Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/29/q/bon-sent-I-d29-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II. *Whether this name "principle," if it is taken essentially and notionally, is said univocally or equivocally.*

Secondly it is asked whether the name *principle*, when it is taken essentially and notionally, is said univocally or equivocally. And that [it is said] univocally seems [to be the case].

1. Basil says that for the Son of God *to receive* is common with creatures, but *to have by essence* is proper. If, therefore, *to receive* is common, so also is *to give*; and if so, since the account of *principle* in regard to the Son and in regard to the creature is taken in respect of this, it seems that it is said univocally.

2. Likewise, *principle* said essentially differs from [*principle*] said notionally as wisdom differs from begotten wisdom; but *wisdom* is not said equivocally in this way and that: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, nothing is said in many ways from the fact that it is said of a genus and of a species, or from the fact that it has one supposit and many — because manifoldness regards diverse significations, not supposits — but *principle* said essentially extends further and agrees with more things than [when said] notionally, and agrees with the very same things: therefore it is not said in many ways, but univocally.

4. Likewise, that it is not said analogically seems [to be the case], because where there is analogy, there is prior and posterior; but in divine things there is no prior and posterior: therefore neither analogy. — And again it seems that [it is] not [said] equivocally either, because where there is equivocation, there is diversity of signification; but person and essence are not diverse: therefore it cannot be taken equivocally.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it is said in many ways is seen first from the Master in the *littera*, who says that this name *principle* produces a manifold understanding: therefore it is said in many ways.

2. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason, because these acts — *to generate*, *to spirate*, *to create* — belong to the principle itself, according as it is taken differently; but it is not [possible] to find one common account for these acts: therefore neither for *principle*, which names a respect so different.

3. Likewise, it is a rule of the Philosopher that if something in one of its acceptations has one opposite and in another another, it is said in many ways; but *principle* is said essentially with respect to the created, and notionally with respect to the uncreated: therefore [it is said] in many ways, in this and that [acceptation].

4. Likewise, *principle* said essentially is said temporally, said notionally [is said] eternally; but nothing is univocally common to the eternal and the temporal: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The name "principle," said essentially and notionally, is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically.*

**I respond:** It must be said that a name's being taken differently in divine things can be in three ways: either as to the supposit, or as to what is signified, or as to what is connoted. In the first way the name *God* is taken differently when it is said «*God is the Trinity*» and «*God generates*», because in the first it stands for the nature, in the second for the person; and that does not introduce any manifoldness. — In another way it happens that a term is taken differently as to what is signified, according as the term itself in one of its acceptations signifies the essence, in another a person, as this name *father*, insofar as God is called the Father of the Son, and insofar as he is called *our* Father; and this introduces equivocation, because there is a diversity of signification not in the thing itself, but in the signifying. — In a third way it happens that [a term] is taken differently by reason of what is connoted, as for instance this name *principle*: said essentially, it connotes a created effect; said personally, it connotes nothing created; and that introduces manifoldness according to analogy, not according to equivocation: according to analogy indeed, since it is taken for diverse [things] or imports diverse [things] which have only the unity of proportion, and therefore it is necessary that analogy fall in there; but not equivocation, since equivocation has many institutings and is taken anew for each, as is plain in this name *dog*.

But this name *principle* is not so. For *principle* is, by its imposition, imposed from the act of *producing*, not of *creating* nor of *generating*. Hence, just as *to produce* is not said equivocally of the production of the Son and of the creature, but analogically, so this name *principle* is taken differently according to these three comparisons.

I grant, therefore, that there is a certain manifoldness there, although it is not manifoldness without qualification, as of equivocation properly so called; and the reasons [given] for this are to be granted, since they do not conclude that there is true equivocation there. Nevertheless that statement of the Philosopher is to be understood [thus]: when a name has diverse opposites which are not united in anything, neither univocally nor analogically, [in such a way] that [the unity] would be opposed to the term [itself], but [where they are] opposed primarily and per se. But it is not so in the present case, since *principle* is not said primarily of the Son or of the creature, but of that which is *produced* or *principiated*; which indeed is said of the Son and of the creature, although not univocally, but analogically.

**To the opposite [arguments]:**

1. To that which is objected from Basil, it must be said that Basil takes *common* for *analogical*, which is a middle between purely equivocal and univocal.

2. 3. To that which is objected concerning *wisdom* and *begotten wisdom*, it must be said that there is no parallel, since there [the diversification] is only as to the supposit, but here it is as to what is connoted. — And by this the next [objection] is plain.

4. To that which is objected last, that prior and posterior do not occur there etc.; it must be said that, although prior and posterior do not occur there *in itself*, they do occur with respect to the effect, since analogy is taken in comparison to the effect. — As for what is said, that there is no diversity there; it must be said that this is true *in the thing*; yet in signifying and understanding, [the act of] understanding the essence is one thing, [and the act of] understanding the person is another, and so likewise of speaking, and through this also of signifying. And therefore, although there is no diversity on the side of the absolute reality, nonetheless there can be [diversity] on the side of signification.