Dist. 27, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/27/q/bon-sent-I-d27-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what [the Master] says: *Insofar as [the Word] is wisdom, he is what the Father is; insofar as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is*, because either this is taken essentially or personally. If essentially, then not only insofar as wisdom is he one in essence with the Father, but also insofar as he is the Word. If personally, then it is false that, insofar as he is wisdom, he is personally what the Father is. — Likewise, since *hoc* ("this") is of neuter gender, it seems that it stands for the essence, and so the Word is always what the Father is, namely one in essence or substance.

**I respond:** It must be said that *hoc* there stands for the [thing] signified by the term, so that the sense is: the Word, insofar as he is wisdom, is what the Father is; because insofar as he is wisdom, something is attributed to him which is also [attributed] to the Father, namely the [thing] signified by this name *wisdom*. Likewise the other [proposition] is true: the Son, insofar as he is the Word, is not what the Father is, because something is attributed to the Son insofar as he is the Word, which does not belong to the Father. Hence *secundum* ("insofar as") states there a relation under a formal aspect, and the pronoun *hoc* imports and points out the proper [thing] signified by the term; and therefore, because *wisdom* signifies something essential, in the first [proposition] it is taken essentially; because the [thing] signified by *Word* is something personal, in the second [proposition] it is taken personally.

Or it can be said otherwise, that it is taken essentially, and insofar as it states a relation in the manner of a formal [aspect]; whence, just as it is by one [thing] that he is God, by another [thing] that he is Father — because by deity he is God, by paternity Father —, in such a way that he is neither God by paternity nor Father by deity — so does Augustine take it, when he says: *insofar as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is*, in such a way that the unity in nature is not denied, but the relation expressed by *secundum* is denied; because the Word, insofar as he is word, does not state unity of essence but distinction of person — the contrary [holds] for *wisdom*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Word, image, and son are said by the same property or notion*; because if this is true, then either there is a synonymy or a piling-up of words there, or [there is] some difference.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a difference; and one difference can be taken thus: that *word* is said [of him] who proceeds from the interior [parts], *image* [of him] who imitates in the exterior [parts], and *son* embraces both; and therefore the [name] *son* is said more [emphatically] and more commonly than any of the others.

Or otherwise: all these three import a likeness to another; but *son* imports that likeness as naturally emanating, *image* as expressly imitating, *word* as expressing [the likeness] to others, insofar as it is of itself or born to express; therefore that person is more frequently named *son* on account of this, that he imports by [his] own name the very emanation and that relation.

Or otherwise: *image* imports that likeness as conformed, *word* imports it as mental or spiritual, but *son* [imports it] as connatural. And so it is plain that there is a different account of signifying the same relation, and so it is the same property, and yet not synonymy. — And in the first acceptation the meaning of *word* takes precedence, in the second the meaning of *son*, in the third the meaning of *image*; nevertheless among them all the middle way is the more fitting.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Son alone is God from God*. For it seems false to say [this], because "the Holy Spirit is God from God": therefore not the Son alone.

**I respond:** It must be said that this exclusion is restricted by the manner of speaking. Which is plain, because he does not say this simply, but speaking of the Father and the Son he says: "not both [are] God from God, but the Son alone", in such a way

that from the very manner of speaking *alone* is restricted to making an exclusion with regard to the Father.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *According to the names of substance it is said: this from that*. For it seems false, because the Son is rightly said [to be] from the Father by names which are not names of substance. If you say that it is understood with regard to the same name; it is objected that *proceeding* is rightly said [to be] from a *proceeding [one]*, and *principle* from *principle*, or *spirating* from *spirating*; yet these names are not said according to substance.

Likewise it is asked about what he immediately adds there: *Although those names do not signify substance*; for if this [is so], then they signify a relation; therefore this name *God* signifies a relation. And again, if they do not signify substance but relation, then relative names can be put in their place: therefore Father from Father.

**I respond:** It must be said that to say *this of that* is twofold, namely according to the same name, or according to another. According to the same [name] it cannot be, unless it belongs to two; and because the names belonging to two persons are nearly all essential, though some are notional; therefore the Master's rule for the most part holds true. However, certain books have *maxime* ("most of all"); in those in which it is not [present], it can be put as a gloss; and so the objection ceases, because the Master does not intend to exclude any [names] except proper [ones], which are said of one alone. — As to the objection that the names do not signify substance; it must be said that he takes "signification" for "supposition", and *non significant* ("they do not signify") amounts to *non supponunt* ("they do not supposit").

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