Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/3/q/bon-sent-I-d3-p2-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the second assignation of the image.*

Consequently there is a question on the second assignation of the image through mind, knowledge, and love. And concerning this three things are asked.

The first is about these absolutely: namely, whether the image is found in them as in powers, or in habits, or in powers and habits at once, or in substance and habits.

The second is about these in comparison to one another.

The third, whether this trinity of the image necessarily leads to knowledge of the Trinity with respect to the persons.

### Question I. *Whether the image is found in mind, knowledge, and love as in powers, or as in habits, or in both at once, or according to substance and habits.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus.

1. It is shown first, that the image is not found in these as in powers, because the aforesaid assignation was in powers: therefore if this also were in powers, it would be nothing but a reiteration of words.

Likewise, knowledge and love do not bespeak a power, but habits, although mind can bespeak a power: therefore the aforesaid three cannot be placed under the formal character of powers.

2. Likewise it is shown that they do not bespeak habits, because Augustine says in the assignation and approbation of the image: «The mind knows itself, loves itself»; but it belongs to no habit to know or love itself: therefore etc.

Likewise, if mind stands for a habit, I ask, for which habit? If for the habit of memory, of which it more seems so, because there is no other to assign; but the act of this habit is to remember, not another; but Augustine assigns to mind these acts, namely to know and to love: therefore etc.

3. Likewise it is shown, that not in powers and habits. For since the powers are three, and the habits three, then there would not be a ternary, but a senary.

4. Likewise I ask, for which power does mind there stand? for either it stands for all, or for two, or for one. If for all, then there is no trinity there; if for two, then there is a quaternity there, since two are habits; if for one, it cannot have those two acts, to know and to love: therefore the trinity is not taken according to habits and powers at once.

**To the opposite of the confusion:**

1. Likewise it is shown, that not according to the substance of the soul and habits. For since the habits of knowing and loving follow the substance itself in time, and substance can also be without them, but the formal character of the image is to the soul itself perpetual and inseparable and co-created: therefore it is not in habits and substance at once.

2. Likewise, if substance is counted together with the habits, since the habits are three, and the substance one: therefore there will be

a quaternity there. If you say that knowledge does not differ insofar as it is a habit of understanding and of memory; on the contrary: habits are dispositions of powers; since therefore there are three powers, there will be three habits.

3. Likewise, the Master says in the text, that mind is taken not for the substance of the soul, but for that which is more eminent in it.

### Conclusion

> In this second assignation of the image, which is mind, knowledge, love, the trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul and with respect to the two habits of knowledge and love.

**I respond:** It must be said, that according to certain men this assignation differs from the preceding, because the prior was in powers, this is in habits. And they answer the objections through a distinction of "mind." For *mens* is diversified according to a fourfold mode of being taken. For in one mode it is said from *mene*, which is moon or defect: and so it is said of the whole substance of the soul on account of the transmutations which it has. In a second mode it is said from *metiri* (to measure); and so it stands for the judicative power, and so Damascene takes it, placing it among the cognitive powers. In a third mode it is said from *eminere* (to be eminent); and so it stands for the superior part of reason, and so Augustine often takes it. In a fourth mode it is said from *meminisse* (to remember); and so it stands for memory both with respect to act and with respect to habit. They say therefore, that in the assignation of this trinity mind stands for the habit of memory; but in the adaptation, when Augustine says: «The mind knows itself and loves [itself]», it stands for the power of remembering.

But this does not seem fittingly said, because the adaptation ought to correspond to the assignation. And further, since the proper act of mind, as it stands for memory, is to remember, that would have to be touched on; but Augustine in this assignation never makes mention except of two acts, namely to know and to love, which are not of memory, but of the other powers.

It must therefore be answered, that that trinity is not in powers; because love and knowledge do not bespeak powers; nor in habits, because mind cannot stand for a habit, since it is taken as agent; nor can it be in powers and habits, because mind cannot stand for one power, since the acts of two powers are assigned to it; nor likewise can it stand for several powers, because there would not be a trinity. It remains therefore, that it is necessary to hold, that this trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul, by reason of the mind knowing and loving itself, and with respect to the habits, by reason of knowledge and love; and thus there is a trinity, since the substance is one, and the habits are two.

This assignation therefore differs from the preceding: because the preceding was through uniformity in powers in comparison to habits and acts, but this is in substance and habits. It differs again in this, that the preceding was through a turning of the soul to God, this is through a turning of the soul upon itself; and the image is not found in man in more modes, as was said above. It differs also, because the preceding assignation of the image is more proper and fitting than this one. For properly speaking, the image consists in unity of essence and trinity of powers, according to which the soul is born to be sealed by that highest Trinity with the image of likeness, which consists in grace and the theological virtues. Whence Augustine sets down this assignation first by way of investigation, in order that through this he may arrive at that one, in which he ends his speculation. Whence this assignation is not proper, as the other is; whence the Master places it second, as not principal.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that therefore which is objected, that habits are not coeval etc.; it must be said, that habit is threefold. For the power of the soul has one habit by acquisition, another by innate disposition, a third it has from its own origin. This is clear, because a habit is that by which a power is facile in act; but a power is facile in these three modes, for example, our affect has facility for loving another's good through acquired disposi-

tion, as through virtue; for loving one's own good through innate disposition; and for loving oneself through one's natural origin. For since [the soul] is undividedly united to itself, it is always apt to loving itself. Likewise, since our intellect is always present to itself, it is always apt to itself for knowing itself. And so that is clear which is objected concerning coevality; for as regards such habits there is indeed coevality.

2. To that which is objected, that there ought to be three habits according to the three powers; it must be said, that in this trinity the habit of memory does not fall in nor has it place, because [the trinity] is found in the soul itself according as it turns upon itself: and therefore the substance of the soul itself holds the place of memory, and the very presence and offering, by which the soul always offers itself to its understanding, holds the place of the habit and act of memory. And so it is clear, that there fall in there only the habits of two powers; and therefore there is a trinity there.

3. To that which is last objected concerning the word of the Master; it must be said, that it is understood not for the whole substance of the soul; for if it be understood otherwise, the word of the Master does not have truth. Which is clear through Augustine, who on the occasion of this image, through almost the whole tenth [book] *On the Trinity*, shows that the soul has an innate knowledge of itself, which is the knowledge of its substance. And besides, nothing one in the soul knows and loves except the substance: therefore if mind stood for one power, it would not have those two acts, namely to know and to love.