the exclusive word deprives [a term] of association: therefore it excludes everything that posits with respect to the association itself; and therefore added to *the Father* it excludes *the Son*.

And on account of this there is another opinion, that an exclusive word added to *the Father* excludes *the Son*; and this position is more probable. Proceeding according to this position, locutions of this sort must be distinguished, in the way Augustine distinguishes and the Master touches upon; because *solus* can effect an exclusion in respect of a composition understood concerning the subject, or in respect of the principal composition. If in the first way, then the sense is: *the Father alone is God*, that is, He who alone is the Father, is God; and then it removes the form of the subject term from others, not the form of the predicate; and under this sense all are true. And under this sense Augustine takes [it]: «The Holy Spirit alone is as great as the Father and the Son [together]».

But if it makes an exclusion in respect of the principal composition, the locution is false, and all are false, properly speaking, unless a determination is added so that the exclusion may be restricted, as is plain, when it is said: «Thou alone [art] Most High, Jesus Christ, with the Holy Spirit». Likewise: «To God the Father be glory and to His only Son» etc.

1. And so the first is plain.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that *the Father alone* is equivalent to this: *no one except the Father*; it must be said that it is false; because *nemo* (no one) is distributed for nature, not for person; but *solus* is added to a personal term, therefore it excludes a person; therefore properly speaking, this is false: *the Father alone knows the Son*, although this is true: *no one knows the Son except the Father*, because the sense is: *no one*, that is, no nature, except the one who is of the same nature, as the Father.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that an exclusive word excludes another; it must be said that it excludes everything else (*aliud*) or another (*alium*) which is neither predicated nor made subject, but is associated, whether it be other in form or in supposit. And since the Father is associated with the Son in respect of a substantial predicate, therefore in respect of that one they exclude one another; and because a part is not associated, therefore it is not excluded. Hence greater or lesser identity does nothing toward exclusion, but [only] the ground of associating or not associating. And if it be objected, that added to a defined term it does not exclude the definition, and to an antecedent it does not exclude the consequent; briefly it must be said that if the consequent so follows that it does not posit association, and the definition does not enclose in itself something diverse, then it does not exclude. But if it is otherwise, then it does exclude, and contradictorily opposed [propositions] are implied in the antecedent: whence here a contradiction is implied: *only the Father is*. With this position Augustine agrees, who denies this: *the Father alone is God*, and similar [propositions].

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