Dist. 29, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/29/q/bon-sent-I-d29-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first concerning what is said: that the Father is the principle of the whole godhead. It is asked, therefore, for what the name *principle* there stands. For it cannot stand for the essence nor for the person, since either of these states, of itself, what is absolute. Either, therefore, it stands for paternity — and this is false, because [the Father] is not father of the Holy Spirit: nor for spiration, because spiration is not in regard to the Son: nor commonly to both, because they have nothing in common except the essence; nor for unbegottenness, because unbegottenness does not state a relation to a person, but a privation of relation: therefore in every way [the proposition] is false.

**I respond:** It must be said that the sense of the locution here is: the Father is the principle of the whole godhead, that is, of all persons in the godhead; and it is an accommodated distribution, as when it is said: *heaven contains all things*, with itself, namely, excepted. — But if it be asked for what the name *principle* stands; it must be said that it stands for paternity together with spiration, because through paternity he is the principle of the Son, through spiration the principle of the Holy Spirit, and through both the principle of both. — As to what is objected, that they have nothing in common; it must be said that they do not agree in a single notion by formal agreement; yet they agree by an originative agreement in the same person and in a property of the same person. For since the person of the Father is from no one, as is said in the *littera*, therefore he produces by every mode of production, and therefore is the principle of the whole godhead. Hence the same [reality] is conveyed by the name *principle*, when [the Father] is called principle of the godhead by the principal understanding, [as] is conveyed by the name *unbegottenness* as far as the consequent understanding. And from this word and from this account of the word that position receives confirmation which says that *unbegottenness* states in the Father the fullness of fontality or fontal fullness, although by a consequent understanding.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about such circumlocutions: how the name *principle* is to be taken there, when it is said: *principle without principle*, *principle from a principle*. For either it is taken essentially, or personally: not personally, as it seems, because the Holy Spirit is said to be principle from a principle, and *principle* does not belong to him except temporally. — Furthermore, as the Master says in distinction twenty-seven, this cannot be said of that except with regard to substantial names: therefore *principle* cannot be taken notionally. — And again, in what notion would it be taken, when it is said *the Son [is] principle from a principle*? Because not for filiation, since this belongs to the Holy Spirit, namely, to be principle from a principle; not for common spiration, since common spiration belongs to the Father, to whom it does not belong to be principle from a principle. — If you say that it is taken essentially; on the contrary: the essence is not the principle of a person nor does it state a relation to a person: therefore since *principle* states a relation to a person, it cannot be taken essentially, and so in no way.

**I respond:** It could be said that the name *principle* is taken in comparison to the creature, and is drawn to the persons through added prepositions, as if it be said: *God from God*, and *God not from God*, and the like; and so the objections cease. — Otherwise it can be said that the name *principle* is not imposed to signify an essential or personal relation, as far as it is of itself, but is indifferently disposed toward either, and its acceptation is determined by what is adjoined. When therefore it is said of the Father, it stands for the notion of paternity and spiration commonly, and is restricted by the property of unbegottenness through the fact that it is said *not from a principle*. Similarly in the Son it stands for common spiration with filiation, which is conveyed through the fact that it is said *from a principle*. But concerning the Holy Spirit it must be said that it stands essentially only and is restricted to the person through the fact that it is said *from both*.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Holy Spirit began to be principle of creatures. For it seems to say [something] against what was said above in distinction three: «*From the perpetuity of creatures the eternal Creator is understood*». If therefore the Holy Spirit is the eternal Creator, then [he is] eternally principle. — Likewise in the hymn: *Eternal Creator of things*. — Likewise it appears from reason, because things were from eternity in God; but only as in a principle: therefore from eternity he was principle.

**I respond:** It must be said that names which state an effect in a creature can state it either in act or in habit: if in act, they are said from time; if in habit, they can be said eternally. And since *principle* can sound either in act or in habit, therefore it can be said not only temporally, but even eternally.

But because usage takes this name *principle* more as said in act than in habit, therefore the Master says that it is said temporally.

As to what is objected, that he is called *eternal Creator*; it must be said that this locution is twofold: both on the part of *Creator*, because it can state an act or a habit; and on the part of *eternal*, because it can be taken adjectivally or substantively. And if *eternal* is taken substantively, then it does not posit eternity concerning the act of creating, but concerning the supposit, and the locution is true. If [it is taken] adjectivally and *Creator* is taken habitually, it is still a true locution; if actually, then false. The senses are manifest. For in one way the sense is: *eternal Creator*, that is, the eternal one who is Creator. In another way *eternal Creator*, that is, from eternity able to create in time. And in a third way *eternal Creator*, because he created eternally. In the first two senses the locution is true, but in the third sense it is false.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the Father from eternity is principle of the Son; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not principle except from time: therefore according to this, since the eternal is before the temporal, *principle* is said in the divine [persons] notionally before [it is said] essentially. But on the contrary: every [name] said essentially is more common; and the more anything is common, the prior it is: therefore *principle* ought to be said essentially before [it is said] notionally.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of this name *principle* in two ways: either with regard to the subject, or with regard to the term. If with regard to the subject, then since the understanding of essence is before the understanding of person, *principle* said essentially according to the order of understanding precedes *principle* said notionally, just as he opposes [it]. But if with regard to the term, then *principle* said essentially regards what is diverse by essence, and so [regards] a created [thing]; but *principle* said notionally regards a person consubstantial and uncreated and eternal; and therefore *principle* said notionally is said eternally, and according to this way it is said in God prior not only with regard to the understanding, but also with regard to the reality. And so it is plain in which acceptation this name *principle* is said priorly according to diverse comparisons.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that when the Son called himself *principle*, he wished to show himself the Creator. For it seems false; because he himself replied to the question of the Pharisees who were asking: *Who are you*? But [the question] asks about the person; but *principle*, insofar as it is taken for *Creator*, is taken essentially: therefore either the Lord did not respond suitably, or *principle* does not stand for *Creator* there. — If you say that it is appropriated to the Son; on the contrary: both the account of creation and the account of principle are appropriated to the Father: therefore not to the Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that *principle* is taken essentially there, as is said in the *littera*: but it has been drawn to the person of the Son. — But as to what you object, that it is appropriated to the Father; it must be said that *principle* by the account of its name is not appropriated to the Son except by addition; and so in the matter at hand, because it is appropriated through the act of speaking. For he did not say simply: *I am the principle*, but *I am the principle who also speak to you*.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that it is not to be conceded that the Son has a principle, since the Son is also principle from a principle. For it seems that it ought to be conceded, because every relative ought to have a correlative corresponding to itself: therefore if the Son, when he is called *principle from a principle*, is said relatively, he ought to have a correlative, which is the principle.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to have a principle* is in two ways: either as a correlative, as the son is said to have a father, and so the Son has a principle; or as a disposition of itself, and so [a thing] is said to have a principle which begins to be, and so the Son does not have a principle, because he does not begin. — Or otherwise: it is one thing to have a principle of being and [another] of duration; in the first way the Son has a principle, in the second way not.

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