Dist. 27, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/27/q/bon-sent-I-d27-p2-a1-q1
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### QUESTION I. *Whether 'word' in divine matters is said essentially or notionally.*

As to the first [point], then, it is asked first whether 'word' is said essentially or notionally. And that it is said notionally is shown:

1. *First*, by the authority of canon [Scripture]. Blessed John, most elegantly expressing the incarnation, says: *The Word was made flesh*; but the union was not made except in the person of the Son: therefore 'word' expresses nothing but the person of the Son, and properly: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, fifteenth [book] *On the Trinity*: «In the Trinity 'word' is said only of the Son, and 'gift' only of the Holy Spirit».

3. Likewise, Anselm in the *Monologion*: «It is most evident that neither he whose word it is can be his own word, nor can the word be he whose word it is».

4. Likewise, by reason it appears so, since 'word' is what emanates from the mind by way of conception; therefore 'word' of itself signifies a concept; but to be conceived and to be begotten are the same, and to be begotten is notional: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, 'word' is said of what emanates by way of perfect expression; but to be image is proper to the Son: therefore so also is 'word'.

6. Likewise, every word signifies a relation to one speaking; but to be relative in divine matters is said notionally, if it signifies a relation to a person; but a speaker can be nothing but a person: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it is said essentially is shown thus. As Augustine says in the ninth [book] *On the Trinity*, chapter ten: «A word is knowledge with love»; but knowledge is said essentially: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a word is that by which a thing is manifested and expressed; but to be manifested belongs to any person, and manifestation is essential: therefore so also is 'word'. If you say that it is not called manifestation simply, but manifestation of another: it is then objected, since the Holy Spirit is the one who manifests the Son, John sixteen: *He shall glorify me*, etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to the speaker, since 'word' is said in respect to the speaker: but speakers are three, as Anselm says in the *Monologion*: «Each one in the Trinity says himself»: therefore the word is of three. But nothing is of three save what is essential: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, as Anselm says in the *Monologion*: «To say is nothing other than to behold by thinking»; but this is essential: therefore so also is 'word'. If you say that to-say, in so far as it is said essentially, has no corresponding word; on the contrary: as Anselm says, «The Father, by saying himself, generates the Word»; but every act in which a person reflects upon itself is essential: therefore also to *to-say*, in so far as it is essential, there corresponds a word: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this is shown by comparison to that which is said through the word. Nothing intermediate between creature and Creator is a notion or notional, since an intermediate stands equally distant from the extremes; but the Word is intermediate, since *all things were made through the Word*: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The eternal Word in divine matters is said only notionally, not essentially.*

**I respond:** To this some have said that *to-say* is taken in three ways in divine matters. In one way *to-say* is the same as *to understand*; in another way, the same as *to generate*; whence Augustine expounds that [text] of Genesis one: «*He said*, that is, He begot the Son, in whom He arranged all things»; in a third way, *to-say* is the same as *to create*; and 'word' does not correspond to that which is *to-say*, in so far as [it is] uncreated, except in so far as *to-say* is the same as *to generate*; and thus it belongs to the Father alone.

— But this does not seem intelligible, that there be a speaking without a word, and that something be a saying to which no word corresponds, just as there is no generating without something begotten, nor knowing without knowledge. And this very mode of speaking and understanding shrinks from anyone saying or speaking without any word.

Therefore some have wished to say that just as *to-say* is taken essentially and personally, since there are three who speak, as Anselm says, so also 'word' is said essentially and personally. And by this way they strive to solve the objections on either side. — But this is expressly against Augustine and against Anselm. For Augustine says that «a word, by the very fact that it is a word, is said in relation to another». Similarly Anselm: «It is most evident that the word is not he whose word it is». And this is also plain through the authorities of Augustine which the Master adduces in the *littera*, and Anselm in the *Monologion* expressly denies this.

On account of this, it must be understood that *to-say* is the same as *to-speak*; but *to-speak* is in two ways, either to oneself, that is, with oneself, or to another. To speak to oneself is nothing other than to conceive something in mind. But the mind conceives by understanding, and understanding another it conceives a likeness of the other, [and] understanding itself it conceives a likeness of itself, since the intelligence is assimilated to what is understood. The mind, therefore, by saying itself with itself, conceives [what is] in every way like itself; and this is the conceived word. — In another way, *to-say* to another is to express the concept of the mind; and to this *to-say* there corresponds the uttered word.

It must therefore be said that just as in us *to-say* is taken in two ways, so in God. For *to-say* of God with himself is to conceive by understanding; and this is to generate offspring like to himself, and to this *to-say* there corresponds the born word, that is, the eternal Word. In another way *to-say* is to express oneself outwardly, and so *to-say* is the same as to declare oneself through a creature, and to this *to-say* there corresponds the created word and the temporal word.

It must therefore be conceded that *word*, like *to-say*, is taken in two ways, namely eternally and temporally. And the word created temporally is neither God nor in God, but a creature in respect to God. The eternal Word is God, and is of him alone whose [property] it is to be conceived, just as *to-say* is of him alone whose [property] it is *to conceive*. Therefore the reasonings proving that 'word' is said notionally are simply to be conceded.

1. 2. To that which is objected, that the word is knowledge, and the word is what manifests; it must be said that neither this nor that is the whole account of 'word', just as *to know* is not the whole account of *to-say* or *to manifest*, but it is necessary that something conceived fall there [as well]; therefore, since knowledge conceived and manifestation through a concept are through the Son alone, not the Holy Spirit, therefore that which is objected is plain.

3. To that which is objected concerning 'word' in comparison to the speaker, it must be said that *to-say* is not said essentially, except in so far as it is said in respect to the created word, and in so far as it notes a temporal effect; but in so far as it signifies an eternal relation, so [the] one alone is the speaker.

4. As to that, then, which is objected, that *to-say* is nothing other than to behold by thinking; it must be said that this is true where intuition is not without a concept, as in us and in the Father; but in the Son it is not so, nor likewise in the Holy Spirit. For although they understand themselves, yet they do not conceive offspring, since there is no fecundity in them for begetting. — If you ask the reason for this, Augustine teaches you in the fifteenth [book] *On the Trinity*: the reason for this is that we do not understand except by understanding [intelligentia], and that is always begotten. But in that blessed Trinity it is otherwise than in the [created] image, since each person understands. And therefore *to understand* does not there signify the account of conceiving, and through this it does not embrace the whole account of saying or of word in God, as it does in us.

5. To that which is objected, that the act reflects upon itself, etc.; it must be said that, whether it be said with oneself or outwardly to another, in either mode it implies *with itself* an absolute act and a relative one. For *to-say* with oneself is to beget a concept by thinking or by understanding; and by reason of the first there is reflection, but by reason of the second there is relation. Similarly *to-say* outwardly is to form something outside by declaring oneself or one's concept. Whence *to-say* in either mode reflects upon the speaker and what is said: upon the speaker, by reason of the absolute act; upon what is said, by reason of what is compared. And thus that objection is manifest, since *to-say* is not only an absolute; and therefore is not always essential.

6. To that which is objected, that the Word is intermediate; it must be said that intermediate is twofold, namely [intermediate] of essence and of intelligence; and the Word is not intermediate in being, but extreme, since the Word himself made all things — but only in understanding — since the Father made all things through the Word. And this will be better said below.