Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/28/q/bon-sent-I-d28-a1-q4
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### QUESTION IV. *Whether improcessibility, like unbegottenness, also names a notion in the Father.*

Fourthly it is asked whether improcessibility is a notion of the Father, just as unbegottenness is. And that it is, it seems:

1. Because, just as the Father differs from the Son through unbegottenness, so [does he differ] from the Holy Spirit through improcessibility: therefore, just as unbegottenness is a notion of the Father, similarly it seems that improcessibility [is].

2. Likewise, just as it pertains to the Father's nobility not to be begotten, so also not to be spirated: therefore, if on account of the ground of nobility unbegottenness is posited as his notion, similarly improcessibility ought to be posited.

3. Likewise, just as begetting belongs to the Father by reason of his being unbegotten, so also spirating [belongs to him] by reason of his being improcessible or unspirable: therefore, just as unbegottenness is a notion because it does not only signify a privation, but also a position, so it seems that improcessibility [is]. If you should say that improcessibility is included under unbegottenness, it is objected: because improcessibility belongs to the Son, and yet [in him there is] never unbegottenness: therefore it is another notion at least in the Son, therefore at least in him there ought to be a notion. If you should say that it does not signify nobility, on the contrary: everything which is said in divine matters pertains to nobility, otherwise it is not said there: therefore if improcessibility is said of the Son, it seems to imply nobility.

In addition to this it is asked: since the Father communicates to someone improcessibility or inspirability, why does he not similarly communicate unbegottenness?

**On the contrary:**

1. If improcessibility is a notion, then the notions are more than five, which is contrary to common opinion.

2. Likewise, if improcessibility is a notion, then this is either because it simply deprives [a person of] being-from-another, or because it deprives [a person of] spiration. If in the first way, it does not differ from unbegottenness; if in the second way, then it does not differ from active spiration, since [the one] who is not spirated is the one who spirates, [the one] who spirates.

3. Likewise, if not-to-proceed were a notion, by the same reasoning [also] not-to-produce; but this is false: therefore etc. If you should say that this is not similar, since not-to-produce does not signify nobility, on the contrary: not-to-produce a person signifies the status of emanation; and just as the formal character of a principle, before which there is nothing, signifies nobility, so likewise the formal character of a status, beyond which there is no proceeding [signifies nobility]: therefore it does signify nobility: if then there is nothing else, why it should not be predicated notionally, it seems that not-to-produce is a notion, just as also not-to-be-spirated.

> **CONCLUSION.** *Improcessibility is not a notion of the Father.*

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that nothing can be a notion in divine matters unless it signify a positive relation either by primary signification, or as a consequence. For if it only deprives [of] a relation, it is said of the essence in the same way as of a person. Whence just as it is said that the Father is not produced, nor does the Holy Spirit produce a person; so likewise the essence is not said to be produced, and likewise [is said] not to produce a person. And just as that which is "unbegotten" cannot be a notion unless it set down a positive relation as a consequence — and it does set this down as has been seen — similarly neither can that which is "unspirable" be a notion unless it set down a positive relation. But it does not set this down except according as it sets down primacy in respect of spiration, just as unbegottenness [does] in respect of generation, so that, just as he is called *unbegotten* who is neither generated nor follows upon generation, so [is one called] *improcessible* who neither proceeds nor follows upon procession.

And since every emanation either is a generation, or follows upon a generation — because generation names the first emanation — therefore *unbegotten* deprives [of] every emanation, and therefore signifies fontal plenitude, not only with respect to generation, but also of spiration; and therefore unbegottenness is neither generation nor spiration. But [one] is called *improcessible* because he is neither spirated nor follows upon spiration, and thus the Son or the begotten is not excluded. For the Son is begotten, and yet is not spirated nor follows upon spiration. Therefore *improcessible* deprives only one single emanation, and therefore signifies only a part of that fontal plenitude; and therefore improcessibility cannot be a notion distinct in the Father from unbegottenness, nor in the Son from spiration, nor does it bring fontal plenitude, but only [a partiality] in spirating. Therefore although improcessibility can signify nobility, nevertheless because it is not distinguished from the others assigned, therefore it is not placed in the count with the others.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus the first three objections are clear, [namely] that improcessibility distinguishes, and signifies nobility, and signifies fecundity; because the reasonings are not valid, since this whole [character] is included in the other reasonings already assigned, therefore it is not distinguished against the others.

To that which is asked, why unbegottenness is not communicated as improcessibility [is]; it must be said that, as is plain, [it is] because improcessibility does not include in its meaning *not-to-be-from-another*, as unbegottenness does, but only signifies *not-to-be-spirated*. The Father, however, can communicate to no one [the property] of not being from another; he can however communicate to another [the property] of not being spirated.

To that which is asked, why not-to-produce is not a notion; it must be said that it is not [a property] of nobility; and granted that it were — since this does not seem to be principally considered in the formal character of a notion — it must be said that this is the reason: because it does not signify a positive relation, so far as belongs to the formal character of its name; and therefore it can simply belong to the essence, and therefore it is not a notion. It is not, however, so concerning unbegottenness, as has been seen in the preceding [questions].