Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/29/q/bon-sent-I-d29-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II. *On the principle as to unity.*

Next there is a question concerning the second article, namely on the unity of this name *principle*, and concerning this two questions are asked. First it is asked whether Father and Son can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit. Second, whether they can be called one spirator or the same principle of the Holy Spirit.

### QUESTION I. *Whether Father and Son can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit.*

That they can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit, it appears.

1. In the *littera* it is said: "It must be confessed that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit."

2. Likewise, by reason it appears, since of one thing-from-a-principle there is one principle in one genus; but the Holy Spirit is one: therefore he has one principle. Therefore if he is immediately and perfectly from the Father and the Son, then the Father and the Son are one principle.

3. Likewise, the Father and the Son spirate: therefore either by one power, or by two. It is plain that [it is] by one, since since there is one essence in them, there is also one power: therefore since the three are said to be principle by reason of power, and there is one power in the Father and the Son, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, just as the three persons by a single creation create, so two by a single spiration spirate; but the three, since by a single creation they create, are one principle of the creature: therefore the two [are] one principle of the Holy Spirit.

**On the contrary:**

1. When it is said: *they are one principle of the Holy Spirit*, either *one* expresses unity of essence, or unity of person, or of notion. Not of essence, since then the Holy Spirit would be principle of the Holy Spirit; not of person, since then the Father and the Son would be one person: therefore of notion. But on the contrary: if the Father and the Son, on account of unity of notion, are called one principle, then by opposites, the Father, on account of plurality of notion, can be called several principles.

2. Likewise, if the Father is principle of the Holy Spirit, and the Son [is] principle, and this principle is not that one: therefore there are two principles.

3. Likewise, the Father and the Son are one principle, therefore the one principle is the Father and the Son: and if so, then the Father is the Son.

4. Likewise, if they are one principle: either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father. If one which is the Father: then the Father and the Son are the Father. If one which is not the Father: therefore the principle of the Holy Spirit is not the Father: therefore the Father is not the principle of the Holy Spirit.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The Father and the Son are rightly called one principle of the Holy Spirit, by which is signified unity of notion, yet in comparison with the unity of essence and of the spirative power.*

**I respond:** It must be said that all concede this: that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, since Augustine proposes and says it; but they differ in the mode of understanding.

For some say that this name *principle* there does not express essence, nor notion, nor person, but expresses the agreement of two persons in a single notion. And they say that just as this name *threefold* (*trinus*) is specially imposed to indicate the trinity of supposits insofar as they agree in unity of nature, so they say it is in the matter at hand. — But since it is not easy to grasp such a position or transferred sense from the force of the word, this position is recognized to have no firmness.

And so there were others, who said that this name *principle* imports a notion in adjacency, and is a name held adjectivally; and therefore this numeral adjective, *one*, falls away from the account of a noun and is held adverbially, so that the sense is: the Father and the Son are one principle, that is, in one mode they produce or spirate the Holy Spirit. — But since this name *principle*, by its imposition, is a substantive name, as is plain, this position does not yet seem reasonable.

And so there were a third [group], who said that this name *principle*, of itself, stands for the essence, and it happens that it is drawn by addition to the person. And when it is said: the Father is the principle of the Son, it is drawn to the person of the Father; but when it is said: the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, it stands for the essence or nature, yet insofar as it is in two persons. And this seems consonant with Anselm, who says that "the Father and the Son spirate, insofar as each is the same God." And they say that *one* expresses unity around this term *principle* not of person, but of essence or nature, as it is in two persons. — But since Augustine seems to say that *principle*, said of the Father and the Son, expresses a common notion; similarly the Master says in the last chapter that it expresses unity of notion; and *principle* imports a notion, and the essence is not referred [relationally]: therefore neither is this mode yet entirely fitting, although it is more probable than the others.

And so there is a fourth manner of speaking, that this name *principle* stands for a notion, yet not in comparison with a supposit, but with the nature and the spirative power; and *one* imports unity around it, according to what befits its acceptation.

And this is plain thus: for since the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as [they are] one God who cannot proceed (*improcessibilis*); and insofar as [they are] one God, there is in them a unity of will; insofar as [they are] non-processible, there is a fecundity of will; and insofar as [they are] one non-processible God, there is in them one fecundity of will, and one fecundity expresses unity of principle, which is in two persons. — But since Augustine seems to say that *principle*, said of the Father and the Son, expresses a common notion; and *one* expresses unity around principle; it must be said that without distinction it must be conceded that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit.

1. And to that which is *asked*, what unity this *one*, which is "one around principle," expresses; it must be said that since this name *principle* is said of several at the same time, it cannot stand for a person; and since again it expresses respect to a person, it cannot stand for essence: therefore it is necessary that it stand for a notion. Therefore when it is said: the Father and the Son are one principle, *one* expresses unity of notion, yet in comparison with the unity of nature and of the spirative power, as will appear in another problem, and is also plain from what has been said.

2. To that which is objected afterward, that this principle is not that one, when the Father and the Son are pointed out; one can respond in two ways. First indeed, that one cannot say *this* and *that*, since by the rule no distinction occurs except where there is union from diverse causes. Since therefore the union is total in the name of principle, such that it is not multiplied, therefore one cannot say *this* and *that* there. — Otherwise it can be said that when *this* and *that* is said, either it points out form, or supposit, or both: if form, it is false; if supposit or both, it is true by reason of the supposit; and therefore it does not follow that [there are] two, since the form is not multiplied. Similarly one can argue in this name *God*.

3. To the two following [arguments] some respond that this name *principle* cannot be a subject, nor can a relation be made to it, since it is held adjectivally. — But that is nothing, since the name is substantive, therefore it can be subject and predicate, and a relation can be made to it. — And if they say that it was invented for this; this is nothing, since it cannot be proved. And again, an invention must have a reason; and we see that a relation can be made, as if one says: *In the principle was the Word*, in which principle was the Spirit, since he was not in another but in the same. It can also be a subject: since if the Father is principle of the Holy Spirit, by simple conversion, the principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father.

For this reason it must be answered otherwise, that, since *one principle* is said, *one* expresses unity of notion, which is common to two; and since it expresses a common unity, therefore it is here a [fallacy of] consequent: the one principle of the Holy Spirit is the Son and the Father: therefore the Son is the Father, just as here: the one God is the Father and the Son: therefore the Father is the Son.

4. To the last [argument] which is objected: either one which is the Father, etc.; it must be said that since *one* expresses the common spiration, as it is in several, therefore one cannot divide: either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father — as if one were to say: every man is animal; either an animal which is white, or an animal which is not white — neither is to be granted, since *animal* stands commonly for a white animal and a non-white one, such that it renders the locution true for both at once. Similarly in the matter at hand, *principle* stands for a principle which is the Father, and which is the Son; and therefore one is not allowed to divide and descend there, but rather there is a figure of speech from a change of supposition.