Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/28/q/bon-sent-I-d28-a1-q3
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### QUESTION III. *Whether unbegottenness or paternity is the personal property of the Father.*

Thirdly it is asked whether unbegottenness is the personal property or relation of the person of the Father, or paternity. And that it is paternity, [it is shown] thus:

1. Because that is the personal property by which the person is separated from all others; but such is this relation paternity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that is the personal property by which the person is most properly named and expressed; but the person of the Father is most properly expressed through paternity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, just as filiation stands to the Son, so paternity to the Father; but filiation is the personal relation of the person of the Son: therefore also paternity [is the personal relation] of the Father.

4. Likewise, that is the property of the person which is said by way of position and proper relation; but among all the relations which are said of the Father, paternity alone is such: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The personal property or relation gives being to the person; but paternity does not give being to the person of the Father, since nothing has being from the fact that it gives being to another; but the person of the Father is called *father* because he gives being to another: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, with the personal property not being understood, it is impossible to understand the person; but with paternity not being understood, [one is still able] to understand [the person] as having the deity and unbegottenness: therefore since unbegottenness is a property of the person of the Father, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the personal property ought to express the whole being of the person; but paternity does not name the person of the Father according to all the plenitude of fecundity, but unbegottenness [does]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, [the] Damascene: «In divine [things] all are one except generation, ingeneration, and procession»; it is established that he does not name all the properties, therefore [he names] only the personal ones: therefore ingeneration is a personal property, and of none but the Father: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The personal property of the Father is paternity, not unbegottenness nor active spiration.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the common opinion says and is held from the words of the Master and of the Saints, namely Hilary and Augustine, paternity is the personal notion of the Father. For in order that any relation be personal, it is required that it express that person's primary and proper relation, and by way of position and completion; but it is established that unbegottenness, as to its first sense, does not express position, [and] as to its consequent sense, does not express a special relation, but rather a fontal plenitude. Likewise spiration does not express the proper relation of the Father; and therefore it is necessary that paternity express [it]. Hence the reasons brought forward to this effect are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, then, that the property gives being to the person: it must be said that this is not to be understood of being absolutely, but of personal being or of distinct being: and the very authority of paternity in divine things does not befall that hypostasis [accidentally], rather it expresses the completion of that person, by reason of which it is this [person]. Although therefore the Father does not have being from the fact that he gives being to another, yet nothing prevents that, from this, he be a distinct person.

2. To that which is objected, that one can [still] understand the person of the Father, etc.; it must be said that, with the intellect fully apprehending and proceeding rationally, one cannot understand the person of the Father or [his] hypostasis without paternity; for if [the Father] be understood as unbegotten in such a way that paternity is not present, "unbegotten" expresses a privation and does not express anything around the Father which it does not also express around the essence; and therefore it is not understood as a personal property, nor is it any other [property], and therefore

the person of the Father is not understood as distinct or as that hypostasis. For the property of unbegottenness, as a property, includes properties and relations with respect to the principled [persons]; otherwise, as was shown above, it is not a property.

3. To that which is objected, that the personal property expresses the whole being of the person; it must be said that if [by] *whole being* is meant the perfect, complete, and proper [being], then it holds true. But if it be understood that [the personal property] expresses the whole being, that is, every relation; then it is false, because it ought not to express every [relation], but it is necessary that it express one determinate [relation], or it would express none determinately, and so it will not be a personal notion.

4. To that which is objected concerning [the] Damascene, it must be said that he does not enumerate all the personal properties, insofar as personal, but rather he intends to comprehend the relations under them: and under generation he comprehends two personal [relations], under procession two, one personal, the other not personal; but in [the term] *ingeneration* he expresses only unbegottenness, which is a property, although not a personal one.