Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/25/q/bon-sent-I-d25-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I. *On the quiddity of the name "person."*

### Question I. *Whether the name "person" in the divine is said according to substance or according to relation.*

And that "person" is said according to substance is shown thus:

1. From the words of Augustine in the seventh [book] *On the Trinity*: «It is the same for God to be and to be a person». And again: «When we say the person of the Father, we say nothing other than the substance of the Father»: therefore "person" says nothing other than substance, therefore "person" is said according to substance.

2. Likewise, Anselm at the end of the *Monologion*: «As many as are the persons, so many are the substances»: therefore the name "person" is said according to substance.

3. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor in his book *On the Sacraments*, in the first part of the second book: «The only substantial name there is, which is said of singulars singularly but in the sum total is not said singularly but is pronounced plurally, is *persona*»: therefore this name *persona* is a substantial name.

4. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*, defining "person," says that «it is an individual substance of rational nature»; but if "substance" is predicated in the direct case [*in recto*], and not by accident but according to itself: then therefore "person" expresses substance according to all the doctors.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, and this through division. For Boethius, hunting out the definition of "person," says that it is either a substance or an accident; and he says that it is not an accident: therefore a substance. If therefore "person" in these lower things expresses substance and a "what" existing through itself: therefore also in God.

6. Likewise, this is shown through its absolute character, since every name which is said *of itself* [*ad se*] expresses substance in the divine, because such a name is not said according to relation; but this name "person" is of this kind. This is plain; and Augustine says in the seventh [book] *On the Trinity*: «For "person" is said *of itself*, like *good* and *great*»: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, this is shown through the response of the Church: because every name which is conveniently given in answer to a question made *through what* [*per quid*] indicates substance, since *what* asks for substance; but this name "person" was given by the Church in answer to the heretics asking *what are the three?*, as Augustine and the Master say: therefore it indicates substance.

8. Likewise, this is shown by the abstraction of relation. Let us understand that there is no relation in the divine, and that the divine nature is in one sole hypostasis, as the gentiles understand; then it is plain that there is still to be understood an intellectual nature and one having that [nature]: therefore both a person and a nature: therefore if, with all relation circumscribed, the understanding of "person" is preserved, "person" is not said according to relation. And it is said either according to relation or according to substance: therefore it is said according to substance.

**On the contrary:**

1. Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*, at the end: «If the persons are divided, it is necessary that the term which draws its origin from the persons does not pertain to substance». If therefore those things which draw their origin from the persons do not pertain to substance, much more so does not the name "person."

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor says that «"person" is the same as that which exists through itself, according to a certain singular mode of existence of rational nature»; but the singular mode of existence in the divine is relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is shown by reason, since every name which receives multitude or plurification pertains to relation, because according to all [doctors] substance always remains undivided. And Boethius says that «substance contains unity, [and] relation multiplies the trinity»: if therefore the name "person" is multipliable, it is plain that it is said according to relation.

4. Likewise, every name importing distinction of itself is said according to relation; but the name "person" of itself imports distinction, since "person" is a hypostasis distinct by a property; and Boethius says that «it is individual», and individuation is nothing other than distinction: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *"Person" in the divine is said both according to substance and according to relation; in its general understanding it is said more principally according to substance than according to relation; but in its special understanding it is said in God according to relation.*

**I respond:** It must be said that some have wished to resolve [this] by distinguishing the signification of "person" according to diversity of number, so that in the singular it would be said according to substance, in the plural according to relation. *(Opinion of certain ones.)* — But this solution is valid neither in itself nor for the matter at hand. *(Not proved.)* In itself it is not valid, because every plural doubles its singular, therefore it does not change its signification. For the matter at hand it is not valid, because it is said in the singular: *the person of the Father is one, [the person] of the Son is another*, which could not be said if it were a substantial term, since *the substance of the Father is not one, [the substance] of the Son another*.

Others have wished to resolve [it] by a distinction of signification according to different times, namely that before the response of the Church it would be said substantially and according to substance, [but] after the response it would be said according to relation. *(Opinion of others.)* — But this solution is not valid in itself nor for the matter at hand. *(Disproved.)* In itself it is not valid, because the Church for some reason gave that name [as response] rather than another substantial one; and then it did not impose the signification: therefore the response of the Church does nothing for the change of signification. For the matter at hand it is not valid, because the doctors speak according to the signification which it has after the response of the Church, and the reasonings on either side proceed.

