Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/24/q/bon-sent-I-d24-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I. *On the numeral and partitive term "one."*

### Question I. *Whether this name "one" is said positively or privatively in divine matters.*

That [it is said] privatively, however, is shown:

1. By its account. For the Philosopher says that *one is that which is not divided*; but this account is given through privation: therefore "one" is said privatively.

2. Likewise, the Commentator says on the *Metaphysics* that *"one" and "many" are opposed as privation and habit*, since "one" expresses privation, "many" expresses habit; and if this is true, "one" is said privatively not only in God but also in all things.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, since "one" is opposed to that which is "many": either then contradictorily, or contrarily, or privatively, or relatively. Not contradictorily; this is plain. Again, neither relatively, since relatives are simultaneous, and one depends on the other mutually; but "one" does not depend on "many." Not contrarily, since one of contraries is not the principle of the other: but "one" is the principle of many: therefore by the topic from division it is opposed privatively. But it is established that "many" expresses position: therefore "one" expresses nothing but privation.

4. Likewise, that in God it is said privatively in a special way is plain, since "one," insofar as it is said positively, is the principle of multitude and quantity: but in God there is no quantity: therefore neither is "one" said positively.

5. Likewise, this same thing is plain, since, if God is positively one and a stone is one, therefore God and a stone are two: therefore God and a creature constitute a number, and if so, God is part of a number, which has been disproved above. If you say that this does not follow, since "one" is not said univocally; this is nothing, as it seems; for if it posits something — since this could also belong to a creature, at least analogically, and numbering be reckoned according to analogy, as when one says: humanity and whiteness are two essences — therefore this does not solve [the difficulty].

**On the contrary:**

1. From the same source a thing has being and being-one, since the form, which gives being, gives distinct being; if therefore "being" is not said privatively but positively, by parity of reason neither is "one" said privatively of anything.

2. Likewise, what sounds in the direction of completion sounds in the direction of habit, not of privation; but "one" sounds in the direction of completion, since the more perfect a thing is, the more it approaches unity: therefore "one" is not said privatively.

3. Likewise, if "one" is privative, it is established that it is so only of multitude. But on the contrary: no privation precedes habit naturally; but "one" naturally precedes "many": therefore "one" is not a privation.

4. Likewise, no privation constitutes its own habit nor is preserved in it; but "one" is preserved in many [things] and constitutes them: therefore it is not opposed as a privation: therefore it is not received privatively.

> **Conclusion.** *"One" in God is said only positively, and not privatively; in creatures, however, sometimes positively, sometimes privatively even according to the thing itself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the opinion of certain ones, and of the Master principally, was that whatever may be the case about this name *one* in creatures, in God it is not said positively but privatively, as he says in the *littera* and takes up an authority from Hilary; although Hilary does not say it expressly, except that the use of these names in [reference to] God is found rather for the sake of denying [something] than of positing something. And his reason was that "one," said positively, is the principle of quantity and of number; but God does not have quantity in himself, nor is he in himself numerable, nor numerable along with another.

But although this position seems probable, nevertheless it is not commonly held. And the reason for this is that, since "one" is much more completely in God than in creatures, much more strongly is it there said positively. And again, since every unity is reduced to the first unity, and there is no reduction of habit to privation, it is necessary that "one" in God posit something.

And therefore it must be said that one [way] is to speak of this name *one* in creatures with respect to the thing understood, [another] with respect to the account by which [it is] understood. If we speak with respect to the account by which [it is] understood, thus I say that it is said privatively; whence its account is also assigned through privation of division or multitude. And this is because "one" is first, and first things cannot be understood by us nor made known except through posterior things; and hence it is that it is said privatively. Whence unity in substance, or quantity, or quality, since it has something prior through which it can be understood, is said positively, as identity, equality, likeness, and their opposites privatively.

If, however, we speak with respect to the thing understood, then "one" has a relation to matter, and has a relation to form. By reason of the relation to matter, it is in itself undivided, yet it is potentially divisible; and since material potency stands by way of privation, so likewise does "one." By reason of the relation to form, which gives distinct and limited being, thus it expresses position. Since therefore in God "one" is wholly according to form, [whereas] in creatures it is considered both according to form and according to matter, hence it is that in God it is taken only positively, [but] in creatures sometimes positively, sometimes privatively even according to the thing itself.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected first, that it is defined or made known privatively; the response is plain, since according to the account of its name, in that it is first, it must be made known thus.

*To 2.* To that which is objected secondly, that it is opposed as a privation; it must be said that "one" by relation to matter is taken privatively, and so the Commentator takes it; by relation to *form*, it is taken contrarily, according as multitude is taken formally; by relation to the consequent act, which is to measure, it is taken relatively and according to the genus of relatives in which one [member] does not depend on the other, as is plain in knowledge and the knowable; and so the various opinions on this are true.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that in God there is no principle of numbering etc.; it must be said that "one" expresses privation of multitude according to the general account of the name; but that privation, although in name it is a privation, nevertheless really is a position; since the more there is privation of division in something, the more complete and perfect that thing is. Since therefore in God there is the most perfect unity, there it is taken according to every-way privation of multitude. In this way, however, that is called "one" which does not have in itself multitude in act, nor is it in potency to multitude, neither through division nor through aggregation. Now this "one" is most perfect and supreme and infinite, and that is not in potency to number, and this is not numerable along with another; and in this way it is in God alone. And so it is plain that God is called "one" positively, and how his unity differs from [that of] a creature.

*To 4.* What then is objected, that "one" is the principle of multitude; it must be said that this is true in created unity, but is not true in perfect and uncreated unity — I mean a principle *within*, as a part.

*To 5.* Hence if it be said: God and a creature are two, either this is said improperly, and "two" falls away from the account of number according to the thing itself; or if it expresses a number, this is only on the part of the one understanding; since, when [the intellect] understands diverse and distinct [things], it takes [them] under the account of number, just as, when our intellect understands, it concerns time.