Dist. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/3/q/bon-sent-I-d3-littera
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### Distinction III.
### Part I.

#### *On the knowledge of the Creator through creatures, in which the vestige of the Trinity appears.*

For the Apostle says that *the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen through the things that have been made, also his eternal power and divinity*. By *creature of the world* is understood man, "on account of the excellence by which he excels among other creatures, or on account of the affinity which he has with every creature." Man therefore was able to behold the invisible things of God with the understanding of the mind, or even did behold them, through the things that have been made, that is, through visible or invisible creatures. For he was helped by two things, namely by nature, which was rational, and by the works made by God, so that the truth might be made manifest to man. Therefore the Apostle said: *because God revealed it to them*, that is, when he made the works in which there shines forth, to some extent, an indication of the craftsman.

For as Ambrose says: "So that God, who by nature is invisible, might also be known from visible things, he made a work which manifested the workman by its own visibility, so that through the certain the uncertain might be known, and he be believed to be the God of all things who made this which by man is impossible to be made." They therefore were able to know, or did know, that beyond every creature is he who made those things which no creature has the power to make or to destroy. Let any creature you please come forward and make such a heaven and such an earth, and I shall say that it is God. But since no creature has the power to make such things, it is plain that above every creature is he who made them; and through this, the human mind has been able to know that he is God.

In yet another way they were able, or did, come to know the truth of God by the lead of reason. For as Augustine says in the book *On the City of God*: "The highest philosophers saw that no body is God, and therefore they transcended all bodies in seeking God; they saw also that whatever is mutable is not the highest God and the principle of all things, and therefore they transcended every soul and all mutable spirits; then they saw that everything that is mutable can have being only from him who is unchangeably and simply. They understood therefore that he both made all these things and could have been made by none."

"They considered also that whatever is in substances is either body or spirit, and that something is better as spirit than as body, but far better is he who made both spirit and body."

"They understood likewise that the species of body is sensible, and the species of spirit is intelligible, and they preferred the intelligible species to the sensible. We call *sensible* those things which can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body, *intelligible* those which are grasped by the gaze of the mind. Since therefore in their view both body and soul were more or less beautiful, but if they could be wholly without form they would not exist at all: they saw that there is something by which those things are made beautiful, where there is the first and unchangeable species, and therefore incomparable; and they most rightly believed this to be the principle of things, which itself is not made, and from which all things are made." Behold, in so many ways the truth of God could be known. Since therefore God is one and a simple essence, which consists of no diversity of parts or accidents, nevertheless the Apostle says in the plural: *the invisible things of God*, because in many ways is the truth of God known through the things that have been made. For from the perpetuity of creatures the eternal Founder is understood; from their magnitude, his omnipotence; from their order and disposition, his wisdom; from their governance, his goodness. And all these belong to manifesting the unity of the Deity.

### Ch. II.
#### *(On the knowledge of the Trinity through creatures.)*

Now it remains to show whether through the things that have been made some vestige or slight indication of the Trinity could have been had. On this Augustine says, in the sixth book *On the Trinity*: "It behooves us that, beholding the Creator with the understanding through the things that have been made, we should understand the Trinity. For the vestige of this Trinity appears in creatures. For all these things which have been made by the divine art exhibit in themselves both a certain unity and a species and an order. For each of these created things is some one thing, as are the natures of bodies and souls, and is formed by some species, as are the figures or qualities of bodies and the disciplines or arts of souls, and seeks or holds some order, as are the weights or arrangements of bodies and the loves or delights of souls; and so in creatures the vestige of the Trinity shines forth. For in that Trinity is the supreme origin of all things and the most perfect beauty and the most blessed delight." Now the supreme origin, as Augustine shows in the book *On True Religion*, is understood to be God the Father, from whom are all things, from whom are the Son and the Holy Spirit. The most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son, namely the truth of the Father, in no part unlike him, whom together with him and in him, the Father, we venerate, who is the form of all things which have been made by the one and are referred to the one — which all things, however, neither would be made by the Father through the Son, nor would be preserved in their proper limits, unless God were supremely good, who neither envied any nature which from him was good, and so that it might remain in good itself, gave to some things as much as he willed, to others as much as they could receive; which goodness is understood to be the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of the Father and the Son. Wherefore it is fitting that we worship and hold this very gift of God, with the Father and the Son, as equally unchangeable. Through the consideration of creatures therefore we understand the Trinity of one substance, namely one God the Father, from whom we are, and the Son, through whom we are, and the Holy Spirit, in whom we are; that is, the principle to which we return, and the form which we follow, and the grace by which we are reconciled: namely, the one by whose authorship we have been founded, and his likeness through which we are re-formed to unity, and the peace by which we cleave to the Unity: namely, God who said: *let it be done*; and the Word, through which was made every thing that substantially and naturally is; and the Gift of his kindness, by which it pleased him that what was made by him through the Word should also be reconciled to its author, that it might not perish." Behold, it has been shown how, in creatures, in some measure, the image of the Trinity is indicated; for through the contemplation of creatures a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity neither can be had nor could have been had without the revelation of doctrine or of interior inspiration. Hence those ancient philosophers, as through a shadow and from afar, saw the truth, falling short in their contuition of the Trinity, like the magicians of Pharaoh at the third sign. We are nevertheless helped in the faith of invisible things through the things that have been made.

