Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/23/q/bon-sent-I-d23-a2-q2
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### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether several essences can be numbered in the divine.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the numeration of that name *essence*. And that it is not numbered, is shown thus:

1. Because in divine matters there is a most absolute unity, which is not multiplied: therefore since no name is so absolute as the name *essence*, therefore by it is signified an unmultiplied unity: therefore the name *essence* is not numbered; and this is what Augustine says, that reason is repugnant [to it].

2. Likewise, this same [point] is seen from the lesser case. For this name *God* is a name of essence in comparison to person; but according to Scripture in the Law, namely Deuteronomy 6, God is called one and not several; and according to the [Athanasian] Creed: «Not three gods, but one is God»: therefore this name *essence* also is much less pluralised, since it is said more absolutely.

3. Likewise, the divine nature is not multiplied in the three; but this name *essence* is a name of the divine nature, just as this name *substance*: therefore neither *essence* nor *substance* are multiplied under their proper names, as it seems.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII: «Why are these three not called one person», and he is speaking of three persons: but the neuter gender refers to the essence: therefore since they are called *three* [in the neuter], therefore [there are] three essences.

2. Likewise, by reason it is seen: Augustine in the same book says that «the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are called three persons, because what is *person* is common to them»; but this name *essence* is common: therefore it can be said [that there are] three essences.

3. Likewise, in the same place he says, and it is held in the text [of the Master], that «they are therefore called three persons, because the Father is person, and the Son [is] person and the Holy Spirit [is] person». Therefore in like manner there are three essences, since the Father is essence etc.

4. Likewise, the Father and the Son are several beings (*entes*), therefore several having entity — for it follows: they are several gods, therefore several deities — likewise: the Father and the Son *are*: therefore [there are] several to-be's, therefore several essences.

> **Conclusion.** *Essence is not numbered in the divine, since one and the same nature, [being] not numbered, is in the three persons.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in every substance, whose [property] it is to be and to operate, we necessarily understand the nature and the having-of-nature. Since therefore this is the case in God, we understand in God a nature and one having a nature. And we call the nature *substance* or *essence*; the one having the nature we call *person*. Since therefore in the rational creature it happens that one person has several natures, namely a corporeal and a spiritual: so by contrary sense in God, on account of [his] supreme simplicity, it happens that one nature is had by several, since it happens to be had in one and another mode; and this cannot be from the same [supposit].

Since therefore there is only one nature [that is] had and not numbered, therefore only one substance and essence is spoken of; but since [there are] several having [the nature], therefore [there are] several persons, with no incompatibility at all existing.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning *essence* through what Augustine says: *These three*; it must be said that he is speaking less expressly and improperly; and therefore his word is to be interpreted.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that [there are] therefore three persons, because *person* is common, and each one is a person etc.; it must be said that he is not stating the whole reason, but [only] a part as regards the outward word; therefore one must understand that it is added there: because what is common is what is distinguished. Whence the Father is person and the Son is person, not the same [person], but another.

4. To the last [argument] which is objected, it must be said that *being* (*ens*) is sometimes said substantively, and so it does not draw number from elsewhere; sometimes it is taken adjectivally, and so it draws number from the supposit, and so the form is not numbered; and in this mode it does not follow that there are several entities, nor [from] this verb *they are*, that [there are] several to-be's.