Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/26/q/bon-sent-I-d26-a1-q3
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### QUESTION III. *Whether the act of the personal properties is to distinguish the hypostases, or to manifest them as already distinct.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made about the properties as to their act. And it is asked whether the act of properties of this kind is to distinguish the hypostases, or to manifest them as distinct. And that it is to distinguish, is shown:

1. Through Boethius *On the Trinity*: «Substance contains unity, relation multiplies trinity»: but if it multiplies, therefore it distinguishes.

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* says that the person is distinguished by a property of origin; but the property expresses origin and relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing is plain by reason, since, when persons are distinguished, either they are distinguished through something absolute, or [something] respective. Through an absolute, no, since, as Augustine wills, «what is said with reference to itself is said of each one severally»: therefore it is necessary that they differ through something respective.

4. Likewise, the property of the Father either is accidental to the hypostasis itself, or is consubstantial to it; if it is accidental, then there are some accidents there: therefore there is some composition there. If, however, it is consubstantial and connatural: therefore since it does not follow upon the being of the hypostasis, it is not only an account for being made known, but also for being distinguished.

5. Likewise, in the supremely simple the account of being and the account of being known are altogether the same; but the person of the Father is supremely simple: therefore he is distinguished by the same [account] by which he is known to be distinguished. But this is by a property: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Every respective is reduced to an absolute; but what is reduced to something according to the account of understanding follows it: therefore since the properties are respective, [and] the hypostases absolute, the properties are reduced to the hypostases: therefore the hypostases are prior. But what is prior is not distinguished by what is posterior, since being and being-distinct are from the same [source]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every [thing] which distinguishes something gives it such being as it itself is or has; but the properties have of themselves only respective being: therefore if hypostases are distinguished by properties, they have only respective being. But this is false, since since they are supposits of the essence, they have absolute substantial being.

3. Likewise, in the divine persons there is plurification through origin, therefore also distinction. But origin expresses an emanation or going-out, and relation per se does not emanate unless something else has emanated first, since in the [category of] *toward something* there is no motion: therefore hypostasis arises from hypostasis according to the account of understanding before there is an understanding that relation is. And if so, relation follows distinct being in the hypostases: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, «everything that is said relatively, is something, except that which is said relatively», as reason dictates, and Augustine says in the seventh book *On the Trinity*. But Father and Son are said relatively: therefore each of them is something, except that which is said relatively; therefore with the relation abstracted [away], it happens that something is understood. I ask therefore what that is: either essence, or hypostasis. If essence, therefore relation is in the essence: therefore it multiplies it. If hypostasis: then either one, or two. Not one, since it is impossible to understand that Father and Son are one hypostasis: therefore two. And if so, the rest is plain etc.

5. Likewise, with all the properties of two individuals abstracted, e.g. of Peter and of Paul, the hypostases alone remaining, it still happens that one understands the distinction to remain: therefore by parity of reason in the divine hypostases. But if this is true, then they are only an account of distinguishing as far as we are concerned.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The personal properties are accounts not only of manifesting distinction, but also of distinguishing.*

**I respond:** It must be said that on this point a twofold opinion has existed. For some have said that, with the properties abstracted, it is impossible to understand the hypostases as distinct, since properties of this kind in divine matters not only give the persons to be made known, but also give being; whence with these themselves abstracted, [their] being and distinct being are abstracted [away].

The opinion of others was that, with the properties abstracted, it is still [possible] to understand a distinction in the hypostases, since according to them properties are not the account of distinguishing according to the thing, but [an account] of manifesting the distinction. Whence they say that, with paternity and filiation abstracted, it still happens that one understands [the one] who [is] from another, and from whom [is] another. — And if you ask how they are distinguished, they say that [they are distinguished] by themselves, just as principles and most general genera are distinguished and differ by themselves. Whence this is immediate: substance is not quantity.

And if we look more deeply, both opinions contain something of probability; and this is plain thus. For in the divine hypostases we understand origin or emanation, we also understand relation. According to the account of understanding, origin precedes him who arises; and according to the account of understanding, relation follows him who is referred. The relative property therefore can import only relation; and in this mode it follows the account of distinction and is the account for making the distinction known, not for distinguishing, as the second opinion says, and the reasons brought forward to the second part concerning relation itself prove. For the distinction can then be understood, since the one [is] understood [as] from another, and from whom [is] another. — The property can also import both, namely relation and origin; and then it is not only the account of making known, but also of distinguishing. For with origin or emanation circumscribed [away], it is impossible to understand a plurality in divine matters, but rather just as the essence is one, so also is the hypostasis understood [as] one. And so the first opinion proceeds, and the reasons to the first part.

But it must be noted that, since in the divine persons it is the same to arise and to be and to stand toward another, yet according to the account of understanding [these] are ordered, so that the first [thing] is to arise, then being is understood in those things which have being from another, and then [for them] to stand toward another. But since they are the same in God, therefore they are designated by the same name. Hence generation expresses origin and relation; yet properly speaking generation expresses origin, and paternity [expresses] relation. Since therefore divine property according to the common usage of speaking imports relation and origin, therefore it must be held that the properties are not only an account of making the distinction known, but also of distinguishing.

1. And to that which is objected, that the respective is reduced to the absolute; it must be said that to be reduced to something is twofold: either as to a principle, or as to a term. The property of origin in these two ways is reduced to the absolute: to the hypostasis of the Father unbegottenness is reduced as to a principle, but to the hypostasis of the Begotten and the Spirated as to a term. Since therefore what is reduced to something as to a principle follows it, therefore with origin abstracted, only God is understood [as] unbegotten, [as] not being from another, and so in the unity of hypostasis. But since what is reduced to something as to a term is understood to precede [it], hence it is that, with origin abstracted, there is no longer [any way] to understand a proceeding hypostasis. — Or that is to be understood [of cases] where the respective expresses dependence, by reason of which it falls short of supreme simplicity, which is not [the case] in God.

2. To that which is objected, that the respective gives only respective being; it must be said that this is true of a respective which expresses only relation; but it is not true of a respective which expresses origin.

3. To that which is objected, that relation does not arise per se; it must be said that relation is a property, according as it is itself, but origin [is] as it is that which arises; and since origin properly does not arise, but is that by which the arising thing arises, in such wise that it does not follow in time or in nature, but according to the account of understanding, [origin] either is necessarily simultaneous or precedes. Therefore that is plain.

4. To that which is objected, that everything that is said relatively is something, except that which is said relatively; it must be said that this does not have truth in the supremely simple, [namely] that being and being-referred should differ in such wise that one could be separated from the other according to the thing — but — since there they are one — only according to our intellect; and even so our intellect does not abstract in such a way as to understand the hypostases [as] distinct, with the properties and relations abstracted [away]. For if from the hypostasis of the Father paternity be abstracted, or conversely, [the hypostasis] no longer has anything special which would be the principle of understanding it; and so it is considered under a general and incomplete account. Whence those also seem to me to speak well who say that there remains the understanding of this name *thing*, according as it is a general vocable. And so it is plain that, with the properties abstracted, no distinction remains either in thing or in intellect; and therefore in both modes they are an account of distinguishing.

5. To that which is finally objected, that Peter and Paul are understood to be distinguished, with their properties abstracted; it must be said that the case is not similar. For there the distinction is on the side of the proper matter and proper form, which is made known through accidental properties; but in divine matters there is distinction only through origin. Therefore that is plain.