Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/3/q/bon-sent-I-d3-p2-a1-q3
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### Question III.
### *Whether memory, understanding, and will are the same in essence as the soul.*

In the third place there is asked, concerning the comparison of these powers to the soul or to the subject, namely whether they are the same in essence as the soul. And it seems that they are.

1. Augustine says in book ten *On the Trinity*: "These three, memory, understanding, and will, are one mind, one life, one essence, and through this one substance."

2. Likewise, Bernard *on the Song of Songs*: "I behold three things in the soul: memory, understanding, and will; and these three are the soul itself." If you should say that this is said by causation, this is nothing, because Augustine *On the Spirit and the Soul* says that the soul "is in a certain way its own [properties], as powers, and in a certain way not its own, as virtues"; but if it had been said by causation, both could be said.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher seems to wish to say this same thing, because he says that the principle of being and of operating is the same: therefore since the principle of being is the substantial form itself, the principle of operating will be the same; but the principle of operating is a power: therefore a power is a principle of being; but there is no principle of being except the substantial form in man: therefore the power and the substantial form are the same in substance.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reason: As prime matter is by nature fitted to receive all things in truth, so is the soul according to likeness; but the power of prime matter with respect to forms to be received does not differ in essence from it: therefore likewise it seems concerning the power of the soul. Proof: for if it differed in essence, it would either be a substance or an accident. Not an accident, because it precedes every form and every

accident; if a *substance*, then either matter or form. Furthermore, if it differed, matter would be capable of receiving it.

5. Likewise, an accidental form is not simpler than a substantial form; but the power of operating does not differ from the accidental form, just as the power of heating does not differ in essence from heat, nor the power of illuminating from light itself: therefore likewise it seems that neither does the power of the soul differ from the soul itself.

6. Likewise, what is an accident is substantial to no substance; but these powers are substantial: therefore they are not accidents of the soul: therefore they are substance; it is clear that [they are] none other than the soul. Proof of the minor: because rational, sensible, and vegetable soul in man do not denote a diversity of substances, but of powers: therefore it is clear that in man these differences — vegetable, sensible, rational — are taken from powers; but differences of this kind are substantial: therefore the powers also [are substantial]: therefore etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustine in book fifteen *On the Trinity* assigns the difference of the created image from that uncreated Trinity, namely that in that Trinity the haver is that which is had, but here the haver is not that which is had: therefore if the soul has three powers, then essentially it is not them.

2. Likewise, Dionysius says that in every creature these three differ: substance, power, and operation: therefore in the soul also substance and powers differ.

3. Likewise, Boethius: "In every creature *that by which it is* (quo est) and *that which is* (quod est), or *what it is* (quid est) and *to be* (esse), differ": therefore likewise — indeed much more strongly — *what can [act]* and *that by which it can*.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reasons thus: things which differ in genus differ in essence, and one is not essentially predicated of the other; but the powers and the soul are of this kind, because the soul is in the genus of substance, but its powers are in the second species of quality, namely of natural potency or impotency: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, those things one of which is outside the other differ essentially and substantially; but power goes out from the substance, because it operates upon an object which is outside; but it is impossible that it should operate where it is not; if therefore power is where it operates, and operates outside the substance of any thing: therefore it goes out beyond substance: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, there is another reason to this point: that if the soul and its powers were the same in essence, therefore one would not be multiplied except according to the multiplication of the other; and thus, since the soul is only one, it would have only one power; but this is false: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> The powers of the soul are substantial and are in the same genus by reduction as the soul; nevertheless they are not altogether the same with it in essence.

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that natural power is said in two ways. In one way, insofar as it denotes the mode of existence of a natural power in a subject, according to which a subject is said to be easy or difficult for doing something; and thus natural power denotes a mode of quality and is generally in the second species of quality, as is clear when one says "runner" and "boxer," each of which denotes a facility which follows the mode of existence of the power of stepping or resisting or acting in the subject. In another way, natural power is said to be a power naturally going forth from the subject. And this can be in two ways. For one power goes forth from the substance with an accident, as

