Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/22/q/bon-sent-I-d22-a1-q4
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### QUESTION IV. *Whether all names said of God are said according to substance.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether all names said of God are said according to substance. And that they are not, but rather otherwise, is shown:

1. By the authority of Augustine in the fifth [book] *On the Trinity*: «Let us hold this especially, that whatever is said of that most excellent and divine sublimity *with respect to itself* (*ad se*) is said substantially: but what is said *in relation to something* (*ad aliquid*) [is said] not substantially, but relatively»; but *Father* and *Son* are said in relation to something: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*: «God is great without quantity, good without quality, but is not related without relation»: therefore relation truly and properly remains in God, therefore also the mode of being said relatively.

3. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason, since in the divinity there are certain incommunicable names, as is clear in all the personal [names]; but substance is communicable, since it is one in three: therefore such names do not indicate substance: therefore in the divine [things] there is another mode of being said than according to substance.

4. Likewise, in the divine [things] there is a being-disposed in one way and another, since the Son stands toward the Father otherwise than the Holy Spirit; but there is not another and another being or subsisting: therefore since this happens to be understood and the understood thing said, it is necessary that there be another mode of being said and of being understood than according to substance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Everything that is said is said either according to substance or according to accident, since substance and accident sufficiently divide being; but in the divine [things] nothing is said according to accident: therefore [it is said] according to substance.

2. Likewise, everything that is said is said either *per se* (through itself), or not *per se*. If *per se*, then according to substance; if not *per se*, then therefore through another and in another; but all things which are said of God are said *per se*: therefore all are said according to substance.

3. Likewise, to be said according to substance and according to relation either expresses a diversity on the side of the thing, or on the side of the mode of understanding or the mode of being said. If on the side of the thing: then in God there is diversity and composition; if on the side of the mode of being said: then since the mode of being said is diverse in this, that he is *good*, and in this, that he is *great*, and in this, that he is *God* — for if it be asked, *how great* is God? the response is *great*, the response is not *good*; similarly if it be asked, *what kind* is God? the response is *good*, not *great* — therefore there would not only be two modes, but also many more than two.

4. Likewise, that which is given in answer to a question framed by *what* (*per quid*) is said according to substance both as to the thing and as to the mode; but relative names are given in answer to a question framed by *what* concerning God: therefore they are said according to substance. Proof of the minor: Augustine in the book *On Christian Doctrine*: *If it be asked, what is God, the fitting response is: Father and Son and Holy Spirit*.

5. Likewise, since there are certain things in the divine [order] which

are not said according to substance nor according to relation, as this name *incarnate*, this name *unbegotten*, it seems that this division does not embrace all the divine names.

> **Conclusion.** *Not all names are said of God according to substance, but some also by mode of quantity or quality, and moreover some according to relation.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that to be said diversely (*dici diversimode*) [occurs] according to a threefold difference.

In one way, to be said diversely is considered according to a diverse mode of being, which is *per se* and *per accidens* (through itself and through accident); and in this mode there is no being-said-diversely in the divine [things], since this diversity of mode posits an essential diversity in the thing said; and as to this there is in God only one mode of being said. For all things which are said of God are God himself and his substance.

In another way, to be said diversely is according to a diverse mode of understanding, which is considered according to one and another account or means of knowing; and so there is not only being-said-diversely among the divine names, but rather in every way, since God is known not only through diverse [things], but through all the genera of things; and so among the names said of God, some are said by mode of substance, as *God*; some by mode of quantity, as *great*; some by mode of quality, as *good*; and so of all the others.

In the third way, to be said diversely is according to a diverse mode of being-disposed; which indeed is considered as regards the absolute and the compared or related; and this mode of diversity is *less* than the first, and *greater* than the second. Less than the first, because according to the first an essential diversity and composition is considered; greater than the second, because according to that [second] no distinction at all is considered in the thing. But according to this [third] mode unity and plurality are considered in him: unity according to the absolute, plurality according to relation. And as to this mode there are only two modes of being said, namely according to substance, as those things which are said *with respect to itself* (*ad se*), and according to relation, as those things which are said *in relation to something* (*ad aliquid*). But because these do not bespeak another mode of being, therefore these are predicated of those and are one; and because they bespeak another mode of being-disposed, therefore according to the former [there is] unity, according to the latter plurality. From these [points] the objections are clear.

1. For as to what is objected, that everything which is said is said according to substance or according to accident; it must be said that in the divine [things] it has an instance [against it], where relation is not an accident, nor yet is said according to substance.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that everything which is said in the divine [things] is being *per se*; it must be said that this is true, but yet it does not follow: it is said as being *per se*, therefore according to substance, since "name to be said according to substance" is not used in the sense in which substance is said *per se*, but as it is said *with respect to itself* (*ad se*).

3. To that which is objected, of what kind this diversity is — whether according to the thing, or according to the mode of understanding; it must be said that [it is] according to the mode of being-disposed (*se habendi*), which is not only in our intellect, but also in the thing.

4. To that which is objected fourthly, that relative names are given in answer to an interrogation framed concerning substance; it must be said that *substance* is said in two ways: either as *being per se*, or as *ad se*. If as *being per se*, then all [names], both relatives and absolutes, bespeak substance in God; and because in this mode substance is given in answer to a question framed by *what*, therefore all [names] can be given in answer. But if substance be said as *being absolute, not compared*, then that is said according to substance which is said *with respect to itself*. And it is not in this [sense]

that Augustine takes [it]; and so *Father* and *Son*, and the relative names, are not said according to substance.

5. To that which is objected lastly, that many [things] are said of God which are said neither according to substance nor according to relation; it must be said that to be said relatively in the divine [things] can be in two ways. For some names are said relatively *from the principal understanding of the name*, some *from a consequent [understanding]*.

And the first difference is divided into three: for some [names] signify relation and are said relatively, as *Father*; some signify relation [as such], as *paternity*, which is not said in relation to another, but is itself that by which the other is referred; some are said relatively because they take away (*privant*) relation, as *unbegotten*, *improcessible*; yet this is not pure privation, as will be seen below.

But those which import relation *from a consequent understanding* likewise are according to a threefold difference. For some are said to be said relatively, because they are put in place of relatives, as when it is said: *God begets God*, that is, *the Father [begets] the Son*. Some are said relatively, because they enclose relation inwardly in their signified [meaning], as when it is said *incarnate* — for the sense is, that is, *united to flesh*; for union bespeaks a relation, which regards the singular person — or *to assume flesh* and the like. Some are said relatively, because they enclose relation in their *supposita*, as *like* and *equal*; for they are not like, except those which are referred and distinguished.