### Ch. III.
#### *On the image and likeness of the Trinity in the human soul.*

"Now indeed let us come to that discussion, where in the human mind, which knows God or is able to know him, we may find the image of the Trinity." For as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*: "Although the human mind is not of that nature of which God is, nevertheless his image — than whom nothing is better — must be sought and found there, where our nature has nothing better, that is, in the mind. For in the mind itself, even before it shares in God, his image is found; for even if, having lost participation in God, it is deformed, yet it remains the image of God. For by this very fact is the mind the image of God: that it is capable of him and can be his participant. Now then let us seek in it the Trinity which is God. Behold therefore: the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity — not yet, indeed, God, but the image of God. For here there appears a certain trinity of memory, intelligence, and love." Therefore let us treat especially of these three: memory, intelligence, will. "These three therefore, as Augustine says

in the tenth book *On the Trinity*, are not three lives but one life, not three minds but one mind, one essence. But memory is said in relation to something, and intelligence and will or love are likewise said in relation to something; whereas life is said with reference to itself, and mind, and essence. These three therefore are one in this, that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are said singly with reference to themselves, even together they are said not in the plural but in the singular. But they are three in this, that they are referred to one another."

"They are equal also, not only severally to one another singly, but also severally to all together; otherwise they would not contain one another mutually; but they do contain one another mutually. For both singulars are contained by singulars, and the whole by singulars. For I remember that I have memory and intelligence and will; and I understand that I understand and will and remember; and I will that I will and remember and understand."

"And I remember together my whole memory and intelligence and will. For what I do not remember of my memory is not in my memory; nothing however is so much in memory as memory itself: therefore I remember it whole. Likewise, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; and whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember my whole intelligence and my whole will."

"Likewise, when I understand these three, I understand the whole together. For there is not anything among intelligible things which I do not understand, except what I do not know. But what I do not know, I neither remember nor will. Whatever therefore of intelligible things I do not understand, consequently I neither remember nor will. Whatever therefore of intelligible things I remember and will, I consequently understand."

"My will also contains my whole intelligence and my whole memory, when I use all that I understand and remember. Since then by singulars the whole and the wholes are mutually contained, the whole singulars are equal to the whole singulars and the whole singulars together are equal to all the wholes; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence." "Behold, of that supreme Unity and Trinity, where there is one essence and three persons, the human mind is the image, although unequal." Here however "mind" is taken for the soul itself, where that image of the Trinity is; "but properly *mind* is said," as Augustine says, "not of the soul itself but of what is more excellent in it," in which sense it is often taken. It must also be known that memory is not only of things absent and past, but also of things present, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*; otherwise it would not contain itself.

Here it must be carefully attended to, in what sense it is to be taken which he said above, namely that those three — memory, intelligence, and will — are one, one mind, one essence. Which surely does not seem true according to the propriety of speech. For *mind*, that is, rational spirit, is a spiritual and incorporeal essence. But those three are the natural properties or powers of the mind itself and differ from one another, since memory is not intelligence or will, nor is intelligence will or love.

"And these three are also referred to themselves," as Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*: "For the mind cannot love or remember itself unless it also knows itself: for how does it love or remember what it does not know"? In a wondrous way therefore these three are inseparable from one another; and yet each of them, and all together, is one essence, though they are said relatively to one another.

But now it must be seen how these three are said to be one substance: namely, in this way, because they exist substantially in the soul or mind itself, not as accidents in subjects, which can be present and absent. Hence Augustine in the ninth book *On the Trinity* says: "We are admonished, if we can in any way see it, that these exist in the soul substantially, not as in a subject, as color in a body, because although they are said relatively to one another, yet singly they are substantially in their substance." Behold in what sense those three are said to be one or one substance. "Which three, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*, in the mind naturally and divinely instituted, whoever vividly perceives, and how great a thing it is in it whereby even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recalled, beheld, longed for (for it is recollected through memory, beheld through intelligence, embraced through love), certainly finds the image of that supreme Trinity."

