Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/26/q/bon-sent-I-d26-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II. *What the properties of the persons are in divine matters.*

Secondly, inquiry is made about the properties: what they are. And that they are relations, is shown:

1. Since Hilary says in book XII *On the Trinity*: «It is proper to God once born to be a son»; but sonship is a relation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Damascene: «We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word differs from the paternal hypostasis by the mode of nativity and by relation»; but the mode of relation is a relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor in the book *On the Trinity* says that the persons are distinguished by a property of origin; but origin in divine matters is not a motion, but a relation, therefore [it is] a relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since *proper* is what belongs to one alone; but nothing absolute is incommunicable in divine matters and belonging to one alone: therefore every personal property is relative, therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Just as paternity is a relation, so magnitude is a quantity, and so goodness is a quality; but the magnitude of God is not a quantity, nor is goodness a quality: therefore neither is paternity a relation. But paternity is a property: therefore etc. If you say that this is not similar, since the others pass into the substance, [whereas] relation does not; the contrary is shown first thus:

2. Just as quantity is one genus of accident distinct from substance, so also is relation; but since in God no diversity falls, therefore necessarily the genus of quantity passes into the substance, since there is there neither accident nor diversity of genera: therefore by parity of reason [so does] relation.

3. Likewise, just as God is his own magnitude, so [God is his own] paternity; but since God is his own magnitude, therefore quantity does not differ from substance, but passes into it: therefore likewise also paternity.

4. Likewise, it seems that relation passes [into substance] more, since among all the genera of accidents relation imports a greater dependence, since [it has reference] to subject and to object; but God is altogether independent: therefore relation in no way remains in God.

5. Likewise, among all the genera of beings relation has the least of entity, as is plain since it comes and goes without change of that which is referred; but in the supreme being there ought to be posited only what has much of entity: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The properties of the persons are relations.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the personal properties must necessarily be relations. And this for a twofold reason: both because they are incommunicable and belong to one alone, and also because they really differ, as has been shown previously. And only relation remains in divine matters.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that relation in some [respects] agrees with the other genera, in some differs. For it agrees in this, that it is a predicament and a genus of being, and in this, that it is an accident; and it disagrees in this, that beyond the other genera it has a respect not only to a subject, but also to an object according to relation and dependence.

As to the first conditions, it is impossible for relation to remain in divine matters, just like the other genera, and this on account of the supreme simplicity. For in God relation is not a predicament nor an accident, but is substance. As to those conditions, however, which it has with respect to the object, it is necessary that it remain in some way, namely as to relation, and this on account of the true distinction which is in divine matters, and the true origin and relation; and it is necessary that it not remain in some way, namely as to dependence, and this on account of the every-way absoluteness which is in divine matters. The other genera therefore simply pass over, but relation in some way remains there, in some way passes over; since the other genera express only a respect to the subject and according to that they pass over. But relation expresses moreover a respect to the object, and according to that respect expresses a plurality which truly is in divine matters; and so relation remains. It is plain also how it passes over, namely as to everything which expresses composition. Hence it is not a genus nor in a genus, it is not an accident nor anything else.

1, 2, 3. And so the first three objections in the [section of] solution to the opposed [arguments] are plain by this, since one is taken from the nature of the genus, another from the nature of the accident, the third from the predication of identity. It is plain also how it remains, namely as to that which expresses distinction, not as to what expresses dependence and inclination, since thus it would deprive [it of] the perfection of absoluteness.

4. And by this the fourth argument is plain, which objects from the dependence of relation.

5. To that which is objected, that it has less of being; it must be said that this is true when it differs essentially from substance; but in God it is not so. — Yet besides the aforesaid reason this reason could be given that it does not pass over: since precisely because it has the least of being, therefore it makes the least or no composition, even when it remains according to its own propriety. The others, however, which have something of absolute being, make composition; and hence it is that relation has more force in the supremely simple than any of the others.