Dist. 28, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/28/q/bon-sent-I-d28-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what Augustine says: that, if [the Father] had not begotten the Son, nothing would have prevented him from being called *unbegotten*. For according to this it seems that it would befall the person of the Unbegotten to beget and so to be Father. — Likewise, from this it seems to follow that, paternity having been removed, the person of the Father would still remain; and so paternity is not a personal property.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the meaning of the names *unbegotten* and *father* either simply, or insofar as they are placed in [reference to] a divine person. If we speak simply, then the meanings are diverse, and the one apart from the other is intelligible and separable in reality, as is plain in the generation of human beings.

In another way one can speak of these [names] insofar as they are placed concerning a divine person, and so they state different and different accounts of being made known; and those two are altogether inseparable in reality, yet according to the intellect one can be taken apart from the other. And so Augustine speaks, not [in the sense] that they could be separated in reality, but with regard to our manner of understanding.

But that something can be understood apart from another can occur in many ways: either with regard to the apprehensive intellect, or with regard to the resolving intellect. If in the first way, then something cannot be understood without [that which] is its ground of being understood, as God [cannot be understood] apart from deity, and man apart from humanity; yet an effect can be understood without the cause being understood, and an inferior without the superior being understood, because someone can apprehend a man without understanding any of the superiors. And thus the Philosopher says that he who says one [thing] in some way says many — not simply, but in some way, because implicitly.

In another way it happens that something is understood apart from another, by the resolving intellect; and this intellect considers the things which are essential to the thing, just as a subject can be understood without [understanding] its proper attribute. And this can be in two ways: either by an intellect resolving fully and perfectly, or by an intellect deficient and resolving half-fully. By an intellect resolving half-fully, something can be understood to be, the first being not [yet] understood. But by an intellect resolving perfectly, something cannot be understood without the first being having been understood.

According to this threefold understanding it happens to speak in three ways concerning the comparison of the Father and the Unbegotten. For if we speak of the apprehensive intellect, it is possible for these two [names] to be understood with the other not having been apprehended, because the [thing] signified by the one is one [thing] and that of the other is another. If we speak of the resolving intellect, still, if it resolves half-fully, taking the meaning of this name *unbegotten* only privatively, as the gentiles take it, in this way one can be understood without the other. If we speak of the fully resolving intellect, then since *unbegotten*, insofar as it is a property of the Father, is not said only privatively, but rather posits a positive relation, it of necessity posits paternity. And so it is true that, in saying that something is unbegotten, it is necessarily posited to be father, since fontal fullness is posited through him alone.

When therefore Augustine says that [the Father] is not for that reason called *father* because [he is] *unbegotten*, he is speaking of the apprehensive intellect, because the one is not the proper and primary ground for understanding the other; rather, both — namely, *unbegotten* and *father* — state different accounts of being made known; yet according to a full resolution the one of necessity posits the other. Whence the distinction of the person of the Father is, as it were, begun in unbegottenness and consummated in paternity; and therefore, paternity not being understood, that person cannot be understood as completely distinct. And therefore paternity is a personal notion, although in the order of understanding unbegottenness falls first.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Furthermore, the negative particle does not effect this, that what without it* etc. For it seems false, because man is said with regard to substance, yet whiteness can be called *not-man*: therefore, since *man* and *not-man* are contradictorily opposed, and of any [given thing] there is [either] affirmation or negation: therefore whiteness is *not-man*, and whiteness is a quality, therefore etc. If you say that Augustine is speaking insofar as he makes a negation within a genus, then it is objected concerning that which is *not-substance*; it is plain that it cannot make a negation within a genus: therefore, since *not-substance* is said only of other genera, it is plain etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the manner of speaking *with regard to substance* concerning a negated or infinite term is to be taken in two ways: either with regard to the [thing] signified, or with regard to the supposit. If with regard to the [thing] signified, then because a negated term draws its signification from the affirmed [term], the manner of speaking with regard to signification is the same in the negated term and the affirmed [term]. Hence just as *man* is said with regard to substance as far as signification, so also *not-man*. For when I say: *this is a man*, I predicate substance; when I say: *this is a not-man*, I remove substance. But if we speak with regard to the supposit, then the negated and affirmed terms supposit for different [things]. So [the term] is opposed [to its contradictory], and so Augustine does not [intend it differently].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *not-begotten* is referred to *not-begetter*. For it seems to say what is false, because every relation posits two extremes: therefore if *not-begotten* is referred to *not-begetter*, it is necessary, in order that someone be unbegotten, that there be two, of whom one is not-begotten and the other not-begetter. On the contrary: suppose by the impossible that there were no one but one alone, he would certainly still be not-begetter.

**I respond:** It must be said that to be referred to someone can be in two ways: either according to the account of existing, or according to the account of understanding; according to the account of existing, when a real relation is imported; according to the account of understanding, when a real relation is denied. For in order that the privation of a relation be understood, it is necessary to understand the relation; and in order that the relation be understood, it is necessary that the two extremes be understood as affirmed; and so in order that the privation of a relation or relationship be understood, it is necessary that the two extremes be understood as negated. And as far as this Augustine says that *not-begotten* is referred to *not-begetter*, because the understanding of the one cannot be grasped except through the understanding of the other; and so as far as the manner of speaking it is said according to relation, just as *not-man* is said according to substance.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that, when it is said *born wisdom*, *wisdom* signifies the essence. Therefore according to this it will be permitted to put *essence* in place of *wisdom*, since [*wisdom*] makes the understanding of [the essence] — which is false.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the name *wisdom* with regard to the [thing] signified, or with regard to the supposit. With regard to the [thing] signified it states the essence, but yet it supposits for the person; and so the adjective regards [the wisdom] by reason of the supposit, when it is said *born wisdom* — not by reason of the [thing] signified. Nor does it follow on this account that *essence* can be put in place of *wisdom*, because, since *wisdom* is among the middle names, it can supposit for the person and be drawn to the supposit; but *essence*, since it is a most abstract name, [can]not.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *image* sometimes makes [us] understand the essence, and then it is said as toward itself. For it seems false, because *image* always connotes [that] of which [it is] the image; but the image and that of which it is the image cannot be the same: therefore it is always said relatively.

**I respond:** It must be said that *image* always states a relation either to a created [thing] or to an uncreated [thing]; and when it states a relation to an uncreated [thing], it is said personally and relatively in reality; but when [it states] a relation to a creature, it is said essentially and as toward itself — not with regard to the manner of speaking, but because it belongs to the whole Trinity.

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