Dist. 27
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/27/q/bon-sent-I-d27-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXVII.

### Part I.

#### Cap. I. *What those properties are by which the persons are distinguished.*

Here it can be asked whether the properties which Hilary above assigned, namely that the Father is always Father, and the Son is always Son, are those same properties which Augustine above distinguished, saying that it is proper to the Father that He has begotten the Son; and proper to the Son that He is begotten from the Father; and to the Holy Spirit, that He proceeds from both. And then, whether these in turn are those which are called paternity, filiation, procession. It seems that those properties which Hilary posits and those which Augustine posits are not the same. For if they are the same, then it is the same for the Father to be Father and to have begotten the Son; which indeed some concede. But if this is so, then to whom it belongs to be Father, to him it belongs to have begotten the Son. The divine nature, therefore, if it is Father, has begotten the Son; but if it has not begotten, it is not Father. But who would dare to say either that it itself begot the Son, or that it itself is not Father. But if it itself is Father, and did not beget the Son, then it is not the same to say that something is Father and that it begets the Son. And so it does not seem to be one and the same property.

To which we say, without prejudice to others, that each one noted the same properties, although in different words. For what Hilary says ought to be understood thus: it is proper to the Father that He is always Father, that is, the property of the Father is that by which He is always Father; but He is always Father, because He has always begotten the Son. So too it is proper to the Son that He is always Son, that is, the property of the Son is that by which He is always Son; the Son indeed is always [Son], because He is always begotten. Therefore the property by which the Father is Father, is that He has always begotten; and this same is called paternity or generation. And the property by which the Son is always Son, is that He is always begotten from the Father; and this same is called filiation or being-born or nativity or origin or nascibility. So too the property by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit or Gift, is that He proceeds from both; and this same is called procession. In the foregoing locutions, therefore, the same properties were signified.

#### Cap. II. *That it is not entirely the same to say "to be Father" and "to have begotten" or "to have a Son".*

Yet it does not seem to us to be entirely the same to say that something is Father and to have begotten the Son; or that something is Son and to have a Father, or to be the Holy Spirit and to proceed from both. Otherwise *Father* would not be a name of a hypostasis, that is, of a person, but only of a property; likewise *Son* and *Holy Spirit*: and so the three persons would not be signified by three names. And therefore we say, that the name of *Father* not only notes a relation, but also signifies a hypostasis, that is, a subsistence, and so too *Son* and *Holy Spirit*. But the vocabulary of relations, namely paternity, filiation, procession, or to beget, to be begotten, to proceed, signifies only the relations themselves, not the hypostases — or [signifies] to have a son and to have a father. By way of example, when we say: *God is Father*, by the name of *Father* we both note a relation and signify a divine hypostasis, so that the understanding is this: *God* or the divine essence *is Father*, that is, He who has begotten, namely

the hypostasis which has a son. Likewise: *God is Son*, that is, the hypostasis begotten or having a father. So also *God is Holy Spirit*, that is, the hypostasis proceeding from both, or He who proceeds. But when we put the names of the relations in the predicate, we signify only the notions themselves, not the hypostases — as when it is said: *God has begotten*, that is, *He has a son*; and *God is begotten*, that is, *He has a father*. And then the hypostases alone, not the essence, must be understood in the subjects, [the hypostases] which are determined by those properties.

#### Cap. III. *That the properties determine the hypostases, not the substance, that is, the nature.*

For those properties belong properly each to each of the persons, and through them the persons are determined and differ from one another, but do not depart from one another. Whence John Damascene: "The hypostases do not differ from one another according to substance, but according to characteristic idioms, that is, determinative properties. But the characteristic [marks], that is, the determinative [marks], are of the hypostases, and not of the nature; for indeed they determine the hypostases." Likewise: "We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word *is* timelessly and eternally — simple, having all things which the Father has, as His *homoousion* (that is, consubstantial), differing from the paternal hypostasis by the mode and condition of [His] being-born, but never departing from the paternal hypostasis." The same, more openly expressing the personal properties, says in the same place: "We acknowledge the difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in three properties, that is, the paternal and the filial and the processible, [acknowledging] the hypostases themselves to be inseparable and not distant from one another — and the unity indeed unconfusedly: for they are three, although united — and the divisions [to be] without distance. For each is a perfect hypostasis and possesses its own property, namely a proper mode of existence; but they are united in substance and do not stand apart nor depart from the paternal hypostasis." Behold here you have distinguished those three properties, which above were signified by various modes.

