Dist. 27, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/27/q/bon-sent-I-d27-p1-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what [the Master] says: *It is proper to the Father that he is always Father*. For he seems to say [something] false, because every property differs from that of which it is the property, either in reality or in reason; but *father* and *father* agree in reality, in reason, and in name: therefore the one is not the property of the other.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the Father we understand both him *who is Father*, and *that by which he is Father*. When therefore *father* is predicated of himself, by reason of the one [aspect] he is made the subject and by reason of the other he is predicated. Likewise, when "to be Father" is assigned as proper to the Father, because it is assigned in the manner of an attribute, therefore by reason of the property itself it is attributed to the hypostasis. Whence he says that *to be Father* is proper to the Father, not that *the Father is Father*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The same [thing] is called nativity or origin*. For he seems to say [something] against what was said above, in the third distinction, in the chapter *On the vestige*, and [what] was drawn from Augustine *On True Religion*, namely that origin is appropriated to the Father.

**I respond:** It must be said that *origin* is always said relatively. Therefore *origin* can be taken either in respect of a creature, or in respect of a person. If in respect of a creature, thus it belongs to the whole Trinity and is appropriated to the Father; but if in respect of a person, thus it can be taken actively or passively: if actively, thus it belongs to the Father and the Son, but is appropriated to the Father; if passively, thus it belongs to the Son and the Holy Spirit, and is appropriated to the Son, not insofar as it is said simply, but insofar as *origin* states an emanation by way of nature. For thus, since that [emanation by nature] is proper to the Son, so likewise [is] origin, in the sense in which it is so taken; and in this way it is taken here, and therefore it is not against [what was said earlier].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *to beget and to be begotten* signify only the relations themselves, not the hypostases. For it seems false, because when relations are signified in concretion, they import not only the relations, but also the supposit; but when they import only the relations, they are signified abstractly. If therefore this which is *to beget* and *to be begotten* does not import the relation abstractly, but concretely: it seems that they do not import only the relations.

**I respond:** It must be said that concretion is imported differently. For it is imported in one way through a verb, in another way through an adjectival noun. For because a verb imports the act as going forth, therefore [it imports it] at a certain distance; and therefore it also imports [it] under a certain inclination. And on account of this, because it imports [it] at a distance, it does not enclose the supposit within itself; on the contrary, it must be added externally, unless a demonstrative pronoun supplies the place of the external addition — [a demonstrative] which is in the act of properly the first and second person, since [these] are always present and demonstrative. And therefore, although [a verb] imports [the relation] in concretion, nevertheless of itself it imports nothing but the relation,

not the supposit. — But an adjectival noun, signifying the same [thing], signifies the property informing [the supposit], and so [imports it] in a certain union and non-distance; and therefore it imports the form and the supposit at the same time, as when one says *white*, unless it is signified in the abstract, as when one says *whiteness*. Attending to this, the Master says that *paternity* and *filiation*, *to beget* and *to be begotten* state only the relations.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *When we place the names of the relations in the predicates, we signify only the notions themselves, not the hypostases*; because if this is true, when it is said: *the essence is the Father*, since *Father* is placed in the predicate, it then stands for a notion: therefore it is the same to say: *the essence is the Father*, as if it were said: *the essence generates*; but this is false: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that some [things] are placed in the predicate through their own proper nature and signification: and such are those which of themselves import composition, as verbs are; and the Master speaks about such [things]. Some [things] are placed in the predicate in such a way that they are by nature [fit] to be made the subject, as this name *father* and this name *son*; and such, because they are by nature not only [fit] to be predicated, but also to be made the subject, can import the understanding of a hypostasis. Hence the Master's word must be understood with [a certain] precision, namely of those [things] which are by nature [fit] to be predicated in such a way that [they are] not [fit] to be made the subject; and so it has no instance against it.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The characteristic idioms are determinative of the hypostases, not of the nature*, etc. For he seems to say [something] amiss, because properties which do not determine the nature are non-natural; since every natural property, by the very fact that it is natural, determines the nature: therefore, if the properties in divine [things] do not determine the nature, they are not natural — therefore [they are] outside of nature, and therefore acci[?]… [accidental?]

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as the order of nature is said in two ways — either [as that] by which nature *is ordered*, or [as that] in which nature is the ground *of ordering* — so too is it to be understood concerning the properties: and when we speak of a *natural* property, it is not required that the property have nature as its subject, but [only] that it be consonant with the nature of the subject itself; just as a son is not called *natural* because he is from a nature or essence, but [because he is] from a father naturally producing; so too in the case at hand it is to be understood.

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