Dist. 3, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/3/q/bon-sent-I-d3-p2-dubia
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### Dub. I.

In this part concerning the text, a question is raised about what he says: *The image of God remains*. On the contrary, the Psalm: *Lord, in the city you will reduce their image to nothing*.

**Respondeo:** "Image" is said in two ways: with respect to substantial being; and this regards the trinity of powers, their order, and their equality, and in this way it always remains; in another way, insofar as it adds to being a well-being, such as beauty and honor; and this can be lost, since *man, when he was in honor, did not understand*.

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Memory, however, is said relatively* (*ad aliquid*) etc.; therefore memory, intelligence, and will are in the category of relation.

Likewise it is asked, why is mind said to be referred to itself more than memory or intelligence?

**Respondeo:** It must be said that *to be said relatively* (*dici ad aliquid*) is [understood] in two ways: either properly and *per se*, as father and son, or by reason of something annexed, because [the term] has an annexed regard and inclination; and in this way memory is said relatively, because it has an innate regard to the memorable, similarly intelligence to the intel-

ligible, and will to the willable; and these objects have a regard to one another. And so the objection is clear.

To what is asked about mind, it must be said that "mind" is so called from an essential act. Hence it must be understood that *that by which it is* (*quo est*) gives to the soul most general being, and so it is called essence; or insofar as it gives general being, and so it is called life, because the soul is in the genus of living things; or insofar as it gives spiritual being, and so [it is called] mind. For nothing is called "mind" except what lives by an intellective life. — Or, the soul in itself is called essence, as the act of the body life, as perfectible by God mind.

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the three persons are not *of one God*; for he seems to say something false, because, if they are of one essence; but essence is God; therefore they are of one God. If you say that it does not follow, I ask, why is it not granted that the three persons are of one God? If [you say it is] on account of this, that the oblique case marks diversity; then, since essence is not diverse from the person, it cannot be said: the three persons are of one essence.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that the genitive is sometimes construed in the sense of possession, as when one says: *the ox of Peter* or *of John*; sometimes by force of declaration of essence, as *a woman of outstanding form*; sometimes intransitively, as *a creature of salt*. The general is construed intransitively with the special; and thus it can be said: *the substance* or *person of God*; by force of declaration of essence, a noun importing form by way of form [is so construed]; and thus the three persons are said to be of one essence. Since therefore, when it is said: the three persons are of one God, *God* does not signify either by way of form or by way of specifying, it is therefore understood by way of possessing or originating: and therefore [the proposition] is simply false.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that for the greatest part it is unlike. It seems that the image is an expressed likeness: therefore if it is most unlike, it is not an image.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that there is expression simply, or in [its proper] genus. If therefore we speak of expression simply, then I say that the rational soul is not greatly like God; but if we speak in the genus of creature, since it approaches as much as a created nature can, in this way it is called greatly like and an expressed likeness of God.

### Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *If there were two, either each would be insufficient, or one would be superfluous*; because by this way it could be shown that there is only one person.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that in the persons there cannot be superfluity, because in them there is one sufficiency; whence if one were superfluous, [so would] all. But there cannot be any insufficiency there, because the three have nothing more than the one. But if there were two essences, there would be two sufficiencies, if each by itself were sufficient; but if [each] one with the other, each would be insufficient: and so it is clear that the case of two essences is not similar to that of two persons.

### Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that he understood that God has wisdom, which is begotten of him, because he understood that he is not a foolish thing; therefore it seems according to this that the Father is wise with begotten wisdom.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that this consequence is not to be understood immediately, namely: because he is not a foolish thing, therefore he has begotten wisdom. But this must be understood thus: God is a spiritual substance: therefore he is born to know: therefore if he does not have wisdom, he is a foolish thing; but he is not a foolish thing: therefore he has wisdom; but there is no wisdom without a word, and there is no word unless it proceeds from a mind and so is generated: therefore from the first [premise], if he has wisdom, it is necessary that wisdom be begotten. And all these consequences must be understood immediately.

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