Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/25/q/bon-sent-I-d25-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether person is rightly defined by Boethius as «an individual substance of rational nature», and whether this account fits the divine persons.*

In the second place inquiry is made concerning this name *person*, what it is according to definition; and Boethius defines it thus: «*Person is an individual substance of rational nature*». And that this definition is fitting for the divine person is shown:

1. By the intention of the author, since Boethius intends to treat of the person of Christ; but it is established that the person of Christ is uncreated: therefore he intends to assign the account of the divine or uncreated person.

2. Likewise, that this is the account of person in the divine, is shown thus: for in God it is established that there must be posited an incommunicable supposit, and this supposit is the divine substance, and this is also of rational nature; and it [the account] does not fit anything except that of which *person* is said: therefore it is its account, as it seems.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every definition expresses an aggregation, since it consists of several [parts], otherwise there would be empty repetition there; but in what is simple there is no aggregation: therefore nothing simple is definable. But person in the divine is altogether simple: therefore etc. If you say, according to what some say, that although it is simple in reality, yet it is not simple in account; *on the contrary*: either to that account something corresponds in reality, or nothing; if something: therefore there is some composition in reality; if nothing: therefore the account is altogether empty. But on account of an empty account nothing is to be defined: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, by reason of its parts it does not seem to fit the divine person. For *rational* is the differentia of *animal*: therefore for that to which it does not fit to be an animal, rational nature does not fit. But *animal* does not fit God, since it is a species of body: therefore neither does this which is *rational*.

3. Likewise, it seems that *substance* is not said in the direct case of person, because, the defined being multiplied, the definition and the parts of the definition must be multiplied: therefore if person is a substance, since there are several persons, therefore [there will be] several substances. — If you say that *substance* there stands for *hypostasis*; *on the contrary*: hypostasis is called an individual substance, as Boethius says: therefore just as it is empty repetition if one were to say *rational man*, so also in the aforesaid notification. — It is asked therefore, whether this name *substance* stands for the common [nature] or for *hypostasis*.

4. Likewise, it seems not to be convertible. For the soul of man is an individual substance of rational nature: therefore etc. — Lastly inquiry is made, since diverse definitions of *person* are assigned, how they differ.

> **Conclusion.** *That definition of Boethius is good and fitting for the divine persons.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is plain from the intention of the author, this definition of person is fitting and is assigned to the divine person.

1. To that, however, which is objected, that *what is simple is not definable*; some say that to define something is twofold. In one mode, in the direct case and through a differentia expressing position, as when it is said: *man is a rational, mortal animal*; and in this mode it is true that the definition expresses aggregation and composition, and in this mode only what is aggregated is definable. In another mode, it happens that something is defined in the oblique case and through a differentia expressing privation, as when it is said: *snubness is curvature of the nose*; and then it is not signified that the substance of the thing is aggregated from diverse [things], since what is placed in the oblique case does not necessarily enter into the essence. Further, a privative differentia does not posit any composition or apposition; and such is the account in question.

For this which is *of rational nature* falls in the oblique case, and this differentia *individual* does not posit but privates. — But this response cannot stand. First, indeed, because what is defined through the oblique [case] is either defined as *accident* through substance, or as through a *thing of the same genus*; but whether thus or thus, there is addition there. For the definitions of accidents, as the Philosopher says, are by way of addition. Likewise, if through a *thing of the same genus*; then therefore it enters into the essence and does not express the whole, since it is part of the definition: therefore it is necessary that what is added add something according to the thing, and so whether in the direct or in the oblique case it is necessary to express aggregation.

