Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/28/q/bon-sent-I-d28-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *On the property of unbegottenness.*

### QUESTION I. *Whether the name "ingenerate" or "unbegotten" is said according to substance or according to relation.*

As to the first [point], that this name *ingenerate* is said according to relation, is shown:

1. Through Augustine, who says in the fifth book *On the Trinity* and as is found in the *littera*: "One does not depart from the relative predicament when one says *ingenerate*": therefore it is said according to relation.

2. Likewise in the same book: "Just as the begotten [is said] to the begetter, so the ingenerate [is said] to the non-begetter"; but what is said to another is said relatively or according to relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the same is seen by reason, since everything in which person differs from person is said according to relation — this is plain — but according to this [name], that is *ingenerate*, the Father differs from the Son: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no negation deprives the mode of signifying or saying; but *begotten* is said according to relation; therefore with negation added, it will still be said [according to relation]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every relation in divine [things] posits something — that is certain — but *ingenerate* posits nothing: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [premise]: if this name posits something, then either as it is taken negatively, or as it is taken privatively. Not as taken negatively; this is plain. If therefore as taken privatively; but privation removes the act and posits the aptitude: therefore according to this *ingenerate* will be the same as *apt to be begotten, and not begotten*; but this fits no one: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every relation in divine [things] signified in concretion imports distinction, and therefore none is said of the essence according to the mode of denomination — for this is false: *the essence begets* — but *ingenerate* is said of the essence, for the divine essence is *not begotten*, since its opposite is not predicated of the essence, namely *begotten*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, negations stand opposite to affirmations; but *begotten* is in less than *related*, and *generation* than *relation*: therefore *ingenerate* is in more than *non-related*, and *ingeneration* than *non-relation*. But *non-related* or *non-relation* is not said according to relation, since then it would imply opposites: therefore since this [word] *ingenerate* is in more, it is not in the genus of relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every relation in divine [things] is either with respect to a principle, or with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle: therefore if this [word] *ingenerate* expresses relation, [it is] either with respect to a principle, or with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle. But not with respect to a principle, since then the Father would have a principle, which is unfitting. If with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle, then the negation is not of that of which the affirmation was — for *begotten* is said with respect to a principle, since [it is] from someone — therefore if *ingenerate* is not said with respect to a principle, then the negation is not said with respect to that with respect to which the affirmation was. Therefore neither does it express relation to that-which-is-from-the-principle, since the name does not permit [it], nor to a principle, since the thing does not permit [it].

> **CONCLUSION.** *The name* ingenerate *in its principal sense expresses relation privatively, but in its consequent sense positively, namely fontal fullness.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there are diverse positions on this. For all have held that this [name] *ingenerate* is said according to relation, but differently.

For some have said that *ingenerate* expresses only the *privation of relation*; and that alone suffices for it to be said notionally, since privation can be a principle of distinguishing and of making known, just as a sheep that is unmarked [is distinguished] from one that is marked. And again, negation expresses nobility, as *not being ruled* in a king, *not being caused* in a cause, *not being produced* in a principle. — But this position cannot stand, since pure negation neither distinguishes nor expresses nobility: it does not distinguish, for the negation of relation is said of the essence; it does not express nobility, for all nobility posits something through the mode of position.

Others have held that this [word] *ingenerate* is said according to relation and positively, since by privating the one it posits the other: just as *unequal* privates equality and posits the relation opposed to it, similarly also *dissimilar*, whence it imports relation positively; so this [word] *ingenerate*, by privating the relation to the begetter, posits the opposite relation to the non-begetter. And this they say Augustine held, who says that "just as the begotten [is said] to the begetter, so the non-begotten [is said] to the non-begetter". — But this position cannot stand, since *non-begotten* is said either to a principle, or to that-which-is-from-the-principle. If to that-which-is-from-the-principle, then this name *ingenerate* cannot be said with respect to it, since *begotten* is said with respect to a principle, and the same is signified in this name *begotten* and *ingenerate*, and *ingenerate* differs only in the negation: therefore it is necessary that this name *ingenerate* be said with respect to a principle. But if this is true: then according to this the Father would be posited to have a principle with respect to which it is said. And again, that principle would be called *non-begetter*; but *not to beget* does not express a principle, but the privation of it.