### Ch. III. (continued — On dissimilitude.)
#### *On the likeness of the creating and created trinity.*

"Yet nevertheless let one beware, lest he so compare this image made by that same Trinity to it, that he reckon it altogether similar, but rather, in any such likeness, let him discern a great dissimilitude also."

"This can be briefly shown. One man, through those three, remembers, understands, loves, who is neither memory nor intelligence nor love, but has these. There is therefore one man who has these three; he himself is not these three. But in that supreme simplicity of nature which is God, although there is one God, nevertheless three persons

there are, Father and Son and Holy Spirit", and these three are one God. "It is one thing therefore, the very reality of the Trinity, and another, the image of the Trinity in another thing; on account of which image, even that in which these three are, is also called an image, namely man. Just as both the panel and the picture which is on it are called an image; but the panel is called by the name *image* on account of the picture which is on it."

"Again, this image, which is man having those three, is one person. But that Trinity is not one person, but three persons, the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Therefore in this image of the Trinity these three are not one man, but they are of one man. But in that supreme Trinity, of which this is the image, those three are not of one God, but they are one God; and there are three of them, not one person." "For those three are not man, but are of man or are in man. But can we say that the Trinity is so in God as to be something of God, and itself not to be God"? Far be it from us to believe this. Let us say therefore that in our mind there is the image of the Trinity, but a slight one of whatever kind, which bears the likeness of the supreme Trinity in such a way that for the greatest part it is unlike. But it must be known that "this Trinity of the mind, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*, is not for this reason alone the image of God, because the mind remembers itself and understands and loves itself, but because it can also remember and understand and love him by whom it was made."

It is also possible to distinguish in another way and by other names the trinity in the soul, which is the image of that supreme and ineffable Trinity. For as Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*: "Mind and the knowledge of it and love are three something. For the mind knows itself and loves itself; nor can it love itself unless it also knows itself. Two something are mind and the knowledge of it; likewise, two something are mind and the love of it." "When therefore the mind knows itself and loves itself, a trinity remains, namely mind, love, and knowledge." "But *mind* is taken here not for the soul, but for that which is more excellent in the soul." These three, however, although they are distinct from one another, are nonetheless said to be one, because they exist substantially in the soul.

And the mind itself is as it were the parent, and its knowledge as it were its offspring. "For the mind, when it knows itself, begets its own knowledge and is the sole parent of its own knowledge. The third is love, which proceeds from the mind itself and the knowledge, while the mind, knowing itself, loves itself; for it could not love itself unless it knew itself. It loves also its pleasing offspring, that is, its own knowledge; and so a certain love is the embrace of parent and offspring."

"Nor is the offspring less than the parent, while the mind knows itself in its full extent; nor is the love less than the parent and offspring, that is, than the mind and the knowledge, while the mind loves itself as much as it knows itself and as much as it is."

"These are also each in themselves, since the loving mind is in love, and love is in the knowledge of the lover, and knowledge is in the knowing mind." Behold, in these three some sort of vestige of the Trinity appears.

The rational mind therefore, considering these three and that one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator and sees unity in trinity and trinity in unity. For it understands that God is one, one essence, one principle. For it understands that, if there were two, either each would be insufficient, or one would be superfluous; because if anything were lacking to one which the other possessed, there would not be the highest perfection there; but if nothing were lacking to one which the other possessed, since in one would be all things, the other would be superfluous. It understood therefore that there is one God, one author of all, and it saw that he is not without wisdom, as it were a foolish thing; and therefore it understood that he has wisdom, which has been begotten from him; and because he loves his wisdom, it also understood that there is love there.

### Ch. IV.
#### *On the unity of the Trinity.*

"Wherefore according to this consideration, as Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*, let us believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, the founder and ruler of all creation; and that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but a Trinity of persons related to one another." For as he himself says in the book *On the Faith, to Peter*: "One is the nature or essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, not one person. For if it were one person in the same way as the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, the Trinity would not truly be spoken of. Again, the Trinity would indeed be true, but the one God would not be the Trinity itself, if as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by the property of the persons, so they were also distinct by a diversity of natures." "But the faith of the Patriarchs, the Prophets, and the Apostles preaches that one God is the Trinity." "In that holy Trinity therefore there is one God the Father, who alone essentially has begotten one Son from himself; and there is one Son, who alone is essentially born from the one Father; and there is one Holy Spirit, who alone essentially proceeds from the Father and the Son. But all this one person cannot do, that is, to beget himself and to be born from himself and to proceed from himself." For as Augustine says in the first book *On the Trinity*: "There is no thing which begets itself, that it may be."

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