Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/26/q/bon-sent-I-d26-a1-q1
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### QUESTION I. *Whether properties of the persons are to be posited in divine matters.*

That in divine matters there is to be a positing of properties not only verbally, but also really, is shown thus.

1. Jerome says, and it is found at the end of the preceding distinction: «We confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine says in the book *On the Faith to Peter*: «It is proper to the Father, that he begot one son»: therefore by [the rule] from conjugates, generation is a property of the Father; but it is established that generation really is in God, and it is also established that it belongs to the Father alone: therefore according to the thing it is the Father's property.

3. Likewise, it belongs to a property to distinguish; therefore where there is a true distinction, there is a true property; but in divine matters there is a true distinction: whence Damascene: «We recognize the difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in three properties — the paternal, the filial, and the processible».

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since just as the mode of inquiring about essence and person is one [thing], so the mode of inquiring about essence and property is another. For about essence one inquires through *what*, about property through *how it stands*: therefore just as essence and person are posited in divine matters according to truth, so a property must be posited.

5. Likewise, above it has been proved that generation and procession really differ — otherwise the persons would not differ — therefore generation and spiration differ really. But both generation and spiration are in one person not multiplied, as in the person of the Father: therefore since the person is really one, and the properties are really many, therefore there is to be a positing of properties really differing in divine matters; but not by an essential or personal difference, since they are in the same person: therefore by a notional [difference]. But if generation and spiration do not differ, just as this is true: *the Father spirates the Holy Spirit*, so also this: *the Father generates the Holy Spirit*; and then it would follow that the Holy Spirit would be the Son.

6. Likewise, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, this has been proved above, and the reason is at hand, since the one who is spirated is altogether one. This [fact] that he is one expresses a unity not of essence nor of person: therefore it must be that of a property; and if so, it is necessary to posit properties in divine matters really, not nominally or only in voice.

7. Likewise, in the Father there is paternity and unbegottenness: either then [it is] the same property, or another. If the same property, then also the same relation; but according to paternity he is referred to the Son: therefore also according to unbegottenness. But this is false, therefore it is another; and the person is one: therefore it is necessary to posit properties in the divine persons even really differing.

**On the contrary:**

1. Hilary, *On the Trinity*: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ by names alone: therefore if they differ by names alone, there are not real properties there, but vocal ones.

2. Likewise, Damascene says in the first book: «It is needful to know that to differ in thing is one [matter], to differ in account is another», and he says that in creatures there is a difference in thing and an agreement in account, but in divine matters [it is] the contrary. Since therefore there is a distinction according to properties, it seems then that they are there only according to the mode of speaking or of understanding: therefore not on the side of the thing.

3. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since in what is supremely simple no difference falls; but the divine person is supremely simple: therefore either there is no property there, or it is only by mode of speaking: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the person is just as simple as the essence; but the properties of the essence do not differ except only by mode of speaking, not according to the thing: therefore likewise the properties of the person.

5. Likewise, the divine essence on account of its supreme simplicity refers itself to the creature, and therefore an essential relation differs from the essence only by mode of speaking, as when [God] is called *Lord*; for it altogether passes into the substance: therefore by parity of reason a person refers itself to a person.

6. Likewise, a creature on account of its essential comparison to its principle refers itself to its Creator — otherwise between Creator and creature there would fall a middle, which would be neither Creator nor creature — therefore if the comparison of person to person is much more essential, then it refers itself. And if so: it seems that the property or relation itself differs from the person only by mode of speaking.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Properties of the persons are to be posited in divine matters, which differ from one another not only according to voice, but also really, and in some way also from the persons.*

**I respond:** It must be said that all Catholic treatise-writers have posited properties of the persons in divine matters. For since there are several and distinct persons, it is necessary that there be a distinguishing [factor] there; this we call a property. But they have varied in the mode of positing.

Since therefore some saw the supreme simplicity in the person as in the essence, they posited that just as in the essence *that by which it is* and *that which is* are altogether the same, so in the person there is altogether the same [item] who is distinguished and that by which [he is distinguished], and so [the same] supposit and property, differing only by mode of speaking; as if one were to say: *I beg you, kindly one* or *your kindness*.

But this position cannot stand, because, as has been proved in the opposing [arguments], in the same person there are properties differing not only by mode of speaking, but also really. For we see that one person is compared to one in one mode, as the Father to the Son; and we see one person to be compared in one mode or by one relation to several, as the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son; and again, one person to be compared in several modes to several, as the Son to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Likewise we see several persons to be compared in the same mode to one, as the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit: therefore the unity of the relation cannot be taken from the side of the essence — this is certain — nor from the side of the person which refers; nor from the side of the person to which it refers. It remains, therefore, that there is another mode of speaking, taken on the side of the thing.

