Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/3/q/bon-sent-I-d3-p1-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the Master's text.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text regarding those reasons which the Master sets forth, with respect to their ground of proof and force of inference, since they all appear either to be invalid or to presuppose what is doubtful.

For the first reason is of this sort. Whoever can do what no creature can do is above every creature; but he who made this world did what no creature can do: therefore he is not a creature, but is above every creature. And this reason begins there: *For as Ambrose says, that God,* etc. In this reason a twofold doubt seems to be presupposed, namely, that this world has been made, and that no creature could have made it, both of which are very much in doubt.

The second reason is this. Whoever made corporeal things and changeable spirits is above all corporeal and changeable things: therefore he is spiritual and unchangeable. Here likewise it seems to presuppose a doubt, namely that God made spirits. And again, it does not follow from this — that if he made changeable things, he is therefore unchangeable; rather, the opposite seems to follow, namely that he is changeable.

The third reason is this. Whoever made good things and better things is best; but God made corporeal things, which are good, and spiritual things, which are better: therefore God is best. This reason likewise seems to have no plausibility, because in that case any craftsman whatever who makes good and better things would be best, which is false.

The fourth reason is this. Whoever made beautiful and more beautiful things is beauty itself, or beautiful form, and this is most beautiful; but we see that corporeal things are beautiful, and spiritual things more beautiful: therefore he who made them is most beautiful. Likewise this seems also not to hold, on account of the aforesaid counter-instance.

Likewise, the question is asked concerning the difference among these reasons, and how they are distinguished. If you say, as some say, that they are four corresponding to the four kinds of causes, this is nothing, because the kind of material cause does not apply in God. If you say that they correspond to modes of knowing — on the contrary: there are only three, namely, the mode of cause, of removal, and of excellence.

**I respond:** It must be said that all these reasons, in order that they may prove and infer, presuppose something certain. For the first reason presupposes that the production of a thing from nothing cannot occur except from infinite power. This being supposed, since it is certain that no creature has infinite power, it follows that

the act of producing things from nothing is of him who is above every creature. And so from this act as from something proper to him, God is known to be omnipotent and immense. — In the other three reasons a stopping-point is presupposed, just as in the whole of philosophy a stopping-point is presupposed in causes; and therefore every changeable thing is reduced to an unchangeable, because in the changeable there is no stopping-point in the genus of efficient cause except in a mover that is not moved: for everything that is moved is moved by another. Likewise the good and the better are reduced to the best, because there is no stopping-point in the genus of end except in the best. Likewise the beautiful and the more beautiful are reduced to the most beautiful, because there is no stopping-point in the genus of beautiful form except in that which is beautiful form itself by essence.

As to the question raised concerning the distinction among the reasons, the answer is already clear from what has been said. For they cannot be distinguished by the kinds of causes alone, nor by the modes of knowing alone, but by both. For the first reason is taken according to the mode of cause; the others are taken according to the mode of cause and of excellence, because they consider order and are distinguished according to order in the threefold genus of cause — the efficient or moving, the final, and the exemplar.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, the question is raised concerning what the Master afterwards says, that *from perpetuity the eternal Creator is understood.* For it is worth nothing: the effect is perpetual, therefore the agent is eternal.

Likewise, the question is similarly raised about what he says: *From greatness, omnipotent.* For it is worth nothing: he made great things, therefore he is omnipotent, or can make all things.

**I respond:** To this some say that it is only a kind of persuasion by sign, not a necessary argument. For they say that omnipotence and eternity, since they are infinite, cannot be sufficiently proved through creatures, which are finite. — Yet it can be said otherwise: although it does not follow in any agent whatever, it nevertheless necessarily follows in the first agent or first perpetuator. For it is impossible that a creature should have being and great being and all this from someone who cannot do the whole; and by the same reasoning by which he can do the whole, he can also do each particular thing. Likewise, if it is the first perpetuator, it is wholly in act and nothing in potency; and if so, since it can make another endure infinitely, it itself is actually infinite in duration: therefore eternal.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, the question is raised concerning what he says: *All things which have been made by divine art show in themselves a certain unity and beautiful form and order.* For he seems first to say something false, because if so — since these three are made — then they have unity, beautiful form, and order, and so for the others: therefore if there is to be a stopping-point, then some things have been made which do not have these.

