Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/29/q/bon-sent-I-d29-a2-q2
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### QUESTION II. *Whether the Father and the Son can be called one spirator, or also the same principle.*

Secondly it is asked whether these [propositions] are to be granted: *the Father and the Son are one spirator*, or *they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit*. And that this is to be granted — *they are one spirator* — it seems:

1. Because the Father and the Son are not one principle, except because they spirate by a single spiration: therefore, since this name *spirator* signifies the spiration itself, the Father and the Son are one spirator.

2. Likewise, because the Father and the Son create by a single creation, they are called not only one principle of the creature, but also *one creator*: therefore since they likewise spirate by a single spiration, they are one spirator.

3. Likewise, that they are *the same principle*, it seems, because unity not multiplied makes identity in every way; but the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, in such a way that the unity of the principle is in no way multiplied in them: therefore they are the same principle.

4. Likewise, this is true: *the Father and the Son spirate by the same spiration*; but the same is signified by this name *principle* as by this name *spiration*: therefore by an equipollent [argument], the Father and the Son [are] the same principle.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Spirator* and *he who spirates* are equipollent: therefore if there is one spirator, then *one is* also *he who spirates*. But this is false: *one spirates*, since not one but two are those who spirate: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, *spirator* signifies the spiration itself in concretion to a supposit: therefore that [supposit] is either an essence, or a person. Not an essence, therefore a person: therefore if the Father and the Son are one spirator, they are one person or hypostasis.

3. Likewise, that *the same principle* is not to be granted, it seems. For if they are the same principle, they are the same; but this is false, that the Father and the Son are the same: therefore the first too is false. That [the inference] follows is plain; for it follows well: *they are the same animal, therefore the same*. Furthermore, that this is false — *they are the same* — is plain, since they are distinct, therefore they are not the same.

4. Likewise, that which is *idem* is a relative pronoun: therefore since a pronoun designates a definite person, and a relative is one which signifies identity in that for which it stands, it signifies identity in the supposit; but that is not an essence, but a person: therefore it signifies that they are the same person; which since it is false, it remains that that locution is false.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The locutions are not to be approved, neither that the Father and the Son are one spirator, nor that they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit, although they are one principle of him.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this locution: *the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit*, is simply received; this however: *the Father and the Son are one spirator*, is not received; and this likewise is not admitted: *the Father and the Son are the same principle*. For although they seem to be equipollent to that [first locution], nevertheless they are not equipollent. For in these locutions the notion of spiration is signified in a different way.

On account of which it must be noted that a notion can be signified in two ways, namely *in abstraction* and *in concretion*: in abstraction, as if one says *spiration*; in concretion, as if one says *principle* or *spirator*. In concretion, however, it can be signified either by comparison to a subject in the formal character of supposit, or by comparison to a subject in the formal character of [an] active [agent], or in both ways.

The notion of spiration is therefore signified in concretion in comparison to a subject in the formal character of supposit by this name *spirator*, which is a verbal noun. And because the supposit of this notion is a person, and not one person but two, therefore we say *two* *spirators*, not *one*. Nor is it the same with that which is *creator*: because, since it is an essential name, it signifies in concretion to a subject which is substance — and that is one in the three — but a notion to a person, which of itself is multiplied, is not one in two.

The notion is also signified in comparison to a subject in the formal character of [an] active [agent], as by this name *principle*, which signifies origin. And since a subject acts through a power, and power has regard to nature, [and] since in the Father and the Son there is one nature and one power not multiplied: by this name *principle* the notion of spiration is signified as in no way multiplied. Therefore we say: *the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit*, so that *one* signifies the unity of the notion and of the spirative power and of nature in the spirators. Hence it is, that the Father is not called several principles, even if he have several notions, since he does not have [them] according to diverse powers and natures.

The notion is also signified in comparison to a subject as in the formal character both of supposit and of active [agent], when *the same principle* is said, since the pronoun *idem*, which requires a definite person to be signified, has regard to the supposit; and *principle*, as has been said, has regard to it as active. And since the supposit is neither the same nor one, therefore this is false: *the Father and the Son are the same principle*.

Therefore this is true: *the Father and the Son are one principle*; this however is false: *they are one spirator*; this again is false: *they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit*. And the reason for all these is plain from what has been said.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected — that they are one principle because they spirate by a single spiration — it must be said that this is not the whole reason; but this is the whole reason: that by a single spiration and a single power and in unity of nature they spirate the same one; and *principle* in this way signifies that notion: and therefore they are one principle. The notion is not so signified, however, by this name *spirator*, which is a verbal noun and descends from a verb that involves a personal supposit. For *spirator* is said of him who spirates, and that one is a person.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning creation, the response is now plain, since creation does not only have to come about by one power, but also has one supposit, and that is substance — for the Father does not create as a proper subject, but the divine substance itself, which is one — but the supposit of spiration cannot be a substance, but a person: therefore it is not said that the Father and the Son are one spirator.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that identity is unity not multiplied; it must be said that this is not enough, unless it is such a unity as is not multiplied nor admits with itself a plurality of supposits, which identity excludes. And since the unity of the principle admits a plurality of persons, that [objection] is plain.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that they spirate by the same spiration; it must be said that it does not follow from this that they are one spirator; for although the notion is the same, nevertheless the supposit is not the same. And when *the same principle* is said, identity is noted in both; when *the same spiration* is said, identity is noted in [only] the other: therefore this does not follow from that, nor does the one infer the other.