The third manner of speaking is that this name *ingenerate*, insofar as it is assigned as the notion of the Father, is said according to relation partly privatively, partly positively. Concerning this it must be noted that, as Augustine says, "*ingenerate* and *non-begotten* are the same". But *non-begotten* can be taken in three ways, like *non-white*, since it can be a negation in a genus, or outside a genus, or partly in a genus and partly outside a genus. Insofar as it is a negation outside a genus, thus it generally privates and does not posit any quality, just as one can call *non-white* that which is not in the genus of color nor of quality. Insofar as it is a negation in a genus, thus it privates whiteness and posits a contrary quality, as *non-white*, since it lacks whiteness, but yet is black. Insofar as [it is] partly in a genus, partly outside a genus, namely in a remote genus and outside the proximate genus; thus *non-white* is said [of that] which lacks both whiteness and color, yet has a quality nonetheless.

In this manner [it is] to be understood in the matter at hand. For this [word] *ingenerate* imports order in the account of remote genus, and order to a principle in the account of proximate [genus], and such an order through the mode of nature in the account of completive [genus]. If therefore *ingenerate* be a negation outside a genus, thus *ingenerate* is said [of him] who is not begotten and does not even have order or relation; and in this mode it expresses pure privation and is said of the essence, and is said neither according to substance nor according to relation, since it is privation only. — In another mode it can be a negation in a genus; and then *ingenerate* is said [of him] who is not begotten, yet has order to a principle, and in this mode it expresses an underlying relation; but yet from this it does not express nobility, and so it fits the Holy Spirit, yet is not a notion. — In a third mode it can be a negation in a certain manner in a genus, in a certain manner outside a genus; and thus *ingenerate* is said [of him] who is not begotten, yet has order, but not to a principle; and in this mode it expresses the privation of relation with respect to a principle. For if it has order, and not to a principle, therefore it itself is first and a principle; and in this mode it expresses nobility, just as also a principle [does]. And it was fitting that it be signified through negation, since first [things] are known through negation, and in this mode it is a notion.

But since *ingenerate*, by the account of its name, does not seem to express anything but the privation or negation of generation, on this account it must be said in a fourth manner, that this name *ingenerate*, insofar as it fits the Father properly, expresses relation privatively, but by this very fact expresses consequently relation positively.

This is plain thus. *Not to be begotten* is said of him who simply is not begotten; and so [it] fits not only the Father, but the essence and the Holy Spirit. But beyond this sense, as it properly fits the Father, it adds, since the Father is not begotten, nor received through generation; and thus the essence is excluded, which is received through generation, but it still fits the Holy Spirit. As it fits the Father alone, thus he is called *ingenerate*, since he is not begotten, nor received through generation, nor follows upon generation. Through the first member the Son is excluded, through the second the essence, through the third the Holy Spirit, whose procession presupposes generation according to the original order, since he proceeds as the bond from the Father and the Son. For although in divine [things] there is no prior and posterior, yet according to origin and the account of understanding, the generation of the Son is prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit, as was shown above, and yet they are simultaneous in nature.

Thus therefore, with the verb *to follow* taken broadly, since there properly is no preceding and following there, in three ways someone is said to be *ingenerate*: either since he is not produced through generation, or since he is not produced through generation nor had or received through generation, or since he is neither produced nor received nor follows. In this mode therefore *ingenerate* imports being from another in no mode, and so primacy and through this fontal fullness, as was shown at the beginning of the preceding distinction, and as is plain from the beginning of the following distinction, where it is said that "the Father is the principle of the whole deity, since he is from no one"; and so in its principal sense it expresses relation privatively, in its consequent sense positively; and so it does not express the negation that posits nothing.

Whence the reasons for this [conclusion] must be conceded.

1. To that therefore which is objected, that it posits nothing insofar as [taken] negatively; it must be said that this is false, since it is not a negation *outside a genus*, as if one said: *a chimaera is ingenerate*, but rather it is a negation with the constancy of the subject; and such a negation in the subject leaves the highest nobility.

2. To that which is objected, that it is said of the essence; it must be said that it is true, but according to as it is said only privatively, and so it is not a property of the Father; but according to as [it is] a property of the Father, it is not said of the essence.

3. To that which is objected, that negations stand opposite to affirmations; it must be said that this is not always true of negation in a genus, but [is true] outside a genus. For *non-white*, insofar as it is a negation in a genus, is not said as superior to this which is *non-qualitative*; similarly *ingenerate* is not superior to this which is *non-related*.

4. To that which is finally objected, that it expresses relation; it must be said that insofar as it imports relation privatively, it is said with respect to a principle; and from this it does not follow that the Father has a principle, but rather that he does not have [one], since it is not said according to position, but according to removal. Whence Augustine well says, "[it] is said to the non-begetter", since *ingenerate* signifies the removal of the begetter. But insofar as it imports relation positively and consequently, thus [it is said] with respect to that-which-is-from-the-principle; and so it is not unfitting that some privative name should consequently import something which the affirmative opposed to it does not import. And thus the rest are plain.