Likewise, he seems to enumerate badly, because Augustine sets forth these three: *mode, beautiful form, and order,* and these others: *unity, truth, and goodness.* Therefore the question is raised about the various ways of enumerating, and whence they come.

**I respond:** To this some say that this is to be understood of perfect creatures, or, if of all, then those three do not name conditions in the created thing, but in the uncreated exemplar. — Yet it can be said that in first and general notions there is reflection, and therefore a stopping-point, and one ought not to proceed further.

As to the question raised concerning the enumeration of those three, that it does not seem fitting; it must be said that the created thing can be considered in three ways: either in

itself, or in comparison with other creatures, or in comparison with the first cause. And according to all these modes it happens that a trinity is found, in two ways.

For if it is considered as in itself or with respect to itself, that is, either with respect to the substance of its principles — then there is that trinity: *matter, form, composition,* which is set forth in the book *On the Rule of Faith*; or with respect to its relations — then there is that one from *Wisdom* chapter eleven: *Thou hast disposed all things in number, weight, and measure.* For in *number* is understood the distinction of principles, in *weight* their proper inclination, in *measure* their proportion to one another.

Likewise, if one creature is considered in comparison with other creatures, this can be either insofar as it acts by natural action — and so the trinity of Dionysius is taken, *substance, power, and operation*; or insofar as it acts by spiritual action — and so that of Augustine, *On Eighty-Three Questions*: «*that by which it consists, that by which it agrees, that by which it is distinguished*», and the last is referred to the soul.

But if they are considered in comparison with God, this can be in two ways: either insofar as they are merely referred to him — and so there is that one, *mode, beautiful form, and order*; or insofar as they are referred to him and made like him — and so there is that one, *unity, truth, and* *goodness*.

Therefore, since vestige is properly noted in comparison with God, vestige is properly taken in these last conditions. And because there is great agreement among these comparisons, the Master mingles them with one another on account of their great agreement and correspondence; because unity corresponds to mode, which regards God as efficient cause; truth corresponds to beautiful form, which regards him as exemplar; goodness corresponds to order, which regards God as end.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, the question is raised about his appropriating truth to the Son when he says: *Most perfect beauty is understood as the Son, namely the truth of the Father.* But on the contrary Augustine in the *Soliloquy*: «*Truth is that which is*»; but being is not appropriated to any person: therefore neither is truth.

Likewise, he seems badly to appropriate order to the Holy Spirit, because in the preceding chapter he says that from order the wise one is understood; but wisdom is appropriated to the Son: therefore so also is order.

**I respond:** It must be said that truth can be considered in two ways, just as color. For in one way color is considered according to that in which it is; and so it is defined in the book *On Sense and the Sensed*: «*Color is the extremity of the transparent in a bounded body*». In another way, in comparison with vision, which it moves; and so it is defined in the book *On the Soul*: «*Color is the mover of vision according to the act of the luminous*».

Likewise, truth can be considered in comparison with that in which it is; and so the true is that which is; in another way, by comparison with the *intellect,* which it moves; and so truth, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, «*is the end of speculative thought*». According to the first mode Anselm says: «*The truth of the Father is the essence of the Father*». As to the second mode Hilary says that «*truth is declarative being*». And since the Son proceeds as the Word, to whom the account of declaring

is appropriated, therefore the account of exemplar is appropriated to him, and consequently the account of truth — with respect to the second mode of truth; while he himself receives [truth] in the first mode.

To what is objected concerning order, it must be said that there is the order of things in the universe, and this is appropriated to wisdom; and there is the order of things to their end, and this is appropriated to goodness; and so it is clear that there is no contradiction.

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