Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/23/q/bon-sent-I-d23-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I. *On the transferring of the names "person," "substance," "essence" to the divine.*

### Question I. *Whether the name "person" is conveniently transferred to the divine.*

First, then, it is asked whether the name "person" ought there to be transferred to the divine. That, however, the name "person" ought not to be said in divine matters is shown thus:

1. Augustine in the fifth [book] *On the Trinity*, and it is had in the contrary [position] in the *littera*: «It was said: three persons, not in order that this might be said, but lest it be passed over in silence»: therefore it seems that "person" is said in divine matters only for the sake of fleeing heretics, and not according to truth and propriety.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, since "person" names a particular, and not just any [particular], but [one] of rational nature; but from whatever the higher [genus] is removed, the lower also [is removed]: therefore, since in divine matters there is no saying of a particular, likewise there will be no saying of "person" either.

3. Likewise, the particular of rational creature is the most composite among all created things. For it is composed of bodily and spiritual substance, and again the bodily seems to have a greater composition than all [others]: therefore, since "person" is the name of a particular, and that of one supremely composite, and in divine matters there is supreme simplicity, it is plain that in divine matters the name "person" ought not to be said.

4. Likewise, our terms ought to correspond to the Greek [terms], so that the unity of faith may be shown; but the Greeks do not use the term *prosopon* in divine matters, which is the same as *persona*: therefore, since they themselves have terms more proper than we, we also ought not to use [it].

**On the contrary:**

1. "Person" is said as if *per se sonans* ("sounding through itself"), or *per se unum* ("one through itself"); but *per se unum* is most properly received in God: therefore "person" too, according to its name.

2. Likewise, "person" is said [to be] one having its intellectual nature distinct from others; but in God [there is] to be posited [one] having an intellectual nature and distinct from others, as has been shown above concerning the plurality of persons: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, "person" names to me the ultimate in the genus of rational nature; but rational or intellectual nature is the more noble among created things, and again, the ultimate in it is the most complete, since to it no addition can be made: therefore, if whatever is of completion is to be posited in God most properly, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, "person" expresses dignity. Whence in ecclesiastical matters those having some notable dignity are called persons: therefore, since dignity is most properly in God, the name "person" is most properly to be posited in God.

> **Conclusion.** *The name "person" is said conveniently and properly in divine matters to signify the distinction and the most noble property of the supposits.*

**I respond:** It must be said that "person," from its own account, expresses a supposit distinct by a property pertaining to dignity. And this is plain in its etymology, and in its equivalent.

In its etymology, since "person" is said as if *per se unum* ("one through itself"). Now *per se unum* is properly called one which is altogether distinct from others and undivided in itself. Again, "person" is said from *personando* ("sounding through"), as if "resounding from itself"; and "to resound" is said of that which in sound stands out above others; and therefore "person" is called a distinct supposit having dignity, and by reason of this dignity, although by the nature of the word it ought to be said *pérsona*, with the penult shortened, it is said *persóna*, with the penult lengthened.

Likewise the account of this signification is taken from the equivalent in the Greek tongue, which is *prosopon*. Among the Greeks *prosopon* meant, as Boethius narrates, a masked man, [a thing] which used to be made in tragedies: and this was done on account of two [reasons]: one reason was for distinctly representing him about whom the speech was being made; the other reason was for better resounding or sounding through. And these two correspond to the said two properties: and therefore from this name *prosopon* among the Greeks was drawn this name *persona* among the Latins. And because in ecclesiastical matters the distinction of dignities is especially attended to, it was first drawn to signify honor in ecclesiastical [persons]. Then, since the individual of rational nature is distinct from others, and this by a property of dignity among creatures, hence it is that it was extended to signify the supposit of rational nature. Finally, since in God there is to be found a supposit distinct by a most noble property, with the Holy Spirit dictating, it was transferred to the divine, because there the reality of the name is most properly found, although the name itself was first imposed on others. It is to be conceded therefore, that in divine matters the name "person" is properly and conveniently received.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that *it was said, not in order that it might be said*; it must be said that Augustine speaks for that time in which the name "person" according to usage was equivalent to "substance"; and therefore it was said, *not in order that it might be said* [in the way that] "person" had been accustomed to signify, but it was said as if transferred, *lest it be passed over in silence*, that is, lest the confession of the faith should be proved to be diminished.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that "person" names a particular: it must be said that "particular," from the account of its name, imports a part and imperfection; but "person," from the account of its name, imports completion; therefore it is posited in divine matters, although not "particular"; and rightly, because in divine matters the name of a species is properly said, and the name of a genus improperly.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that "person" names what is most composite; it must be said that this happens because the individual of created rational nature is in a genus and therefore is distant by many differences, since it is distinguished by quality; but in divine matters the distinction is by origin alone, and besides [God] is not in a genus; and therefore it is not necessary that there should there be an aggregation of differences.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that among the Greeks they do not use the equivalent, namely *prosopon*; it must be said that the reason for using [it] among the Latins was not so much propriety as poverty, since they did not have what they might respond. And the reason for this was that "substance" according to common usage sounds the same as "essence"; the Greeks, however, had their own term, namely *hypostasis*, which they use: and therefore they were not compelled to transfer [it], as we [were].