And therefore it must be understood that *"person"* is said [to be] *a supposit of rational nature distinct by a property*, according to all who understand its special signification; but it is established that the supposit of rational nature is substance, [and] it is established that the distinguishing property is relation. *(The author's view.)* Since therefore "person" imports both, namely the supposit and the property, it must be said both according to substance and according to relation. And while it is said according to substance and according to relation, it is said more principally according to substance, as far as concerns the general and primary understanding of the name. For "person" expresses a definite supposit of substance, whether in God or in creatures. And to this corresponds the very mode of speaking on the side of the name.

But as far as concerns the special and ultimate understanding of the name, since it expresses a supposit distinct by a property, which is relation, it is said in God according to relation. And hence it is that the Saints and doctors say that the name "person" is said according to substance, although it is also said according to relation.

But someone will object: since these modes, namely *being said according to substance* and *being said according to relation*, divide the divine names oppositionally, as it seems; either they will not be able to be found in the same [name], or that name implies opposites in itself. — And therefore it must be understood that, as Richard of St. Victor says, *being said according to substance* is twofold: either by indicating substance according to the common nature, and thus *man* is said according to substance; or by indicating substance as a definite supposit, like *a certain man*. In the first mode, to express substance is to express a *what*; in the second mode it is to express a *someone*. I say therefore that the name of essence or substance is said according to substance, because it indicates the common nature; but "person" is said according to substance because it indicates a definite and distinct supposit. The common nature, however, is not multiplied nor referred; and therefore that which expresses substance according to the common nature is so said *of itself* [*ad se*] that it can in no way be said according to relation; and in this mode indeed it is divided oppositionally. But the supposit or hypostasis is by nature plurified and compared to another and so referred. And what is so said according to substance, nothing prevents [it] from being said according to relation by reason of a superadded relation; and this is what Richard of St. Victor wishes to say.

The response, then, is plain to all the objections on either side. For it must be conceded that the name "person" is said according to substance, as has been explained, as the Saints say and the reasons prove; for thus they understand "to be said according to substance." Nevertheless it must be conceded that it is said according to relation, although not so principally, as the following reasonings prove, since the multitude of relations plurifies the person itself.

*(Solution to 7.)* 7. To that, however, which is objected, that it is given in answer to a question made *through what*, since from this it could be concluded that it expresses substance not only as supposit but also as common nature: it must be said that *what* sometimes asks for the essence with a supposit assumed, *what is that which is said by the name?*, as: *what is man?* And what is given in answer to this question indicates substance purely and essence, when it is a question concerning substance. Sometimes, with the term assumed indeterminately, it asks *what is said by the name?*, as if it be said: *Brunellus is running*, and one asks: *what [is] Brunellus?*, namely whether man or ass. Sometimes, with the quiddity and signification assumed, it asks concerning that with respect to which the dependent name is said, as if it be said: *the white things are running*, and it be asked, *what [are] the white things?* — one can answer: *men*, or *asses*. And in this mode the heretics asked: *what [are] the three?* Because the blessed John had said in the first Canonical [letter], chapter five: *There are three who give testimony* etc., they asked: *what [are] the three?* — since it is an adjective without a substantive; and then it asks for the supposit more than for the essence — and therefore the supposit was the answer, and this through the name "person." Whence, the Holy Spirit prompting, the Church responded most excellently and nobly and catholically, as Richard says; and very well and by the prompting of the Holy Spirit, as Richard says, it answered with this name rather than with another.

*(Incidental question.)* But then it could be asked: why did the heretic not ask through this interrogative *who*? and it seems that he ought to have. For if he was asking concerning the supposit, and *who* asks concerning the supposit, he ought to have asked: *who [are] the three?*

*(Solution.)* And to this the response is that *who* asks concerning a definite or real supposit; and concerning that they were not asking, because in the same authority is added: *the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit*; but they were asking concerning the supposit with respect to which this which is *three* is signified in adjacency: and therefore they asked rather *what [are] the three* than *who [are] the three*. For thus it was fitting to answer with a single name, and they were asking this.

8. To the last argument, since it does not proceed rightly, the response will appear better below. Yet this can be said, that, even if the understanding of "person" can be abstracted from this property determinately, nevertheless from its general understanding it includes the understanding of property; and since in the divine the property is relation, therefore [in this] understanding it includes relation. Whence just as this person in the divine, which is the Father, cannot be abstracted from paternity, which is the personal relation, with its personality preserved; so neither [can] "person" [be abstracted] from the understanding of relation in general. And thus it is plain that it does not follow that it is said according to substance only.