Dist. 25
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/25/q/bon-sent-I-d25-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXV.

#### Cap. I. *What is signified by this name "person" in the plural number, namely when one says "persons".*

Furthermore it must be considered, since this name *person*, as has been said before, is said according to substance, what is the understanding of the saying when it is uttered in the plural: three persons, or two persons, and when it is said: the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son another, the person of the Holy Spirit another. For if in these locutions the term *person* makes the understanding of the essence, we would seem to confess several essences, and so several gods. But if it does not there hold the signification of essence, the meaning of this name is different, when it is said: the Father is a person, or the Son is a person; and another, when it is said: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons; and when it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, and the like.

"For *person*, as Augustine says above, is said *to itself*, and it is the same for God to be a person as to be, just as it is the same for Him to be as to be God." From which it is plainly gathered that we predicate the divine essence when we say: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person, that is, divine essence; and altogether one and the same is signified by the name *person*, that is, the divine essence, when it is said: the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, as is signified by the name *God*, when it is said: the Father is God, the Son is God. So also the same is signified, when it is said: God is God, and God is a person; for by both names the divine essence is understood, since both are said according to substance.

But when it is said: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, what do we signify by the name *person*? The essence? For this seems so, if we diligently scrutinize the words of Augustine set forth above. For he said above that "we therefore say three persons, because that which *person* is is common to the three". And likewise: "since the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are called three persons". It seems therefore that this name *person*, when it is said: three persons, holds the same signification which it has when it is said: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person; since, as Augustine shows, this — that is, three persons — is said on account of this, that that which *person* is is common to them. Therefore that which is common to them, that is, to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, seems to be signified by the name *person*, when one says three persons.

In another way also it can be shown that there by the name *person* the essence is signified, when one says three persons. For as Augustine said above, by that necessity we said three persons, that we might answer those inquiring, *what three*, or *what three things*. When therefore it is asked, *what three* or *what three things*, it is fittingly answered when one says: three persons. But when it is asked, *what three*, or *what three things*, by *what* one inquires about the essence. For nothing is found *what* those three are, except essence. If therefore we rightly answer the question, it is necessary that in answering we should signify the essence; otherwise we do not show what the three are. But if in answering we signify the essence, we understand the essence itself by the name *person*, when one says: three persons.

To some it seems that by the name *person* the essence is signified when one says three persons, on this account, because Augustine says it is therefore said three persons, since that which *person* is is common to them, so that the understanding may be such: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, that is, they are three having that in common which is *person*, that is, they are three of whom each is a person, that is, an essence. But how, according to this understanding, will it be said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another? And this also they wish to understand thus, namely the Father is one and the Son another, having yet that in common which is *person*. And they confirm this by the authority of Augustine, who in the seventh book *On the Trinity* says: "We say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence. But we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as if there were something else there which is essence, and something else which is person". By this authority and the foregoing they attempt to assert that in the aforesaid locutions the name *person* signifies the essence.

But what shall they answer to that which Augustine himself in the book *On the Faith to Peter* says, "namely, that the Father is one in person or personally, the Son is personally another, the Holy Spirit is personally another"? For how is the Father personally one, the Son personally another, the Holy Spirit personally another, if in being a person they wholly agree, that is, if *person* makes the understanding of the essence only? Therefore it seems to us that this can be said otherwise more fittingly according to the authorities of the catholic Doctors.

#### Cap. II. *On the threefold acceptance of this name "person" in the Trinity.*

It must be known therefore that this name *person* makes a manifold understanding, not one only. And as Hilary says in the fourth book *On the Trinity*: "The understanding of what is said is to be drawn from the causes of speaking, since the matter is not subject to the speech, but the speech to the matter". Distinguishing therefore the causes of speaking of this name, namely *person*, we distinguish the signification, saying that this name, namely *person*, properly is said according to substance and signifies the essence, just as Augustine showed above, when one says: God is a person, the Father is a person. Yet by a certain necessity, as Augustine said above, this name has been transferred so that it might be said in the plural three persons, when it was asked, *what three*, or *what three things*; where it does not signify the essence, that is, the divine nature, which is common to the three persons, but the subsistences, or hypostases according to the Greeks. For the Greeks, as Augustine said above, understand *substance*, that is *hypostasis*, otherwise than we do. For we call *substance* the essence or nature. But we call persons, as they call substances, that is hypostases. If therefore we so understand persons as they understand substances or hypostases — yet they understand hypostases otherwise than we do substance — therefore we understand persons otherwise than substance. When therefore we say: three persons, we do not there signify the essence by the name *person*. What therefore do we say? We say that there are three persons, that is three subsistences, namely three beings; for which the Greeks say: three hypostases.

