Dist. 31, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/31/q/bon-sent-I-d31-p1-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether equality and likeness in divine matters are said according to substance or according to relation.*

Secondly it is asked whether the aforesaid names are said according to substance or according to relation. And that [they are said] according to substance, is shown:

1. By the authority of the Master in the text: "Equality," he says, "is not relation or notion, but unity or identity of nature"; and Hilary, *On the Trinity*: "Likeness is undifferentiated essence": therefore both likeness and equality express the divine essence.

2. Likewise, equality is said according to quantity, and likeness according to quality; but in the divine, quality and quantity pass over into substance: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that is said according to relation imports distinction in its principal understanding; but *like* and *equal* express agreement: therefore they are not said according to relation.

4. Likewise, nothing that is said according to relation is said of two things, unless it imports relation in general — I say this on account of this name *related* and *distinct* — but *like* and *equal* import a special relation, if they import [any], since one cannot assign more specific [relations] under them, and they are said of more than [two]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Hilary, *On the Trinity*: "Likeness is not [a relation] of a thing to itself"; but everything that is said according to substance is said with respect to itself: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that is said according to substance is said of many in the singular; but *like* and *equal* are said in the plural: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by equality the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, but not by essence: therefore equality does not express essence.

4. Likewise, either the Father is the equality of the Son to the Father, or he is not. If so: then since the Son by that equality is equal to the Father, the Father is equal to himself; which is not conceded. But if the Father is not the equality of the Son to the Father, then equality is not said of all [the persons]: therefore it does not express essence; for the essence of the Son is the Father.

### Conclusion.

> *Likeness and equality are said in some way both according to substance and according to relation, but properly and principally according to relation, consequentially and causally according to substance.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the common opinion of all, since *like* and *equal* express the agreement of many in one, [it is the case that] of themselves they import distinction in supposits and union or unity in essence. And since the distinction of persons pertains to the mode of speaking according to relation, and the unity of being to the mode of speaking according to substance, therefore names of this sort are neither said wholly according to substance, nor wholly according to relation, but in some way according to substance, in some way according to relation. But since they cannot be said in this twofold mode principally, but it is necessary that [they be said] according to one or the other, therefore one must further inquire according to which mode of speaking they are taken in the divine. And here there are diverse opinions.

For some say that names of this sort, signified according to concretion, are said principally according to relation. For *like* are said [those] having the same quality. Since therefore [this name] looks to a supposit per se insofar as it is concrete, therefore it is said according to relation. But in the abstract, since *likeness* is the unity of nature or essence, since it looks first to the unity of form, not to the distinction of supposits except consequently, principally it is said according to substance. — But this manner of solving is not suitable. For the signification is the same in the concrete and in the abstract in [their] principal signification: therefore if one is said according to substance, the other is so likewise: therefore this does not solve what was said.

The second opinion is that names of this sort, both in concretion and in abstraction, are said principally according to substance, and connote distinction in supposits. And their reason is that, since *likeness* looks to these two, namely agreement and difference, more immediately and more completely it looks to agreement. For different things are said to be alike insofar as they agree, but agreeing things are not said to be alike insofar as they differ. *Likeness* therefore looks to distinction by way of matter, but by way of form it looks to the unity of essence; and therefore completively both *likeness* and *like* are said according to substance. — But this position cannot stand. For it is certain that *likeness* is said [as] a respect of some things to one another; but in the divine there is only the respect of person to person. But the respect of person to person cannot be said according to substance: therefore it is necessary that this name *like*, which is imposed from *likeness*, not be said according to substance.

And therefore there is a third opinion, that names of this sort are said according to relation, formally speaking. For they express the respect of distinct supposits agreeing in some one thing; and so the respect falls there by way of the formal, but the unity of essence and the plurality of supposits falls by way of cause. Therefore properly and principally [they are said] according to relation, consequently however according to substance, speaking causally. And this is more clear, if we consider the signification of these names in creatures, whence the transfer is made. For likeness is according to quality, likewise equality according to quantity; and *likeness* expresses relation formally, but quality causally, likewise *equality* expresses quantity causally but relation formally. For likeness is not a quality, but a relation, which is regarded according to quality.

**To the arguments:**

*1.* To that which is objected from the Master and Hilary, that it is essence; it must be said that all such expressions are understood causally.

*2.* To that which is afterwards said, that *equal* is said according to quantity; it must be said that *according to* expresses the efficient cause, not the form; so also of *like*.

*3.* To that which is objected, that relatives import distinction; it must be said that some [names] in the divine are said according to relation, which are distinctive of the related, as *Father* and *Son*; and such import a distinguishing respect, and such import distinction as exercised. But some are said according to relation, which are relative of the distinct, as *like* and *equal*; and such import a respect, but that respect is not a distinguishing notion, but consequent on the one distinguishing. For it imports distinction not as exercised, but as conceived. For the distinguishing respect is of one person to another, insofar as it is from that one. But in names of this sort there is imported the respect of one person to another, insofar as they share one nature. And since respect is relation, therefore it is pluralized; but since [it is] a respect of one essence, therefore it is said of more than [one].

*4.* And therefore the last [point] which is said is clear, that no relative is said of more than [two], unless it expresses relation in general. For it must be said that this is not only [the case] in those names which import distinction in general, as *related* and *distinct*, but also in those which express the respect of many, insofar as they share in something. For such a name expresses respect in general, specified however by reason of communication in one [thing]; whence *like* are said [to be] related to one another, sharing one quality.