Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/29/q/bon-sent-I-d29-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I. *On the principle with respect to multiplicity.*

### QUESTION I. *Whether the name "principle" in divine [things] can be taken personally or notionally.*

That it is taken notionally is shown thus.

1. Augustine in book five *On the Trinity*: "The Father is the principle to the Son, since he begot him": therefore the same is imported by the name *principle* as by the name *generation*: therefore it is held personally or notionally.

2. Likewise, the same is seen by reason, since wherever there is a true account of emanation and origin, there is a true account of a principle; but in divine [things] there is truly and properly an account of emanation: therefore there truly and properly is the account of a principle.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Principle* and *first* are the same: therefore wherever the account of *principle* falls, one must say *first*, and wherever one must say *first*, one must say *prior* — since the superlative presupposes the comparative — and where [there is] *prior*, there [is] *posterior*: therefore from *first*, where there is the account of a principle, there is the account of *posterior*. But in divine [things] it is in no way admitted that one person is posterior to another: therefore in no way is a person the principle of a person.

2. Likewise, in creatures *principle* and *beginning* are the same, as is plain through the Philosopher, therefore where *beginning* is not admitted, neither [is] *principle*; but all persons in divine [things] are without beginning, therefore also without principle: therefore *principle* does not express a relation of person to person: therefore it is not taken personally or notionally.

3. Likewise, *cause* and *principle* are the same in reality, differing in account, since *principle* is said with respect to becoming, *cause* with respect to being: therefore if being is of greater nobility than becoming, the account of *cause* ought to be received there more properly than that of *principle*; but it is not admitted that one person is cause and another effect: therefore neither ought the notion of *principle* to be received there.

4. Likewise, *God is alpha and omega, principle and end*, and each is of equal nobility; but the notion of *end* is said of God essentially in such a way that in no way [is it said] personally — for God is the end of the creature in such a way that he is not the end of [a divine] person — therefore similarly it seems that he is the principle of the creature in such a way that he is in no way the principle of [a divine] person.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The account of "principle" is admitted in divine [things], chiefly with respect to the person of the Father, but not the account of cause and effect, nor of prior and posterior, nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of end and that-which-is-toward-the-end.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in divine [things] there is a true origin or emanation, and not only true but also most complete. For it to be most perfect, it is necessary that the emanating [person] have with the producer an equality in every mode and unity in substance, since nothing can be equal to God except God. If therefore emanation and origin must be expressed fittingly and catholicly, names that express the truth of origin must be admitted, and names that import imperfection or diversity or inequality must not be admitted.

Since therefore *principle* and *that-which-is-from-the-principle* express the truth of origin, both are admitted in divine [things], but most of all the notion of *principle*. But since *posterior* expresses imperfection, and *beginning* likewise, since it expresses an imperfect duration, namely an inception; and the notion of *cause* imports diversity, since a cause is *that whose being follows another*; and the notion of *end* [imports] inequality, since the end is better than those things which are toward the end: therefore neither the notion of prior and posterior, nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of cause and effect, nor of end and that-which-is-toward-the-end, is admitted in [a divine] person with respect to [a divine] person. But the notion of producer and produced, since it is possible that the produced be supremely perfect and be equal to the producer, is therefore admitted in divine [things], and likewise the notion of *principle*.

**To the opposing arguments:**

1. To that which is objected, that *prior* follows upon *principle*, and *posterior* upon *prior*; it must be said that, as it is said according to Hilary, "the Father is greater than the Son, yet the Son is not less" — since *less* sounds [as something] toward imperfection, therefore, although it is admitted that the Father is prior to the Son, since the latter is from the former, not conversely, yet it is not admitted that the latter is posterior. However, neither is the account of *prior* admitted altogether properly; since although in divine [things] there is order and origin, properly there is origin, and less properly order, and [order] is only by reason of origin. Since therefore *principle* principally imports origin, and *prior* [imports] order; therefore the notion of *principle* is admitted simply, but the notion of *prior* less properly and with qualification; and the notion of *principle*, insofar as it privates anteriority, is most properly admitted in God, especially with respect to the person of the Father. And therefore it does not follow that *prior* is said so properly that it expresses only a relation to *posterior*.

2. To that which is objected concerning *beginning*, it must be said that *beginning* is taken in one mode broadly for the principle of being and of enduring; in another mode properly for the principle of enduring, so that that is said to have a beginning which begins to be. In the first mode it can be taken in divine [things], and thus Hilary takes it in the *littera*; but in the second mode it cannot, and thus it is not equivalent to *principle*.

3. To that which is objected concerning *cause*, that it is the same as *principle*; it must be said that in creatures *principle* and *cause* are the same; and this is because the produced [thing] differs from the producer, and therefore can be called its *effect*, and that [other] can be called *cause*; and the notion of *cause* and of *principle* coincide in the same [thing], and likewise the name; but not so in divine [things], since there the producer can be of one substance with the produced. Therefore that [argument] does not hold.

4. To that which is objected concerning *end*, the response is already plain, since the *end*, of itself, expresses an excess of goodness with respect to that which is toward the end; not so the *principle* with respect to that which is from it; and therefore God cannot be the end except of an unequal creature, yet he can be and is the principle of an altogether equal person. And therefore one person is not the end of another, yet it is the principle.