Dist. 22, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/22/q/bon-sent-I-d22-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what he says: *To these are to be added certain names also* etc., because either the divisions of Augustine and Ambrose are sufficient, or not. If [they are] so, then the Master superfluously adds [more]; if they are said to be insufficient, [this] is to be held as unfitting.

**I respond:** It must be said that neither the division of Augustine nor of Ambrose is deficient, nor is the Master's addition superfluous, since the members of the Master's division are included in the members of Ambrose's division. For that [division of Ambrose] is by way of immediate [members]; for since it is three-membered, it is reduced to these divisions: for every name of God either is proper, or transferred; if proper, either it pertains to substance, or to persons. But the Master specifies these members further, because some name can pertain to the unity of substance from eternity, or in time; likewise to the persons from eternity, or in time; and to the persons in two ways: either dividedly, as this name *Father*, or together and conjointly, as this name *Trinity*; and so there are six members.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Trinity is as it were a collective [noun]*. For he seems to speak ill, because «a collective unity, as Bernard says, is the least unity; but the unity of the Trinity holds the citadel among all unities»: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that this name *Trinity* falls short in two [respects] of a properly collective noun. First, because the things which a collective noun gathers have diversity simply; and second, because they have unity in a certain respect; but the contrary is the case in the name of the Trinity. Yet in this there is a likeness, because just as a collective noun says many at once and is predicated of none per se, so neither is this name *Trinity* predicated of any of the persons, and yet it imports them all together; and therefore the Master does not say that it is collective simply, but *as it were* (*quasi*).

### Five Rules on the Divine Names.

*It must be known therefore that those things which* properly etc. On this it is to be noted that from the words of Augustine, which are placed here and in the book *On the Trinity*, five rules concerning the divine names are drawn forth. The first is this: every name which is said of God is said according to substance or according to relation, except this name *man*. The second is this: every name which is said of the three persons, in such a way that [it is said] of each one singly, is said according to substance, with the exception of partitive names. The third is this: every name said according to substance is predicated of the three persons taken together in the singular, except this name *person*. The fourth is this: every name said of God in relation to a creature signifies the essence, except those which pertain to the union. The fifth is this: every name which is said of God in time and is not said of the persons singly, predicates a notion or as it were [a notion]; this is said on account of this name *sent*, which says a being-from-another.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent*; for since we say *three powerful [ones]*, it seems that by parity of reasoning we can say *three omnipotents*.

**I respond:** It must be said that the verb always signifies adjectivally and in adjacency, and therefore always draws its number from the supposit; likewise the participle, while remaining a participle, because it has the nature of the verb. But the noun, because it signifies in rest, is sometimes substantivized, and when it is enumerated, then it is enumerated as a substantive noun on the side of its form. And therefore, because *powerful* (*potens*) can be a participle, *omnipotent* (*omnipotens*) is a noun only: hence one does not so receive *three omnipotents* as *three powerful*, unless *omnipotens* be an adjective or held adjectivally. But the reason why *omnipotens* cannot be a participle is on account of composition, which the verb does not admit. For the participle, as the Grammarian says, passes into a noun in four ways: namely by composition, as *unlearned* (*indoctus*); by comparison, as *more learned* (*doctior*); by construction, as *loving him* (*amans illius*); by loss of tense, as *to-be-loved* (*amandus*), insofar as it signifies the same or sounds the same as *worthy to be loved* (*amari dignus*).

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this argument of Augustine: *If he is great by participation, then greatness is greater than he himself*, and there is set down: *God is not great by that greatness* etc. And it seems this argument does not hold. For it does not hold [thus]: this [thing] is white by whiteness through participation: therefore whiteness is whiter or greater than it [the thing].

**I respond:** It must be said that the argument of Augustine is good and is founded upon the very explication of the name, because *to participate* is *to take a part*, and if it takes a part, then it is less than the whole. To what therefore is objected concerning whiteness, it must be said that *being greater* is [taken] in two ways: either as to being, or as to power.

It must be said therefore that the participation of a subject is regarded with respect to a universal form; and although it [the form] is wholly in the subject as to being, yet not as to power, because it can be in others; but to God nothing can be greater either as to being or as to power. And therefore the argument of Augustine holds well, [namely] that God can participate in nothing.

Otherwise it can be said that the argument of Augustine holds well in those forms which are by nature [apt] to denominate something through essence; and in such [forms], that which is by participation is reduced to that which is through essence; and whenever it is so, that which is being through essence excels that which has being through participation. If therefore greatness is great through essence, and God [is great] by participation, it necessarily follows that greatness is greater than God. It is not so concerning whiteness, because it is not [by nature apt] to denominate itself nor to be predicated of anything through essence, denominating it.

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