And on account of this it must be said otherwise, that this account, understood of created person, is a notification expressing aggregation. But in God it does not express aggregation according to the thing, but according to the mode of understanding; which nevertheless is not empty, because all things which are said in the account of person are found in God, although not by way of diversity. — And this indeed can be understood thus. In creatures specification is by completing addition, individuation by contracting addition or apposition. And therefore, when it is said *individual substance*, *individual* really adds beyond *substance*, whence also *individual substance* [adds] beyond *nature*; and therefore it is necessary that the person in a creature be composite. But in God individuation or distinction is by origin alone. And since the [divine] person arises from itself, therefore there is no addition there at all, but plurification, and through plurification distinction and individuation; and therefore neither does *individual* add beyond *substance*, nor *substance* beyond *nature*. Therefore truly it is said and it is a true account of understanding; and this notification fits the divine person, nor is any composition signified in it; whence it holds the account of a certain notification and falls short of the account of definition, since neither God nor the divine person is definable, yet [each] is knowable and notifiable.

2. To that which is objected concerning the differentiae set down, or concerning the members [of the definition], it must be said that *rational* is said in one way [of that] which has the power of discerning good from evil, true from false — and thus it fits both God and creature; in another way [of that] which has the power of discerning by inquiry and collation and discourse — and this belongs to the soul joined to flesh. And so such a differentia in the first mode is placed in the definition, but in the second mode the objection raises [its difficulty].

3. To that which is objected, that *individual substance* is said in the direct case; it must be said that it is numbered, just as person [is]. For, as Anselm says, there are many individual substances, just as there are many persons.

To that which is asked, whether this name *substance* stands for the common [nature] or for *hypostasis*, it has been customary to respond in three ways.

In the first way thus, that *substance* stands for the common. And if you object that that [common nature] is not individuated; they say that the supervening differentia regards substance by reason of the supposit, not by reason of the form, as is plain when it is said: *individual animal*. — But this response does not seem fitting, because this name *substance*, insofar as it stands for the common, does not supposit for [a] person. Whence this is false: *the essence generates*; and this: *the substance generates*.

In the second way it is said that *substance* there is worth as much as *hypostasis*; nor is there empty repetition. For individuation in person is regarded with respect to a threefold incommunicability, namely *by predication* — and this fits the hypostasis; and *by composition*, since [the hypostasis] is not combinable with another; and *by union*, insofar as something is united to a more worthy [nature]. And thus the differentia *individual* expresses these two incommunicabilities. Whence it is plain that there is no empty repetition there: it is plain

also that the definition is convertible. By this twofold incommunicability is excluded the soul of man, which is combinable with another, and the human nature in Christ, which is united to a more worthy [nature]. — But yet, although that has been reasonably said, there still remains the question concerning *hypostasis*, since hypostasis is *individual substance*. Likewise it is asked how *substance* is taken there, and it cannot be taken for the common [nature], nor for the hypostasis.

And on account of this it is said in a third way, that this name *substance* stands there in the way that *substance* is divided into first and second substance, and so in a certain commonness toward universal and particular substance; and they gather this from the words of Boethius, when he hunts the definition of person through the aforesaid division of substance, as is plain there. Whence this name *individual* contracts that indifference of that name, so that it stands for first substance; and thus there is neither empty repetition there nor individuation of common substance.

4. To that which is lastly asked concerning the assignation of definitions, it must be said that person is defined by Boethius thus: *person is an individual substance of rational nature*; by Richard thus: *person is an incommunicable existence of intellectual nature*. It is also defined in another way thus: *person is something existing through itself alone according to a certain singular mode of rational existence*. By the masters it is defined thus: *person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to nobility*. — And the difference of these definitions is to be noted: because Boethius and the masters define *person* according as it is said commonly in God and in creatures; but Boethius considers more the account of the thing, while the masters [consider] further the account of the transferred [signification]. But Richard's definitions are of person as it is in the divine especially; but one is the proper assignation, the other [is] the exposition or correction of Boethius's definition. — Yet it could be said that all say the same thing, [but] differ according to the manner of speaking; because Boethius's definition was given and seemed to sound an impropriety; therefore Richard set down another more by proper words; and so on up to the fourth.