Dist. 25, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/25/q/bon-sent-I-d25-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the name "person", said of created and uncreated persons, is a univocal common term.*

Secondly it is asked whether this name *person* is a univocal common term [applicable] to created and uncreated persons.

And that it is so, is shown thus:

1. Because there is the same account [*ratio*] and the same name "person" according as it is said of these and of those.

2. Likewise, this is shown because the commonality of "person" is a commonality of similar relation; but a similar relation, which is found in God, is found also in the creature, since just as the Father is a supposit of the divine nature, so Peter [is a supposit] of human [nature]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the completion of the account of person consists in incommunicability; but incommunicability is common to divine and created persons: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *(Foundations.)* God and creatures are at the highest distance: therefore they have nothing in common, therefore nothing univocal.

2. Likewise, "person" is substance: therefore [those] which are univocally [predicated] in "person" are univocally [predicated] in substance. But Creator and creature are not univocally [predicated] in substance, because then God would be in a genus: therefore neither in "person."

3. Likewise, [things] which are univocally [predicated] in something equally are in it; but the creature in no way participates equally with God: therefore the very thing that is *person* is not said univocally of God and creature.

*(Incidental question.)* 4. It is asked, then, of which it is said by priority — *person*; and it seems that it is said by priority of creatures, since it has been transferred from there to the divine. **On the contrary:** intellectual nature and substance and distinction are by priority in God rather than in creatures; and there are not many things [pertaining] to the account of person: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *The name "person" is said of created and uncreated persons analogically, and indeed by an analogy of equality of the divine persons compared to themselves, but by a remote analogy of the divine persons together with the created [ones].*

**I respond:** It must be said that this name *person*, as has been seen previously, expresses nothing other than a commonality of relation, upon which a commonality of account [*ratio*] is founded. Since therefore a similar relation is found in created and in uncreated persons, hence it is that this name *person* is not said equivocally, but analogically. *(Conclusion 1.)*

But it must be attended to *(Distinction.)* that a commonality of relation can be by reference to things of the same genus; and then there is univocation and analogy according to equality — as Peter is an individual and Paul [is an individual] — and the account of individual belongs to them equally. It can also be by comparison to things of diverse genera, as Peter and Peter's whiteness are united in this, that they are individuals; and the account of individual belongs by priority to Peter rather than to his whiteness. Thus it must be said that this name *person*, said of the divine

persons, since it is said by comparison of things of the same nature, [is said] therefore analogically and equally; and therefore in a certain way univocally; likewise, when it is said of created persons. *(Conclusion 2.)* But when it is said of created and uncreated persons, it is said by comparison of things of diverse natures, and therefore by priority and posteriority. *(Conclusion 3.)* And thus *person* is said by priority of created persons according to the name, but according to the reality [*res*] of the name it is said by priority of uncreated persons.

And as to what is asked, whether *person* is common to created and uncreated persons; it must be said that if it is called a univocal common term, no. And the reasons for this must be conceded. *(Conclusion 4.)*

*(Solution to the opposing arguments.)* 1. To what is therefore objected, that there is the same *ratio* etc.; it must be said that there is not the same *ratio* except according to analogy; because intellectual nature and hypostasis and distinction and property are in God far more nobly and otherwise than in creatures.

2. To that which is objected, that there is a similar relation; it must be said that it is not a likeness of equality; and therefore such a likeness does not produce univocation, but analogy alone.

3. To that which is objected concerning incommunicability, it must be said that it is not a pure privation, but rather imports distinction; and since another account of distinguishing, distant much from this one, is in God — and this not only according to the thing, but rather also according to right reason — the intellect does not attribute to God a mode of distinguishing which belongs to composite [things]. Therefore neither by reason is it univocal, but only analogous.