Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/23/q/bon-sent-I-d23-a1-q3
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### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether the name "essence" is fittingly used in divine matters; and there is also asked the difference of the names essence, subsistence, substance, and person.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the name *essence* may [or: ought to] be said in divine matters. And that [it] so [should be], it seems:

1. Augustine, in book seven *On the Trinity*: «*Essence* is truly and properly said in divine matters, so much so that perhaps God alone ought to be called *essence*».

2. Likewise, this name *who is* (*qui est*) is the name which God himself imposed upon himself; therefore if he properly so names himself, God is properly called *who is*; but of whatever *who is* is properly said, *essence* can properly be said in him: therefore *essence* too is said in divine matters.

3. Likewise, among all names the name *essence* is the most absolute; whence essence according to Avicenna is called *the quiddity of a thing under an absolute name*; since therefore in divine matters there is every-way absoluteness: therefore [there is] also the name *essence*.

**On the contrary:** 1. We do not understand God except in creatures and through creatures; but the naming of God is through our understanding: therefore no absolute name at all ought to be put in God.

2. Likewise, I ask: in what do the name *substance* and *essence* differ? For *substance* signifies either the common, or the supposit. If the supposit: then the name *person* is superfluous; if the common: then the name *essence* is superfluous: therefore, since we ought to circumcise our lips in speaking of God, this name ought by no means to be put in God.

3. Likewise, by reason of this it is asked concerning the necessity, sufficiency, and difference of these four names: *essence*, *subsistence*, *substance*, and *person*.

> **Conclusion.** *The name "essence" is fittingly used in divine matters; the rationale and sufficiency of the four names are explained.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that these four names or terms in their genus correspond to four terms in Greek, which are: *usia*, *usiosis*, *hypostasis*, and *prosopon* — so that *usia* corresponds to *essentia*, *usiosis* to *substantia*, *hypostasis* to *subsistentia*, and *prosopon* to *persona*.

Now the rationale and sufficiency of these four names is taken by some thus. In divine matters there is to be taken *the communicable* and *the incommunicable*, and this from the truth and necessity of the faith, which says God [is] threefold and one.

And since we ought to understand in God what truly is, through that which we see in these lower [things], chiefly according to the noble, primary, and principal conditions; since in the common in the lower [things] there is found *that which is* (*quod est*) and *who is* (*qui est*), by reason of which it is signified in concretion and in abstraction — so that one says *man* (*homo*) and *humanity* (*humanitas*) — so in divine matters we understand [the same], although we do not understand those two as in [actual] difference. Therefore also we signify in abstraction by this name *deity* (*deitas*), and in concretion by this name *God* (*Deus*). And therefore we have imposed on him a name by which the *that-by-which-it-is* itself (*ipsum quo est*) might be signified, and this is *essence*; and the *that-which-is* itself (*ipsum quod est*), and this is *substance*; and so these two names are taken on the side of the common.

There is also to be taken in divine matters that which is *incommunicable*, and this is a *distinct what* (*quid distinctum*) or a *distinct who* (*quis distinctus*). And this indeed it happens to be understood or signified in two ways: either insofar as *distinguishable*, and this through the name *subsistence* or *hypostasis*; or insofar as *distinct*, and this through the name *person*. And although in God the *distinguishable* and the *distinct* in no way differ — because in him potency is always conjoined to act — nevertheless it happens [that they are] signified by a twofold name.

Whence these four names differ according to the mode of understanding, like *that-by-which-it-is*, *that-which-is*, *who is*, *which one is* (*quo est*, *quod est*, *qui est*, *quis est*). And since in God the *quo est* and *quod est* on the one side, and the *distinguishable* and *distinct* on the other, are the same in reality, the Saints take both *substance* and *essence* for the same; likewise the Greeks too use the name *hypostasis* for an actually distinct supposit. Whence the distinction by *quo* and *quod est*, and by *distinguishable* and *distinct*, in the divine names does not make a diversity except according to the rationale of understanding.

There were also others who would say that *substance* and *essence* are taken on the side of the common, but differently, because that common can be understood under a twofold rationale: one is, that all things stand in need of it, in order to be; another is, that itself stands not in need of others. In the first way it is called *essence*, from which and through which all things are; in the second way *substance*, since it stands through itself, with all others set aside. *Subsistence*, however — or *hypostasis* — and *person* are taken on the side of the incommunicable and they differ. For although each name says *a distinct what*, nevertheless *hypostasis* signifies *the distinct supposit of substance*, but *person* signifies the distinct [supposit] *by a noble property*.

There were others who would say that these four names are distinguished through *communicable* and *incommunicable*, according as each can be twofold signified: either in abstraction, or in concretion. For the *communicable* can be signified in abstraction, and so it is called *essence*; or in concretion to a supposit, and so it is called *substance*. Likewise the *incommunicable* can be signified in abstraction, and so it is called *subsistence* or *hypostasis*; or in concretion, and so it is called *person*.

But yet all these modes have a fault [*habent calumniam* — i.e. are open to objection]. *The first*, indeed, which is taken by way of *distinguishable* and *distinct*, [has a fault] because the Greeks use the term *hypostasis* where we use *person*, and so for a distinct supposit. And John Damascene says that «*hypostasis* is *substance* with *properties*»; and so it signifies an actually distinct [thing]. *The second mode* likewise has a fault, because *essence* does not seem in any way to be signified as in the rationale of a cause with respect to others, since it is the most absolute name. *The third mode* has a fault similarly, because *substance* signifies in abstraction, just as *essence*; and besides, it is doubtful whether it is [possible] to understand *hypostases* with the properties abstracted; and therefore if it is not [possible] to understand [them so], how does it happen that one signifies [them]?

And therefore *the fourth mode of speaking* is that, since the faith says God to be threefold and one, insofar as it says *one*, we cannot understand *one* without understanding *that which is* (*quod est*) and *that by which it is one* (*quo est unum*); and *the by-which it is one* is that *quo est*, and *that which is one* is that *quod est*. The first is *essence*, the second *substance*. If we understand *threefold*, it is necessary that we understand *him who is distinguished* and *that by which he is distinguished*. *That by which he is distinguished* is the property; but he *who is distinguished* is always signified as distinct. And this can be in two ways: either as distinct by any property whatever, or as distinct by a noble or notable property. The first is signified by the name *subsistence*, which is called *first substance*, and belongs not only to the individual of [the species] man, but also of [the species] ass. The second is signified by this name *person*, which imports a noble property and belongs only to a supposit of a rational creature. Because the Greeks use the name *hypostasis* as we [use] the name *person*, therefore Boethius says that the Greeks use the name *hypostasis* for a supposit of rational nature. With these things seen, the objections are clear.

**To 1.** As for what is objected, that we ought not to name God absolutely; it must be said that, although we name God through creatures, yet through creatures also we know that he has absolute being. The others are clear.