the power of heating. For fire does not heat through its own substance without heat; and this power is not of another genus than the quality from which it goes forth; hence the power of heating is in the same genus as heat. In another way natural power is said [to be] that which naturally goes forth from the substance and immediately, like the power of generating with respect to the induction of the ultimate form; and this indeed is not of another genus than substance, but is reduced to the genus of substance as a substantial difference. According to this mode it must be understood with respect to the powers of the soul. For in one way it happens to name the powers of the soul according to the first mode, as they denote a facility which denotes the mode of a power of existing in the subject, like cleverness and slowness; and these indeed are in the second species of quality. In another way it happens to name the powers insofar as they denote the order of substance toward act, which is by the mediation of some accidental property, like the power of syllogizing which is in the soul when it has the habit of syllogizing; and this is in the same genus as the knowledge of syllogizing, namely in the first species of quality. Again it happens to name the powers of the soul insofar as they go forth immediately from substance, as by these three: memory, understanding, and will. And this is clear, because, with every accident set aside, it being understood that the soul is a spiritual substance, by the very fact that it is present to itself and conjoined to itself, it has the power of remembering and understanding and loving itself. Hence these powers are consubstantial with the soul, and are in the same genus by reduction as the soul. Yet, since they go forth from the soul — for power has the manner of one going forth — they are not altogether the same in essence, nor however do they so differ as to be of another genus, but they are in the same genus by reduction.

And an example sufficiently clear can be given in a thing and its likeness. For a thing does not have so great an identity with its likeness that they are one in number, nor so great a diversity that they should differ in genus. For the likeness of Martin is not so distant from Martin that it utterly differs from him. And so the likeness of a thing is in the same genus by reduction with that of which it is the likeness. For because it goes forth, therefore it differs, but it does not pass over into another genus. And I speak of likeness according to the formal character of likeness, not of intention, that is, insofar as it goes out from a subject and does not recede, as splendor from light. Therefore the reasons proving that the soul is not its own powers in essence are to be conceded.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2.* To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Augustine and Bernard, that the soul is its own powers; it must be said that there is there not the predication of an accident of a subject, nor of the same in essence, but a substantial or essential [predication].

For which reason it must be noted that "essential" is said in four ways. In the first way "essential" is said [of] what denotes the whole essence of a thing, as the singular species [does]. In the second way "essential" is said [of] what is of the essence and constitution of a thing, like matter and form. In the third way "essential" is said [of] that without which a thing cannot be nor can it be understood to be, as are those things in which the character of a vestige is regarded, like unity, truth, goodness. In the fourth way "essential" is said [of] that without which a thing cannot be thought to have perfect being, as the powers in the soul are, in which the image is regarded; and this is in the least degree substantial or essential; nevertheless it does not pass over into another genus: therefore the soul is said [to be] its own powers.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that the principle of being and of operating is the same; it must be said that this is true of the remote principle, but of the proximate principle it is impos-

sible. For if the proximate principle were altogether the same, then in the thing to-be and to-operate would be the same. Likewise, if the proximate principle were the same, since the thing always has being, it would always have operation. Since therefore form denotes the proximate and immediate principle of being, while power [denotes] the proximate and immediate principle of operating, it is clear that it is impossible [for them] to be altogether the same.

*Ad 4.* To the other [objection] which is brought concerning the power of matter, it must be said that matter is not its own power in essence, since it is not itself the ordering toward form; nevertheless the power of matter is itself essential to matter, just as active power [is essential] to substance. And indeed the power of matter is less far removed from matter than active power [is] from substance; for the power of matter is a passive power, which denotes an order toward another with privation, whereas active power denotes an order with positing: and therefore the power of matter adds less above matter than active power [adds] above substance. And hence it is that diverse powers are not so distinguished in the same matter as in the same substance.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected concerning the accidental form, it must be said that the accidental form is not its own power. For its power [exists] insofar as it flows into another; nevertheless that power does not add as much as the power of the substantial form, since the power of the accidental form denotes an ordering toward act, but not sufficient through itself, but through the power of substance. For as an accident is not through itself, so it does not have the virtue of operating through itself, but through the virtue of substance; and so this is clear.

*Ad 6.* To that which is objected last, it must be said that the powers of the soul are not accidental. Nevertheless the argument is not valid, because perhaps rational, sensible, vegetable are not taken from powers, but from diverse natures found in the soul.

But that argument which was made for the opposite side, that they differ because they are in diverse genera, is to be solved by *negation* (interemptio), because they are not in diverse genera, but in the same one by reduction.