Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/26/q/bon-sent-I-d26-a1-q4
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### QUESTION IV. *How many properties of the persons there are in divine matters.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked concerning the properties as to number. And it seems:

1. That they are infinite, since the properties are respects through which God becomes known to us; but those are infinite, as is plain concerning the ideal respects: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Father and the Son are likened to one another according to all essential conditions; therefore they are compared according to all and according to all become known to us; but those are in an indefinite number: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more respects it has, as a point [more] than a line, and a line [more] than a surface; but the divine being is most simple: therefore in it there are infinite respects. But all are an account of becoming-known: therefore the notions are infinite.

4. But that they are only three, seems [to be shown] through Damascene, who says that in divine matters all things are one apart from generation, ingeneration, and procession; but these are only three properties: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it seems by reason, since a property is converted with that of which it is the property: but a property is of the person: therefore as many as the persons are, so many are the properties and not more. But the persons are three: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, let such an argument be made: every person is one of the three properties — this is true — every notion is a person, therefore every property or notion is one of the three: therefore etc.

That, however, they are more than three is shown thus.

1. Notions or properties are relations. But in every relation there are two relations according to the two extremes; but in divine matters there are two origins: therefore at least four relations.

2. Likewise, a property is what belongs to one alone; but unbegottenness belongs to the Father alone: therefore it is a property. And it is not any of those four relations: therefore there are five.

Therefore the question concerns the sufficiency and number of the notions in divine matters, and on what basis they are taken, and whether the number of properties and of relations be the same.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Properly speaking, in divine matters there are four relations and properties, and five notions; in a less strict sense the names are blurred together and have an equal quinary number.*

**I respond:** It must be understood as to that last [point], that a kind of force is wont to occur between these three names: *property*, *relation*, and *notion*. For *property* is so called insofar as it belongs to one alone; *relation*, insofar as it expresses a relation to another; *notion*, insofar as it is a principle of knowing. And since every property is an account of knowing, likewise also every relation; therefore the name *notion* extends further than those two. Since some property is a relation, as paternity, [and] some is not, as unbegottenness, which does not express a respect but rather privates [it]; likewise some relation is a property, as filiation, [and] some is not, as active spiration — therefore because it belongs to several, not to one alone — and hence it is, that the name *property* and the name *relation* stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded. But the name *notion* is in [the position of] more. Whence there are more notions than properties, [and] more also than relations. But properties and relations mutually exceed one another and equally; therefore they are equal in number.

Yet one need not press the point. For every relation distinguishes in some mode from another, and so is in some mode a property. Likewise everything which distinguishes in some mode imports a relation; therefore every relation [is a] property, and every property [a] relation. But every notion is a property or a relation: therefore every notion is a property and likewise a relation. And so by the extended use of the name they are equal; therefore the number is the same and the same the account of assigning the number in all these names.

It must be understood, therefore, that concerning the number of the properties there have been three opinions. Some have said that they are infinite; some, that [they are] three; some, that [they are] five. — But the reason of this diverse opinion was, that they considered the notions in diverse modes. Those who considered them in comparison to those to whom they become known, said them to be infinite, since through infinite comparisons and likenesses and respects God becomes known to us. — But those who considered [them] in comparison to the hypostases, which are distinguished or become known, said [them] to be only three, since there are only three persons; therefore they have only three things proper, through which they sufficiently become known. — But those who considered [them] by comparison to the accounts by which they become known, said [them] to be five.

For the same is the account of becoming-known and of distinguishing. But the account of distinguishing is taken from the side of origin: either positively or privatively. If privatively; either it privates origin by way of producing, and this does not express nobility, namely *not to produce*, and therefore it is not a notion; or it privates origin by way of [being] produced, and this either specifically or generally. If specifically, it does not express nobility; if generally, then it does express nobility; and so the notion is one alone. If, however, [it be] taken from the side of origin positively, since the origin is twofold, and to each there corresponds of necessity a twofold relation; of necessity there will be four, namely active and passive generation, and active and passive spiration: and in all, five.

The first opinion took its reason rather from afar, and therefore receded farther from the truth; the second [took it] more from near at hand, and therefore drew nearer to the truth; the third [took it] just as it ought, and therefore posited and found the truth. And this is the position which the common opinion of the masters holds, that the notions are five; and the reason of this has been seen before.

**1. 2. 3.** To that, then, which is objected concerning infinite respects and comparisons, it must be said that neither properties nor relations are notions, except those which import a respect distinguishing person from person; and this is the respect of origin, which can be compared in only five modes pertaining to dignity; and so that is plain.

*4.* To that which is objected, that [there are] only three, by the word of Damascene; it must be said that under generation he comprehends two generations, likewise under procession.

*5.* To that which is objected, that a property must be converted with the person; it must be said that this is true of that [property] which is a personal property, making the person to be the person; nevertheless it does not follow, if it is converted, that there be only so many and not more, since one and the same [thing] can have several convertible [terms].

*6.* To that which is objected concerning that syllogism, it must be said that in that procedure there is the fallacy of accident, as here: *the Father is unbegottenness, and the Father is paternity; therefore paternity is unbegottenness*; since what is attributed to a subject or hypostasis is attributed to a relation. — Yet a figure of speech could be assigned, from the change of mode of predicating, since in divine matters the essence is predicated as *what*, the person as *who*, and the notion as *which*; and one proceeds from person to notion.