Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/28/q/bon-sent-I-d28-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II. *Whether unbegottenness and paternity import the same relation.*

Secondly, having supposed that this name *unbegotten* is said according to relation, it is asked whether it imports the same relation as this name *Father* — that is, whether unbegottenness and paternity are the same relation. And that they are not, is shown thus.

1. Augustine, fifth book *On the Trinity*: «It is one thing to say [a person] is Father, and another [to say a person is] unbegotten»; but [they] do not differ according to essence: therefore according to relation.

2. Likewise, this is seen by reason, since it is possible for someone to be understood to be unbegotten and not to be a father, as in Adam, and conversely, as in Cain. If, therefore, one relation can be understood, the other not being understood, and conversely; and one posited, the other not posited: therefore they are diverse relations.

3. Likewise, relations are diversified according to their terms, since a relation, as such, is to another; but *unbegotten* is said by privation of a prior, namely of a father, and *father* by the position of an offspring or son: therefore they say a respect according to one part and another part: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, generation and ingeneration differ more than generation and spiration — for here there is proper opposition, but there only disparation — but generation and spiration are different relations: therefore generation and ingeneration are also [different relations]. But generation and paternity are the same, as was shown above: therefore unbegottenness and paternity are not the same relations.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every relation in divine things is of a person

to a person; if therefore *unbegotten* names a relation, [it is] either to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, or to both. Not to both, since the Father is not compared by a single relation, but by diverse [relations] to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; not to the person of the Holy Spirit — this is clear — therefore to the Son. If, then, the relation to the Son is paternity: therefore unbegottenness is the same relation.

2. Likewise, relations in the divine persons are not accidents, but bestow being on the person: therefore if of one person there is one being, there will be one relation of it. But the Father is one person, and unbegottenness and paternity belong to him: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, just as begottenness in the Son stands to filiation, so unbegottenness in the Father stands to paternity; but in the Son begottenness and filiation are the same relation: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the Philosopher: «I call *first* and *principle* the same»; but *unbegotten* names that which it names under the account of *first*, *father* under the account of *principle*: therefore they name the same disposition and relation: therefore they are not two relations, but one only.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Unbegottenness is a notion other than paternity, since each imports a different relation, both according to the principal understanding and according to the consequent understanding.*

**I respond:** It must be said that what *unbegotten* is imports a different relation from what *father* is, whether as to the principal understanding, or as to the consequent. As to the principal, it is manifest, since *unbegotten* imports a respect to a principle by way of privation, while *father* imports a respect to a principiate by way of position and generation; and so they name diverse dispositions, of which one is a true disposition, the other a privation of a disposition. — As to the consequent understanding they likewise differ, although not as much. For *father* names the relation of principle only with respect to the Son and by way of generation, but *unbegotten* names a universal principality or fontal fullness in producing, not only as to generation, but also as to spiration, not only with respect to the Son, but also with respect to the Holy Spirit. And this is clear, since one is called *unbegotten* on the ground that he is not generated nor follows generation: therefore in the name *unbegotten* the account of being-born and proceeding is taken away; and if so, the account of every-mode principality is posited, and therefore of fontal fullness.

**To the opposite [arguments]:**

1. To that, then, which is objected, that [unbegottenness] names a respect of person to person; it must be said that, privatively or negatively, it does not name a respect to a person. And as to what is said — that every relation names a respect to a person — this is to be understood of that [relation] which names a position. But according as it is taken as to the consequent understanding, it does name a respect to each [other] person. — As to what is objected, that there is not one common relation; it must be said that this is true as to the principal understanding, yet it can well be [so] as to the consequent, so that some name names a fullness with respect to both.

2. To that which is objected, that a relation gives existing to a person; it must be said that not just any [relation does so], but [the one] which is a personal relation. What that is, will appear below.

3. To that which is objected, that in the Son begottenness and filiation are the same: therefore etc.; it must be said that this does not follow, since [these pairs] are not opposed by the same kind of opposition; for paternity and filiation are opposed relatively, but not so begottenness and unbegottenness, but rather contradictorily or contrarily.

4. To that which is objected, that *first* and *principle* are the same; it must be said that *first* is said in two ways: either by the privation of a prior; and so *first* and *principle* are the same in reality, and not in account. In another way *first* is said with respect to a second; and thus *first* and *principle* are the same in reality and in account, and so the *first* is not signified by this name *unbegotten*. For [the name *unbegotten*] imports primacy by privation of a prior, as is plain from the very imposition of the name.