And this sense is supported by the words of Augustine cited above, if they are understood inwardly. For since the Father is a person, that is, an essence, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person; therefore they are called three persons, that is, three subsistences, three beings. For they could not be called three subsistences or beings, unless each of them were a person, that is, an essence. Since therefore that which is *person*, that is, essence, is common to them; therefore they are rightly called three persons, that is, subsistences or subsisting [things], so that, just as the essence which is common to them truly and properly *is*, so those three may be understood truly and properly as subsistences or beings. And therefore Augustine, distinguishing the causes of what is said, says that the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, not out of the same essence, lest something else there be understood to be person, and something else essence. For the three persons, that is, the subsistences, are one essence and of one essence, but they are not one person nor of one person, although *person* is sometimes said according to substance. For if this were said, confusion would arise in the persons.

But to that which they say: when it is asked, *what three*, or *what* *three things*, the question is about the essence, since it is not found *what* those three are except essence — by which they wish to lead us to understand by the name *person* the essence, when we answer: three persons — we say thus: it is undoubtedly true that no one thing is found which those three are except essence. For those three are one, that is, the divine essence. Whence the Truth says: *I and the Father are one*. Yet, when it is asked, *what three* or *what three things*, the question is not about the essence, nor is *what* there referred to the essence; but since the catholic faith was professing them to be three, as John in his canonical Epistle says: *There are three who give testimony in heaven*, it was being asked what those three were, that is, whether they were three things, and what three things, and by what name those three things were to be signified. And therefore by the necessity of speaking the name *person* was found for answering, and it was said: three persons.

But let it not move you that we have said *three things*. For we, in saying this, do not place a number of diverse things in the Trinity, but we say *three things* in such a way that we confess them to be one certain supreme thing. Whence Augustine in the first book *On Christian Doctrine* thus says: "The things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed". "The things therefore which are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And the same Trinity is one certain supreme thing common to those who enjoy it, if nevertheless it is a thing, and not the cause of all things, if nevertheless even a cause. For a name cannot easily be found which would befit so great an excellence, except that it is better said: this Trinity is one God". Just therefore as three things are said, and these are one thing, so three subsistences are said, and these are one substance. — Behold, it has been shown what is the understanding of this name *person*, when we say: three persons.

#### Cap. III. *In what sense it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another; or, the Father is one in person, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another.*

Now let us inspect whether it is said according to the same reason and cause: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. Which can certainly be soundly understood, so that the sense be such: the subsistence or hypostasis of the Father is one, the subsistence of the Son another, the subsistence of the Holy Spirit another; and the Father is one subsistence, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another.

Then it is asked whether it is taken according to the same reason, when it is said: the Father is one in person, the Son another in person, the Holy Spirit another in person; or, the Father is one personally, the Son another personally, the Holy Spirit another personally.

To which we say that, although it can be taken in the same way, more fittingly however from the meaning of the saying the understanding is varied, so that here by the name *person* the property of the person is understood, so that the sense is such: the Father is one in person or personally, that is, by His own property the Father is other than the Son, and the Son by His own property other than the Father; for by the paternal property the hypostasis of the Father is distinguished from the hypostasis of the Son, and the hypostasis of the Son by the filial property is discerned from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is distinguished from both by the processional property.

In this way also *person* can be soundly taken in the foregoing locutions, when it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, that is, the property by which the Father is Father is one, another that by which the Son is Son, another that by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit. So also some wish to understand by the name *person* the properties, when three persons are spoken of; but it is better that we should understand subsistences or hypostases, when we say three persons.

From the foregoing it is gathered that the name *person* in the Trinity holds a threefold meaning. For there is [a place] where it makes the understanding of essence, and there is where it makes the understanding of hypostasis, and there is where it makes the understanding of property. That however it is said according to substance and sometimes signifies the essence, we have plainly shown above from the sayings of Augustine. But that it is taken for hypostasis and property, must be shown from the authorities of the Saints, lest we should seem to dare to say something by our own conjectures. Concerning this Hieronymus in his *exposition of the catholic faith to Damasus* thus says: "There is in the Trinity absolutely no degree, and nothing which can be called inferior or superior, but the whole deity is equal in its perfection, so that, the words excepted which indicate the property of the persons, whatever is said of one person can most worthily be understood of the three. And as, in confuting Arius, we say that the substance of the Trinity is one and the same, and we confess one God in three persons; so, declining the impiety of Sabellius, we distinguish the three persons expressed under [their] property, not saying that the same is to Himself the Father, the same to Himself the Son, the same to Himself the Holy Spirit, but that the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. For we confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names, that is the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, hypostases, that is subsistences. Nor does the Father ever exclude the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; nor does the Son or the Holy Spirit receive the name and person of the Father, but the Father is always Father, and the Son always Son, and the Holy Spirit always Holy Spirit. Therefore in substance they are one, but they are distinguished by persons and names". Behold, here Hieronymus plainly says that the properties are persons, and the persons are subsistences. Whence what we have said becomes manifest, namely that by the name *person* both the hypostasis and the property are signified. — Ioannes Damascenus also says that the persons are hypostases, and calls them *beings*, thus saying: "In the Deity we confess one nature and three hypostases truly being, that is, persons".

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