And therefore now the common opinion holds that in divine matters there are properties of the persons really differing from one another, and through this also differing in some way from the persons. For just as, because in one not-pluralified essence we posit several persons, the modes of speaking essentially and personally differ not only by a difference taken on our side, but also on the side of the thing; so also it must be said of the mode of speaking personally and notionally. And therefore the masters distinguish three modes of speaking in divine matters, which are taken on the side of the thing, namely the essential, the personal, and the notional. And it is commonly said that there are three modes of predicating, namely *in quid* ("in what"), *in quis* ("in who"), and *in quae* ("in which") or *in quo modo se habet* ("in how it stands"). And the fault according to the figure of speech is incurred from the interchange of these modes, just as in creatures from the interchange of predicaments. Therefore, just as in divine matters the essence is true, and the persons are true, so the properties of the persons are true.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary first concerning Hilary, it must be said that Hilary takes the names not for the voices themselves, but for the understandings or things signified imported through those three names. For they import properties there. For *alone* does not exclude there the truth of the property, but excludes a diversity of form or substance or nature.

2. To that which is objected concerning Damascene, that they differ only in account; it must be said that *to differ in account* is threefold. In one mode on the side of our apprehension, as in God goodness and magnitude differ. In another mode *to differ in account* is according to the difference of attribution, since some mode is posited around one or attributed to one, which is not attributed to another; and thus essence and person and notion differ in account. In a third mode *to differ in account* is to differ according to the plurality of distinction, which does not bring in a diversity in essence or nature, yet brings in so great a difference that one is not said of the other; and thus person differs in account from person and property from property. And the first difference according to account is the least, since nothing corresponds to it on the side of the thing; but to the last [something] does correspond. Therefore Damascene does not mean to divide thing against account, except according as *thing* is taken for *nature*, nor even thus does he altogether divide, but rather denominates [it] from the principal [aspect]. For in creatures there is not only a rational community, but indeed even a natural one. For Peter and Paul agree not only in account, but also in common nature.

3. To that which is objected, that this takes away the supreme simplicity; it must be said that a difference of account is in some cases founded upon some absolute thing, whether substantial or accidental, [and] in some cases upon a respect or mode of standing. And the first difference altogether resists simplicity, and cannot be in God; the second, however, does not resist [it]. For we see that some respect comes about anew around something, [the latter] in no way being changed. We see also that something has several respects, [it] itself existing without composition. It must be said therefore that the personal properties are respective, not absolute; and therefore they can differ according to the account of the respects; since *person* expresses a supposit or hypostasis, but *property* expresses a relation to another.

4. From this what follows is plain. For since the essential properties are absolute, they cannot express a real difference, unless they have an essential [one]; and therefore they differ only by mode of speaking. Not so the personal properties. Hence the essential properties altogether pass into the essence, but the personal [properties] do not.

5. To that which is objected, that the essence refers itself; it must be said that the divine essence cannot be referred except to another essence; but to that [other] it is not referred, since a relation expresses an order and a relation. As, however, the Philosopher holds: «God is not ordered to things, but things to him»; and therefore there is no relation there except only by mode of speaking. But when person refers to person, there truly is the order of origin, and therefore relation, and therefore true relation. And so that is plain.

6. To that which is objected, that a creature refers itself; it must be said that *to be referred by itself* can be understood in three ways: either since between the respect of the thing and the essence no middle falls, since the essence itself depends essentially [on its principle]; and thus indeed it is found in creatures. For thus matter is referred to form and form to matter; whence the Philosopher says that «matter, this very [thing] which it is, is in relation to another»; yet neither is matter its own respect, nor form, since they do not have every-way simplicity. In another mode it is *to be referred by itself*, since between that which is referred and its correlative no middle falls which is not one of them; and thus the Father is referred by himself to the Son, and conversely. For the Father is his own paternity, and this on account of the supreme simplicity. In a third mode *to be referred by itself* is, since that which is referred is nothing but a relation and pure respect; and this is impossible to be either in God or in a creature, since, as Augustine says, «everything which is referred is something, except that which is said relatively»; otherwise there would be a relation of a relation. And so it is plain that every relative property, whether it be in God or in a creature, necessarily differs in some way from that of which it is the property, and more in a creature than in the Creator. And let all these [statements] be understood, as before, since every respective [thing] is founded upon something absolute.