Dist. 25, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/25/q/bon-sent-I-d25-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first it is asked about what the Master says: *We say that there are three persons, that is, three subsistences*; because the contrary is said by Boethius in the book *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*, assigning a difference between *to subsist* and *to substand*, since «that subsists which does not need another in order to be; but that substands which, being a subject for others so that they may be able to be, supplies [the support]». It seems therefore that *to subsist* is the same as *to be*, and *subsistence* the same as *essence*: therefore in no way can it be said that there are several subsistences.

**I respond:** It must be said that Boethius takes the name *subsistentia* there according to Marcus Tullius, inasmuch as it takes its signification from the act of standing or of standing by itself; and so there is only one subsistence. But now the doctors of sacred Scripture take it inasmuch as it more imports a respect to property, to which the subsistence belongs; and so it is multiplied. The reason for this is the common usage. Because they take *substance* for the nature of the thing; therefore for the supposit they preferred more to take *subsistence*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *we say that the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, [but] not from the same essence*. For it seems false, because the Father generates the Son from his own substance and spirates the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that all the persons are from the same substance.

Likewise it is asked: why is this not conceded, that the persons are *from the same essence*, just as this is conceded, that they are *of the same essence*? And it seems that it ought to be conceded, because *ex* (from) in the divine [things] expresses the relation of origin, and likewise the genitive imports origin. If you say that [it is] on account of transitions, since

prepositions are transitive — so also the oblique cases are transitive. Furthermore, this [proposition] is received: *the persons are in the same essence*, and yet this which I say *in* is a preposition.

**I respond:** It must be said that when something is compared to another as informing or denominating, on this account a diversity or distinction of one to the other is not posited; for thus is divinity compared to God. In another way one is compared to the other as principle to that which proceeds from a principle; and then of necessity a distinction is imported. Since therefore this preposition *ex* imports a relation of cause or at least of principle, therefore of necessity it states a distinction between the extremes: and therefore this cannot be true, that *the persons are from the same essence*. But because the genitive is not only construed in the relation of principle, but also from the declaration of essence, when it is said: *a woman of remarkable form*, as Priscian says; therefore with the genitive this is true: *the three persons are of the same essence*.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Three things*, and he takes this from Augustine in the first book *On Christian Doctrine*. For it seems that he speaks ill in saying *three things* (*tres res*), because *res* is an absolute and general name: therefore it seems that if it says anything in the divine [things], it says the essence or substance: therefore just as in no way is *three essences* received, so in no way ought *three things* to be received. And if you say that *three beings* (*tres entes*) is received, this is not similar, because *ens* (being) is a participle, and so it draws its number from elsewhere and is not numbered according to its own form of entity; *res* however is a substantive name. If you say that *res* names for me a form on the part of the soul, or that this name is imposed on the part of the soul; this is nothing, because those are names of intentions, and *res* is divided against intention.

**I respond:** It must be said that each thing can be considered in three ways: either according to the properties which it has in its proper nature; or according to the mode by which it comes-to-be in the soul; or according to the consequent property which is in it from the acts of the soul, which are subjecting and predicating, composing and dividing. According therefore to this triple acceptation it happens that a thing is named in three ways. In one way, by a name which indicates existence on the part of its own nature, just as it is called *white* and *black* and the like. In another way, according to what the soul receives; and so, because the soul receives all [things] through the mode of being, it names a thing in this way. Whence everything is called *res* (thing) which the soul thinks of as existing in nature. In another way it happens to name through second intentions, just as it is called *genus*, *species*, *subject*, *predicate*.

Since therefore this name *res* says as it were a middle [term] between the name which says purely the form of nature, and the name which says the form of intention; therefore it suits not only the essence, but also the persons; and therefore we say *three things* [meaning] *three persons*, not so [as we say] *three essences*; and the name itself alludes to this signification. For *res* is said from *reor*, *reris* (I think, you think), which says an act on the part of the soul; and in another way *res* comes from this which is *ratus* (settled, determined), which says stability on the part of nature; and so *res* says stability or determinacy on the part of entity. And so the objections are clear, since in one way it is a name of nature, in another way a name of reason.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this saying of Jerome: *There is in the Trinity no degree (gradus) at all*. For he seems to say [something] against what Augustine says in the ninth [book] of the *Confessions*: «The Father and the Son do not differ in substance, but in cause and degree». — Likewise, in the divine [things] there is *subsistentia* (sub-stance), therefore there is *sub* (under); but *sub* is said relatively

to *superius* (above): therefore there is *sub* and *super* there, therefore inferior and superior, therefore also degree. — Likewise, wherever there is authority and sub-authority, there is degree; but this is in the Father and Son: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said, as the Gloss says, on *Exodus*: «*Thou shalt not ascend by steps to the altar* etc. He ascends to the altar by steps who says that the Father is greater than the Son, and the Son [greater] than the Holy Spirit, as Arius says». Whence since *gradus* (degree) by the very meaning of its name takes away the equality of the persons, therefore Jerome rightly says that there is no degree at all in the divinity; nevertheless order is posited. For *gradus* and *ordo* differ as *point* and *unity*. For *point* is a posited substance; therefore it is only in corporeal [things]. *Unity* is a substance not having position; therefore it is in spiritual [things]. Thus *gradus* says a superposition either of place or of dignity. But *ordo* says a relation to a principle without superposition.

To that, therefore, which Augustine says, it must be said that he speaks improperly in both words, and *cause* is taken there for *principle*, and *degree* is taken for *order*.

To that which is objected concerning *sub*, it must be said that *sub* in the divine [things] does not state inferiority, but only a relation according to the manner of understanding. — To that which is objected concerning authority, it must be said that it is true insofar as *authority* sounds in the meaning of dominion, which posits a degree; but thus it is not in the divine [things], but only insofar as it sounds in the meaning of principle; and this posits an order in cognition.

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