Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/27/q/bon-sent-I-d27-p1-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *On the property of paternity, on the abstraction of properties, on the certainty of this teaching.*

### QUESTION I. *Whether to be the Father and to beget are one and the same notion.*

As to the first [point], that it is the same notion, is shown thus.

1. The one and only property is the hypostasis, which gives [it] to be distinct. For it is not in the account of an accident, but of a form; but that [form] is one only of one. But *to beget* is the property by which the hypostasis of the Father is distinguished, and likewise *to be the Father*: therefore it is the same notion.

2. Likewise, of the Father to the Son there is one and only relation, since there is only one origin and one mode of emanating; but *to beget* expresses the relation of the Father to the Son, and likewise *to be the Father*: therefore it is the same relation or notion.

3. Likewise, if there are diverse properties, then the notions will be more than five — indeed, infinite. For just as upon *to beget* there follows *to be the Father*, so upon *being referred to the Father* there follows *to be distinguished from the Father*, etc.; and if these be other notions, then the number of notions is infinite. But this is unfitting, and it follows if those properties are diverse: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. If the same property is *to be the Father* and *to beget*: therefore altogether the same is imported by the name *Father* and by the name *Begetter*. Therefore just as one is baptized if someone is baptized in the name of the Father, so [also] if in the name of the Begetter; but this is commonly denied.

2. Likewise, properties and notions are diverse and are known to be diverse, since they are predicated of diverse [things] — for of one [thing] one is predicated, of which another is not predicated — but this is conceded: *the essence is the Father*; this is denied: *the essence begets*: therefore etc. *If you say* that this is on account of a diverse mode of signifying; *on the contrary*: this is nothing, since both *to be the Father* and *to beget*, each is said in concretion.

3. Likewise, properties are proved to be diverse when one is not predicated of the other, as *paternity* and *unbegottenness*; but *to beget*, as will be plain below, is not said of *paternity* — for this is not admitted: *paternity begets* — therefore they are diverse.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Paternity and generation are one property according to the thing; but according to the mode of signifying there is a threefold difference between them.*

**I respond:** It must be said that they are altogether the same property according to the thing; and the reason for this manifestly appears. For the one is said of the other not only in concretion, as *the Father begets*, but also in abstraction, as *paternity is generation*; which would not be, if they differed.

Since, however, they are the same property, it is signified in a different mode, and this as to three [points]. The first indeed is, since *generation* expresses the property of the person more generally than this [word] *father*. For, as Augustine says and as is found in the third book, distinction four, upon *being the father* there follows *to beget*, but it does not convert. For a man is said *to beget* lice, yet is not called their *father*. Another reason is that this [word] *father* imports within itself the hypostasis, around which it notes the property; but this verb *begets* does not import the hypostasis, but rather requires [a hypostasis] to be applied to it from outside; and this the Master places in the *littera*. The third [reason] is that, since a property imports two [things], namely emanation and relation, which though they are the same in thing, yet differ in account of understanding — since this [word] *to beget* imports production, and *generation* emanation; but this [phrase] *to be the Father* properly imports relation.

1. From these things the objections are plain. For [the fact] that there is no baptism in the name of the Begetter, this is not on account of a diversity of thing, but of the mode of expressing; and both are considered there, as will be plain in the fourth [book].

2. To that which is objected, that it is not predicated etc.; it must be said that this is on account of the diverse mode of signifying. For this [word] *to beget*, since it does not have a supposit within, posits the thing around the essence, and therefore signifies it to be distinguished; not so, however, this [word] *father*, since it does have a supposit within. For the sense is: *the essence is the father*, that is, *he who begets*.

3. To that which is finally objected, that one is not predicated of the other; it must be said that there is a predication by mode of denomination, and this is through concretion; and there is a predication by mode of identity, and this is through abstraction. Therefore, since *to beget* and *to be the Father* are one and the same property, therefore [the predication] is not only according to the mode of denominating, but [also] is predicated by abstraction, as *paternity is generation*.