Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/24/q/bon-sent-I-d24-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II. *On the purely numeral names.*

Secondly, the principal inquiry concerns the second article, namely on the purely numeral names, such as *two* and *three* etc. And concerning this, two [questions] are likewise asked. First, it is asked whether they are said positively or privatively. Second, whether they are said according to substance or according to relation.

### Question I. *Whether the purely numeral names in God are said positively or privatively.*

And that they are said only privatively is shown:

1. By the authority of the Master in the *littera*, who says that « the use of these is rather brought in for the sake of denying than of positing »; and the Master's authority seems to be confirmed by the authorities of others. For Boethius says in his book *On the Trinity*: « That is truly one in which there is no number »; but in God "one" is most truly: therefore in God there is no number: therefore these terms in God are either said falsely, or they do not predicate number. But they say nothing other than number, if they posit anything: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Isidore says that number is *the power[?] of the memorial-mark*, that is, of division, according to the etymology; but in God division does not occur, therefore neither does number: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher says that « number is a multitude measured by one »; but in God measuring does not occur, since he himself is immeasurable: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason: since from whatever the genus is removed, the species also [is removed]; but the genus of quantity is removed from God: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, in whatever the genus is, it is necessary to posit some one of the species: therefore if number is in God, either there is there the binary, or the ternary, or some [one] of the others. But all the saints deny the species, therefore also the genus: therefore the same as before.

**On the contrary:**

1. If they were said only *privatively*, since they are not one or two, then by parity of reason it could be said: chimaeras are three, since they are not one or two; but that is not said: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that it expresses number, is plain. Eusebius says: « In God there is number, but not order »; but if there is number there: therefore it happens that it signifies being. And if so: therefore the words which signify it are taken positively.

3. Likewise, Bernard: « If one is the essence, [and] three [are the persons], who would deny the number »? as if to say, no one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since discrete quantity is of greater abstraction than continuous: therefore also discreteness more than duration. But a name expressing duration in God is said positively, as *eternal*: therefore also a name expressing discreteness.

5. Likewise, in whatever the species is to be posited positively, the genus is to be posited; but in God trinity is to be posited: therefore also plurality.

> **Conclusion.** *In God number is indeed said positively, but it is not there simply, but [rather] number of persons.*

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be said that the position of the Master was that such numeral names in God did not posit anything, but were privative, as is plain in the *littera*. And the reason for this position was that such names, if they posit anything, posit number absolutely; but that number is not to be posited in God, both reason says and the authority of the saints confirms. For since in God there is no division and separation, neither is there aggregation, nor is there measuring; and number imports separation antecedently, and aggregation and measuring consequently: number in God does not seem to be posited. And therefore the numeral words in God do not say anything, but rather privatively deny, namely a greater number and a lesser.

But neither the position nor the reason of the position is suitable, if attention be turned inwardly. For the position destroys

itself. For it posits that names designating plurality are said privatively, and similarly the names designating unity. And if so, [and] if they are thus mutually opposed, so that each is the privation of the other, there will be there a circle in making known; and if each is the privation of the other — since privation is not of privation, but of habit — each posits something; and so, if they are said privatively, they are said positively; and on this account[?] the position is not suitable.

The reason of the position is likewise not suitably taken. For number imports distinction and beyond this composition of *aggregation*; and although in God there is no aggregation, nevertheless there is distinction; and therefore number is not simply to be removed from God, but [only] such-and-such number. And the Master removes [it] altogether; therefore by his position he failed. And in this article he is not commonly upheld[?] by the masters of Paris.

It must therefore be conceded that such names are said positively, as the reasons adduced for this prove. And it must be conceded that in God in some way there is number, in some way not. For according as it expresses the distinction of persons according to origin, so it must be said to be in God; but according as it expresses aggregation and substantial division, number is not to be posited in God.

From these things the objections are plain. For the reasons for the first part proceed concerning number according to that acceptation in which it is taken in these lower things with respect to the aforesaid conditions. Whence in their own sense they conclude truly, that there is no number there.

Likewise the reasons for the opposite part proceed according as number imports a certain distinction, and this indeed is to posit [it] in God; and therefore they conclude truly in their own sense. Whence in God it must be denied that there is number simply, but it must be conceded that there is number of persons.

*To 4 and 5.* To that, however, which is objected concerning continuous quantity, and concerning the species of number, it must be said that neither is continuous quantity in God, since eternity is not a quantity, nor is the Trinity a species of number.