Dist. 26, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/26/q/bon-sent-I-d26-dubia
----------------------------------------
### DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what Jerome says: *From the leader of the Arians a new name is being demanded of me, a Roman man*. For if it is new, since the Apostle says in the last [chapter] of the first [Letter] to Timothy that *novelties of words are to be avoided*, [Jerome] in no way ought to have conceded [it]. Furthermore, Damascene says that «*hypostasis* is substance with accidents»; but in the divine [things] no accident falls, therefore neither [does] the name *hypostasis*: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that *novelty* in one way sounds [as] a vice, in another way not. When such is the invention that it also produces a meaning which does not have its origin from the ancient truth, then it is truly *novel*; and so the Apostle says it is to be fled, whence he adds *profane*. But that word, as to the sound understanding, was not new, but [only] as to the understanding which the heretics supposed. — As to what is objected from the authority of Damascene, it must be said that the name *hypostasis* of itself does not import a respect to accident, but only to a distinguishing property which, because in creatures it is an accident, [Damascene] therefore says *substance* *with accidents*; but it is not so in God.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *poison lurks under honey*; because since he does not say this except on account of the error attached [to it], it seems that such names ought altogether to be fled.

**I respond:** It must be said that the poison did not lurk under the name, but under the intention or occasion of those who from this wished occasionally to lead [people] into heresy. — Or it can be said that the poison lurked not as to the signification, but on account of the doubt; and therefore now, since its signification has been determined, it is to be used without doubt.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says, that *to have begotten and to have been born are different (aliud)*. For he seems to say [it] ill, because since *aliud* (different) states diversity in essence, according to this it seems that active generation and nativity differ through essence; which is against the faith.

**I respond:** It must be said that *aliud* there does not state a diversity on the side of the absolute thing, but [only] by comparison to the one speaking and understanding, as if he were saying: it is one thing to say or to understand the Father to generate, and another thing [to say or understand] the like; but under this otherness no diversity of essence underlies, but [only] otherness of property.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *it is proper to the Father, not because he is not born*. For he seems to say [something] against what is said below in the twenty-eighth distinction, where it is said that this which is *unbegotten* (*ingenitus*) is proper to the Father, but to say *unbegotten* (*ingenitum*) is not other than [to say] *not begotten* (*non genitum*).

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine speaks of this which is *not born* (*non natus*) inasmuch as it states a pure negation; and so it does not state a property. For *ingenitus*, insofar as it is a property, is not a pure negation.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this argument of Augustine's, by which he says that *in God nothing is said according to accident, because nothing in him is changeable or losable*. For the argument seems not to hold, because some accidents are inseparable; and such are not losable.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine himself says, every accident either is by its own nature losable, or it can be intensified or remitted in regard to its subject. And he does not say that it is an accident only because it can be lost, but because it could come upon a thing previously existing or recede from a thing already existing, or at least be intensified or remitted or varied. — And if you object that accidents cannot be altered, according to Boethius; this is true of alteration from subject to subject; nevertheless it is certain that in the same [subject] they are intensified and remitted. — Otherwise

it can be said that an accident can be compared to its first subject and to its proximate subject. And, having regard to the first subject, every accident states something supervening, which it is also possible to be absent, although not in respect of the subject which is the subject and cause. — A third way of saying [it] is this, that that alone is by nature unchangeable which is altogether simple. If therefore God is altogether unchangeable, therefore he is altogether simple; and in nothing simple is there an accident: therefore in nothing unchangeable is there to be posited an accident. If therefore the Father is unchangeable, and in him is paternity: therefore it is not an accident.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *we are sons of God by making (per facturam)*; because according to this manner of speaking, since an ass has been made, it seems that he could be called a son of God; and likewise, that an ark which has been made by a craftsman could be called a daughter of the craftsman; neither of which is conceded. If you say that he ought to have been made to the image of God; on the contrary: the devil has been made to the image of God: therefore the devil is a son of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that this which I call *son* states two [things], namely origin and imitation. It must therefore be said that there is an imitation by every-mode assimilation; and thus the natural Son imitates the Father, and because he has no companion in imitating thus, therefore he alone is the natural Son. There is, again, an expressed imitation; and this consists in [the] image, and this still keeps the account of son and of *factura* (made-thing). There is, again, a remote imitation; and this keeps only the account of *factura*, not of son. But it must be attended to that an expressed imitation either consists in its [proper] condition, or is further marked out by its perfection and adornment, or is deprived of honor and deformed from its condition. In the first way it is called a son a *factura*; in the second way, a son by making and by adoption: in the third way, in no way is one called a son, except very improperly and with a distracting addition; because the Lord, in John 8, says that sinners have the devil for father, on account of the fact that they recede from God and imitate him.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about the distinction of those three [things] which Hilary posits, namely *origin, truth, and nativity*; and it must be said that he states these three to exclude three heresies. Against Photinus he says *by origin*, not *by adoption*; because Photinus said that Christ was an adopted son of God. Against Sabellius he says *by truth*, not *by name (nuncupatione)*; because he said that the same one was first named *father*, [and] afterwards *son*. Against Arius he says *by nativity*, not *by creation*; because Arius said that the Son of God was a creature.

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *it is said relatively, although a [reciprocal] vocable does not in turn correspond to it*. For it seems false, because «it is proper to relatives to be said in convertibility»: therefore if they are not said in convertibility, they are not said relatively.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is true if a name has been imposed on each extreme; otherwise, if it fails on one side, it is not said: as if one were to say *the oar of a ship*. Similarly Augustine wishes to say that under these names *Father* and *Son* [the relations] are not referred to the Holy Spirit. But yet, where names fail, the Philosopher teaches one to *fashion* [a name], but in the divine [things]

it is better to be silent than to fashion [one], on account of avoiding error.

### Doubt IX.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that there a customary vocable could not be found. For it seems false, because *spirator* (one who breathes) is just as well said in relation to spirit, as *donator* (giver) [is said in relation] to gift.

**I respond:** One way of saying [it] is that Augustine does not speak simply about this name *Spiritus* (Spirit), but about this whole [name] *Spiritus sanctus* (Holy Spirit). — Or otherwise, he says this because *spirator* was at that time not a customary name, as *donator* [was].

### Doubt X.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *donator is not said except from time*; because according to this, neither is *donum* (gift) said except from time, since relatives are *simultaneous in nature*.

And to this it must be said that [*donator*] can be said either from the act of giving or from a habitus. In the first way it is said only from time, and so also *donum*; in the second way it is said from eternity.

---