Dist. 23, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/23/q/bon-sent-I-d23-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what he says: *One usia, three hypostases*. For this seems to be against what Jerome says: «Let us be silent about three hypostases; it is not a name of good repute»: therefore it ought not to be said. — Moreover, it seems that the name *hypostasis* in no way ought to be received, nor the name *usia*, because Boethius says on the book *of the Categories* that *hypostasis* is matter, *usiosis* form, *usia* the composite; but in divine [things] neither matter nor composite is received: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that Jerome does not say that it ought not to be said that there are three hypostases, because [that] would be false or erroneous, but because the name was unaccustomed and seemed to sound the same as *substance*; and *substance* according to the common acceptation is not said in the plural of the persons: and therefore he then wished it to be silenced, lest the heretics receive an occasion of speaking maliciously. But now that name has been specified and made express; therefore it is now conceded.

To that which is objected in the second [place], it must be said that names of this kind are taken otherwise in philosophy, otherwise in theology; and this is clear from Boethius himself, who takes [them] otherwise speaking as a philosopher, and otherwise speaking as a theologian in the book *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *God is more truly [so] than he is thought*. For he seems to say something false, because every faithful person thinks that God is three and one, and nothing is truer than this: therefore he is not more truly [so] than he is thought. Likewise it seems false what he says, that he is more truly thought than he is spoken; for we say many [things] which we do not understand: therefore the truth of speech extends itself further than that of inner thought. Likewise, I say that God is supremely true; but nothing can be thought truer than this nor be greater than the supremely true: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the discourse of Augustine is twofold. For there can be a comparison of being to truth itself[?], because one and the same is God, who is, is thought, and is spoken, and equally true.

Again, a comparison can be made to the act of being and of thinking and of speaking; and thus the discourse of Augustine has [its] truth: since God in his being has the highest truth; but our thought, since it is created and exemplated from the highest truth, cannot be supremely true; likewise neither speech, and therefore it has less of truth. — And again, since the interior act of thinking is more assimilated to the supremely true than the exterior act of speaking, thought has more of truth than speech, because it is more similar to God. But the arguments to the opposite proceed according to the first way.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says, that it was permitted by the necessity of speaking and disputing to *say* three persons, because Scripture does not contradict [it]; but likewise, if they be said not to be three persons, Scripture does not contradict [that either]: therefore it is permitted to say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three persons; but it is not permitted to say [anything] except what is true: therefore the opposite of this is false.

**I respond:** It must be said that this was not the whole reason for what was said, but Augustine keeps silent a part of the cause. For the reason was, as he himself discloses in what follows, that reason was in agreement, and Scripture did not contradict. For even if Scripture were to contradict, however much reason might dictate, it would not be [right] to be said. And on this account it was not permitted to say three essences, because reason was not in agreement. Why, however, reason is more in agreement in this name *person* than in this name *essence* is clear, if the signified of each is attended to. From the words, therefore, of Augustine which the Master sets down, [it is clear] why it was said by the Church [that there are] three persons, [and] it is clear that the reason was threefold. The first was that necessity pressed; the second, that reason was in agreement; the third, that Scripture in no way contradicted, nay rather was even in agreement. Whence he says less and understands more, when he says that Scripture does not contradict.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is objected against [the saying] that there is no diversity at all there, as neither singularity; because if this is true, then there is every identity there: therefore [identity] of natures and of persons.

**I respond:** It must be said that emphasis must be put on the word. For diversity is regarded as to essential or substantial principles. Since therefore in the divine [things] as to substantials no difference falls; therefore he says that there is no diversity; [but] therefore it does not follow that there is altogether all-encompassing [identity], nor is [it the case that] identity [is so simply], unless a determination be added, namely as to essentials; and so that [saying] is clear.

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