Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/3/q/bon-sent-I-d3-p1-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether the trinity of persons together with the unity of essence can be known naturally through creatures.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, what of God is knowable through creatures. And the Apostle says that *his eternal power also and divinity* [are knowable]. And it is asked whether through creatures the plurality of the persons can be known. And it seems that yes.

1. Because the philosophers had no knowledge of God except through creatures, and they knew the Trinity: therefore etc. The minor is clear through Augustine, *On the City of God*: "The philosophers say that philosophy is threefold," in which there is knowledge of the Trinity.

2. Likewise, the magicians failed at the third sign, *Exodus* eight; and it is expounded that they failed in the knowledge of the third person; either therefore as regards what is proper [to each person] or as regards what is appropriated. Not as regards what is appropriated, because goodness shines forth in creatures most of all for us: therefore as regards what is proper: therefore they knew at least two persons.

3. Likewise, this same point seems to follow by reason: because a vestige, since it bespeaks distinction, is a ground for knowing God distinctively or in distinction; but there is no distinction in God except the distinction of persons: therefore through the vestige they were able to know the distinction of the persons.

4. Likewise, through the image there is knowledge of the Trinity as regards order, distinction, and equality; but knowledge through the image is knowledge through a creature: therefore through a creature they were able to know the Trinity.

5. Likewise, more difficult is the knowledge of the hidden properties of a creature than the knowledge of the plurality of the persons, because that [hidden-property knowledge] is grasped only by the great and subtle, but this [plurality of persons] is grasped even by the rude and the unwise: therefore if [the philosophers] were able through the visible properties of creatures to arrive at the invisible properties, much more strongly [were they able to arrive] at knowing that the persons are several. And this is what is said in *Wisdom* thirteen: *For if they were able to know so much that they could estimate the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord?*

**On the contrary:**

1. Knowledge of the Trinity is knowledge of faith; but the knowledge of faith is of those things which are above reason; and those things which are above reason cannot be known through creatures: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there are only two ways of knowing of God through a creature, either by affirming what is in the creature or [what is] similar, or by removing; but the Trinity is not known by removal, but by position; but in no creature is there found a plurality of supposits with unity of essence: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the written law is above the law of nature, or the book of sacred Scripture above the book of mundane creation; but no one lacking faith comes through sacred Scripture into knowledge of the plurality of the persons: therefore much less through the book of mundane creation.

### Conclusion.

> The trinity of persons is not knowable through creatures, but only the trinity of appropriated [attributes], namely unity, truth, goodness.

**I respond:** It must be said that the plurality of persons with unity of essence is proper to the divine nature alone, whose like neither is found in any creature nor can be found nor can be rationally thought: therefore in no way is the trinity of persons knowable through a creature, by ascending rationally from creature to God. But although [the divine nature] has no full likeness, nevertheless it has in some way what is believed to be a likeness in a creature. Hence I say that the philosophers never by reason knew the trinity of persons nor even the plurality, unless they had some habit of faith, just as certain heretics have; whence those things which they said, either they spoke not understanding, or [they spoke] illumined by a ray of faith.

There is another trinity of appropriated [attributes], namely of unity, truth, and goodness, and this they knew, because it has a likeness.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that therefore which is objected, that through threefold philosophy the philosophers knew the Trinity; it must be said that it is true that through that and through other things they came into knowledge of the appropriated [attributes], but believers [came] into knowledge of both trinities.

2. To that which is objected concerning the third sign, it is said, and well, that the wise are said to have failed at the third sign because they failed in the knowledge of the chief effect of goodness, namely redemption.

3. To the other [it must be said] that the vestige bespeaks the distinction of essential properties, and to this corresponds the trinity of appropriated [attributes], not of properties proper [to the persons] or of the persons themselves.

4. To that which is objected concerning the image, it must be said that it is one thing to know the soul according to that which it is; and this knowledge is of reason; or according to [the soul's character] as image; and this knowledge is of faith alone.

5. To that which is objected last, that it is more difficult to know the world; it must be said that this is understood on the supposition of divine assistance; but speaking simply, it is false. For a man would be sooner disposed to faith than he would acquire the knowledge of philosophy. Yet our intellect can do more toward the knowledge of mundane things than toward [the knowledge] of the Trinity; because the latter is above reason, and its contrary one sees in sense; and therefore it requires a new elevation, namely [a knowledge] by infusion.