Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/27/q/bon-sent-I-d27-p1-a1-q4
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### QUESTION IV. *Whether it is permitted to hold opposing opinions concerning the notions or properties.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether it is a sin to hold opposing opinions concerning the notions or properties.

And that [it is] not, it seems:

1. Because the saints held opposing opinions concerning the Scriptures, and yet did not sin, but it was only a punishment to them. Whence Augustine: «To approve falsehoods for truths is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of one condemned».

2. Likewise, Jerome: «What does not have truth from the Scriptures, is despised with the same ease with which it is proved»; but the notions do not have truth from the Scriptures, but were devised by the masters: therefore it is permitted to despise many things there by the same reasoning by which one proves [them].

3. Likewise, this seems [so] by reason, since the number of the notions and such things are not among those things which are necessary for salvation; but it is permitted to hold opposing opinions in those things which do not pertain to the way of salvation, and this without sin: therefore also concerning the notions.

4. Likewise, if there is a sin there, then either of faith or of morals. Not of faith, since it is not against the articles; not of morals, since to believe a falsehood does not regard morals: therefore no sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. Concerning two persons holding opposing opinions about the notions, it is necessary that one say something false concerning divine matters; but a lie concerning divine matters is a lie in the Christian religion, and this is the gravest sin: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, when two are holding opposing opinions about the notions, it is necessary that one be deceived and err; but error concerning divine matters is most dangerous. Whence Augustine, *On the Trinity* book one: «Nowhere is it more dangerous to err, nor more fruitful is anything found». If, then, error concerning the humanity of Christ is a sin: therefore also concerning the notions much more strongly.

3. Likewise, since the properties are God himself, whoever says or believes that the properties are not, or are not what they are, says of God that which he is not; but whoever says that God is not what he is, or conversely, errs with the error of sin: therefore since one of those holding opinions in this way is of this kind, therefore etc.

4. Likewise, as Augustine says: «Not only does he lie who says what is false, but also he who asserts what is doubtful»; but each of those holding opinions says something doubtful, since no opinion of [these] two is certain: therefore each lies. But whoever lies concerning God sins mortally or venially, but more often mortally: therefore each sins.

> **CONCLUSION.** *In those things concerning the notions which have not been determined by the Church, it is permitted to hold opposing opinions, but not to assert them presumptuously.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to hold opposing opinions can be either concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of the Christian religion, or concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry. Concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry it is permitted both to hold opposing opinions and to assert [them]; to opine indeed, because those things do not bear on salvation, [and] to assert, because they are subject to our inquiry. — In those things which pertain to the doctrine of religion a distinction must be made. For some are of the necessity of faith, some of the certitude of Scripture, [and] some are annexed to these, as are those things which serve for the explication of the faith and the exposition of Scripture.

Concerning those things which are of the necessity of faith, to hold opposing opinions is simply a sin in the one [party], namely in him who opines what is false. And if it be a simple opinion, it is the sin of error; if however assertion and defense, it must be called not only error but heresy.

In those things, however, which are of the certitude of Scripture, it is permitted to those ignorant of the Scriptures to hold opposing opinions; nor is it a fault, as if one simple man should believe that Jacob was the father of Isaac, [and] another not, but the converse. And the first, although indeed he should so suspect or opine, does not sin, because he is ignorant of Scripture. To those, however, knowing Scripture it is not permitted; rather the [other] one sins if he simply opine. If, however, he should defend [it], he must be judged a heretic, since he contradicts Sacred Scripture.

In those things, however, which are annexed to faith or to Scripture, either one opinion follows upon faith and Scripture, and the opposite follows upon the other; and then it must be said that before due treatment it is permitted to hold opposing opinions, but after due treatment it is not permitted, rather it is a sin, as was the case with the opinion of [Gilbert] of Poitiers concerning the properties. For he was saying that they are not God, and from this there follows the contrary of the faith. For since the Church adores the property, it would then adore what is not God and what is not God would be adored. Whence if, after the unfittingness had been shown to him, he had not retracted the error, he would have been judged a heretic by the Church; but he retracted at the council of Reims, as Bernard says. — In those things, however, which are annexed to faith and neither follow nor are repugnant, because they are doubtful, it is permitted to opine; but it is not permitted to assert, because to opine is [the act] of conferring reason, but to assert what is doubtful concerning God is [the act] of presumptuous reason.

*Epilogue.* It must therefore be conceded that each opining party, if he should assert, sins, not on account of error, but on account of presumption; and so it must be conceded that it is permitted to hold opposing opinions there.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*1.* To that which is objected, that [there is] a lie in the Christian religion etc.; it must be said that it is not a lie, since neither says against [the rule of] belief; [it is] not in the Christian religion, since it is not of the necessity of faith or of morals.

*2.* To that which is objected, that that error is dangerous; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is contrary to faith; but if it is concerning those things which do not pertain to faith, it is not true.

*3.* To that which is objected, that he sins who says that God is not what he is etc.; it must be said that this is true, if it has been determined by faith or by Scripture; otherwise he does not sin, unless he assert or defend.

*4.* To that which is objected last, it must be said that it is to be conceded. For he who on his own authority asserts or affirms concerning God that which neither Scripture nor faith says nor follows from them, is to be judged presumptuous even if he speak the truth; and if he doubts in his heart and affirms with his mouth, he is a liar; if he asserts in both modes, he is proud.