Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/30/q/bon-sent-I-d30-a1-q2
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### Articulus Unicus. Question II. *Whether the names which are predicated of God in time are predicated per se or per accidens.*

Second, it is asked whether the names that are said of God in time are said *per se* or *per accidens*.

And that they are said according to accident is shown in this way.

1. Augustine, in the fifth book *On the Trinity*, and found in the letter: "That he was Lord of the human being accrued to him in time."

2. Likewise, this same point seems clear from reason, because everything that is present and absent apart from the corruption of that of which it is predicated, is predicated according to accident — this is self-evident — but all those things that are predicated of God temporally are of this kind: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, what is predicated *per se* of something always inheres in it; therefore, by the opposite, what is predicated of something and does not always inhere in it, is predicated not *per se*, therefore *per accidens*: but such are names of this kind: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is predicated of something is either convertible with the subject, or of the formal character of the subject, or is predicated *per accidens*; but names of this kind are neither of the formal character of God nor convertible with him, as is clear for the name *lord*: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the fifth book *On the Trinity*: "Nothing is said of God according to accident."

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason: because wherever there is accident, there is positing of composition and consequently of variety; but neither is in God: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything *per accidens* is reduced to *per se*; but reduction is of the posterior to the prior, not the other way around; yet God has no prior, neither simply nor in some respect: therefore, nothing is said of God according to accident.

4. Likewise, everything that is said of two things — of one *per se* and of the other *per accidens* — is said in a more perfect manner of that of which it is said *per se*; but whatever is said of God is said most perfectly: therefore, nothing is said of God according to accident; therefore, names of this kind are not said of God *per accidens*; therefore, they are said *per se*.

### Conclusion.

> The names that are said of God in time are predicated *per accidens* only in that sense in which *per accidens* is opposed to the necessary.

**I respond:** It must be said that to be said according to accident is threefold. In one way, accident is said by opposition to substance; and in this way, accident is said to be a property inhering in another, which is not of the essence of the thing.

And in this way "nothing is said of God according to accident," as Augustine says, because in this way accident posits composition and variety in that of which it is said. — In another way, to be said according to accident is by opposition to *per se*; and in this way, something is said *per accidens* either because it is said through another in essence, as when one says: *the wall disperses*; or through something with which it is in some way the same and in some way different, as when something is predicated of a superior through an inferior, as: *a figure has three*, or of an inferior through a superior, as: *an isosceles has three*. In this way, nothing is said of God according to accident. For to be said *per accidens* in this way posits in something posteriority and imperfection, as the arguments adduced for this show; but God has nothing imperfectly, nothing from another that is wholly other, nor from something superior or inferior, because these do not obtain in God. — In the third way, to be said according to accident is by opposition to the necessary, such that what does not necessarily inhere is said to happen accidentally. And in this way, names of this kind are said of God according to accident, because they are not said of him necessarily; but they are said of him *per se*, because through comparison to the creature. Now comparison to the creature is *per se*, because God is his own action; but yet, because God acts through will, which is not always and not necessarily joined to the act, it is therefore not necessary; and to this extent the reason for saying it *per accidens* obtains there. Hence this mode of saying *per accidens* is opposed to *per se* in creatures by reason of the fact that, for *per se* in creatures, the necessary follows; but not so in God, because he himself does the same thing and does it voluntarily: and therefore in God this does not stand in opposition to *per se*.

The reasons, therefore, that show that these names are not said of God according to accident, proceed according to the first and second acceptation.

**To the arguments on the opposing side:**

*To 1.* As for what is objected, that to be Lord accrued to him: this is to be understood in this way, that is, it does not belong necessarily nor always.

*To 2.* To the objection that they are absent apart from corruption: it must be said that this definition belongs to accident insofar as being-present-in is through inherence; but this does not apply to God, as has been seen, but only to creatures: hence the point is clear.

*To 3. 4.* To the objection about *per se*, it must be said that the argument speaks of *per se* in creatures. For in creatures the necessary follows upon *per se*, but not so in God.