### Part II.

#### Cap. I.

Here it is not to be passed over that, just as *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Spirit* are names of the persons and designate the personal properties, so also there are other names of the persons, that is, [names] which signify the persons themselves and denote their properties, and the same [properties] as the aforementioned names, whence they too are said relatively, namely *begetter*, *begotten*, *word*, *image*. Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*: "It must be seen, he says, that the same is signified when it is said *begotten*, that is signified when it is said *son*. For therefore [He is] son, because [He is] begotten, and because [He is] son, He is certainly begotten." "But just as *son* is referred to *father*, so *begotten* to *begetter*, and just as *father* to *son*, so *begetter* to *begotten*." The same in the sixth book *On the Trinity*: "*Word* is taken as the Son alone, not the Father and the Son together, as if both were one word. For *word* is said in the way *image* [is], for it is not that the Father and the Son together are both *image*, but the Son alone is the image of the Father, just as also son." The same in the seventh book *On the Trinity*: "*Word*, according as it is wisdom and essence, is that which the Father is; according as it is *word*, it is not that which the Father is, since the *word* is not father, and *word* is said relatively, just as *son*." Likewise in the same: "Just as *son* is referred to *father*, so also *word* [is referred] to him whose word it is, when it is called *word*. And on this account it is not [called] *word* by that [account] by which it is called *wisdom*; because *word* is not said with reference to itself, but only relatively to him whose word it is, just as *son* to *father*." "For He is *son* by that very [account] by which [He is] *word*, and He is *word* by that [account] by which [He is] *son*; but [He is] *wisdom* by that [account] by which [He is] *essence*, and therefore, since the Father and the Son are one essence and one wisdom." Likewise in the same: "The Father is not Himself *word*, just as neither *son* nor *image*." "What however is more absurd than to say that an image [is] with reference to itself"? The same in the fifth [book]: "*Son* is said relatively, *word* and *image* are also said relatively, and in all these vocabularies He is referred to the Father, but none of these is called *father*."

*Epilogue.*

It has been openly shown that, just as *son* or *begotten* is said relatively to *father*, so [are] *word* and *image*; and that He is called *word* or *image* by that [account] by which [He is called] *son*, that is, by the same property or notion is He called *word* and *image* by which [He is called] *son*; but not by that [account] by which [He is] *word*, is He called *wisdom* or *essence*, since not by the notion by which He is called *word*, is He called *wisdom*. For *wisdom* is said according to essence, not according to relation.

#### Cap. IV. *On the general rule of those things which are said with reference to self and of those which are said relatively.*

And here a certain general rule must be observed concerning those things which are said with reference to self and those which are said relatively of the Father and the Son. "For whatever they are said [to be] with reference to self, as Augustine says in the sixth book *On the Trinity*, the one is not said without the other — that is, whatever they are said [to be] which shows their substance, both are said together. Therefore neither is the Father God without the Son, nor the Son without the Father, but both together [are] God"; but they are not both together *Father*, nor both together *Son* or *Word* or *Image*.

#### Cap. V. *Whether God of God, and the like, is said according to substance.*

Here it is asked whether, when it is said: *God of God, light of light*, and the like, they are said according to substance. For according to relation it is established that these are not said. But if they are said according to substance, then both together, namely Father and Son, can be called *God of God, light of light*, according to the aforesaid rule. — To which we say, that although *God* is said according to substance and [so too] *light* and *wisdom* and the like, and they are never taken relatively; yet sometimes [they are taken] for relatives, that is, for persons, but not [taken] relatively — as when it is said: *God begot God*, where we put one [*God*] for the Father, the other for the Son; likewise, when it is said: *God of God, light of light*. In other locutions too, the names of the essence are often found drawn over to the signification of the persons, as when it is said: *God born, God dead, God suffering*, where the Son alone is signified. So also it is understood of the Son alone, when it is said: *God of God*, and the like. Whence Augustine, asking how such things are said, in the sixth book *On the Trinity* says: "How is it said: *God of God, light of light*? For not are both together *God of God*, but only the Son of God, namely [of] the Father; nor both together *light of light*, but only the Son of the light [which is] the Father." And it must be known that according to the names of substance only is it said *this of that*, although there those names do not signify substance. But according to the same names of the persons, it is never said *this of that*, as *Word of Word*, or *Son of Son*, since names of this sort cannot belong to different persons. Which Augustine, although obscurely, in the same book says thus: "This alone cannot be said of them, *this of that*, [namely that] which both together are not": that is, by that name alone we cannot use [the formula] to show one of one, [a thing] which does not belong to both together; "as *Word of Word* cannot be said, since both together are not *Word*, nor *Image of Image*, nor *Son of Son*, since both together are not *Son* or *Image*." — And just as the names of substance sometimes give an understanding of the persons distinctly, so too sometimes [they give an understanding] of the whole Trinity together. Whence Augustine in the fifth book says: "In the name of *Father* the Father Himself is pronounced by Himself, but in the name of *God* both the Father Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit [are pronounced], as when it is said: *None is good but God alone*, since the Trinity is one

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