Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/24/q/bon-sent-I-d24-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether "one" in divine matters is said according to substance or according to relation.*

Secondly it is asked whether *one* is said according to substance or according to relation. And that [it is said] according to substance is shown:

1. Since *« being and one are convertible »*, as the Philosopher and Boethius hold; but "being" is said according to substance: therefore "one" also.

2. Likewise, this is conceded: *« the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God »*; but if they are one God, since "God" does not diminish from the account of "one," therefore they are one. But nothing is said in summation of the three singularly, which is not said substantially: therefore etc. If you say that, when [the term] is taken adjectively, then it is not said substantially; on the contrary: the signification of the term is the same when it is taken adjectively and when it is taken substantively. Likewise, when it is substantivated in the neuter, it is said substantially; since therefore the signification of the term is the same in the masculine and in the neuter, [and] since there is a single imposition, therefore in the masculine it is said substantially. Furthermore, other names in the masculine are said substantially, as this name *eternal*; whence in the [Athanasian] Creed: *« not three eternals, but one eternal »*: therefore likewise [for] "one."

3. Likewise, when it is said: *« the Father is one »*, [the term] is taken either substantially or notionally. If substantially, I have what I propose; if notionally — but the Father has two notions: therefore he ought not be called "one," but "two."

4. Likewise, notion and property are the same: therefore since "property" is said to be *« that which belongs to one alone »*, no notion can be said of three. But this name *one* is predicated of any person whatsoever: therefore it does not express a notion.

**On the contrary:**

1. The rule was had above in distinction twenty-two: *« Everything which predicates substance or essence is said of the three singularly in summation »*; but this does not fit this name which is *one*: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, nothing pertaining to essence or substance is multiplied or pluralized; but this [term] *one* is pluralized, since the Father is one, and the Son is one, and they are two, since one and one: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, to be one and to be distinct are the same; but when I say: *the Father is distinct*, this [term] *distinct* is not said substantially: therefore neither this [term] *one*.

4. Likewise, with respect to whatever term it is [possible] to say *another* in divine matters, that term expresses a relation — whence it is not said *another God*, but with respect to that which is *one* it is [possible] to say *another*, for the Father is one, and the Son is another: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *Since in God there is unity both essential and personal, by which one person is distinguished from another, the term "one," if used adjectively, can signify either unity; but if [used] substantively, then "unitas" [unity, fem.] is attributed to personal unity, and "unum" [one, neut.] to essential.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the account of unity is the account of distinction with indivision, [and] since in divine matters we posit both [an] essence distinct from other essences by itself, and a person distinguished from others by a property, it is necessary in divine matters to posit both an essential and a personal unity. Since therefore the person is not other than the essence, the unity of the essence and of the person are not two unities according to the thing, but one, differing in account: therefore unity is not said equivocally of this and that, since neither is it specially imposed on this nor on that.

Since therefore the concrete takes a special signification from the abstract, this name *one* imports in divine matters [both] essential and personal unity. And when it is taken adjectively, it imports either indifferently; it is determined, however, by what is adjoined. When therefore it is added to an essential term, it imports the essential; when it is added to a notional, it imports the personal.

When, however, it is substantivated, then it is necessary that it be determined by itself. And therefore, since [the substantivated form] imports the neuter gender, [in] which it expresses [unity] under indistinction, in the neuter gender it is fittingly attributed or appropriated to essential unity. In the masculine, however, since it imports distinction and a determinate supposit, and expresses the account of one producing, it is appropriated to personal unity.

*To 1.* And therefore it is plain that thus it is not taken as "being" nor as convertible with it, but only in the neuter.

*To 2.* The second [point] also is plain, that there [in that argument] there is a fallacy of figure of speech from the commutation of this term *one*. For although the signification is not varied through substantivation nor through diversity of gender, the mode of suppositing can nevertheless be varied, especially if usage makes it so, and the account is fitting to usage.

To that, then, which is objected, that *eternal* is said essentially; the response is plain, since "eternity" is said only essentially, but "unity" [is said also] personally. — Some, however, say that this is [the case] in this name *unus* ["one," masc.], because it is a partitive name and has the article in itself.

*To 3.* To that which is objected: either it predicates a notion, etc.; it must be said that it does predicate a notion, but it must be noted that not just any [notion], but the personal [one], which makes [a person] to be one, and that [notion] is one in any person whatsoever.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that "notion" is said of [the] one; it must be said that [there is] signifying [a] notion under [its] proper account, as through this name *paternity*, and commonly, as through this name *relation*, *notion*, *unity* and *property*, which say the same [thing] under diverse accounts. For the sense is: *« the person is one »*, that is, undivided in herself by a single personal property and divided from others.