Dist. 31, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/31/q/bon-sent-I-d31-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether 'equal' and 'like' are said in divine matters according to a mutual relation.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the aforesaid names, namely *equal* and *like*, express a mutual relation, according to which the Father is equal to the Son, and the Son to the Father. And that they do not, is shown:

1. Because according to Dionysius: "In causal [things] we do not admit reciprocation"; but the Father is the principle of the Son: therefore reciprocation does not fall there, such that the Father be called equal to the Son.

2. Likewise, this seems [to be so] by reason; for since the Son is like the Father, therefore he is called the *likeness of the Father*: therefore if conversely the Father is perfectly like the Son, then the Father is the *likeness of the Son*. But this is not admitted: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, he who is equal to another according to equality is equated to him: if therefore the Father is equal to the Son, then he is equated to him; I ask: by whom? either by himself, or by another. Not by himself, since whoever equates himself to another, does something in himself; but the Father does nothing in himself, therefore he is not equated either by himself; nor is he equated by another: therefore he is not equal to the Son.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Like* and *equal* are relatives of equivalence (*aequiparantiae*); but these denominate similarly each extreme: therefore if the Son is like the Father, by equal reasoning the Father is like the Son.

2. Likewise, the ground of likeness is agreement or undifferentiation in quality or substance; but agreement looks equally to each extreme, and so does undifferentiation: therefore if the Son is undifferentiated from the Father and conversely, the Father is like the Son.

3. Likewise, every plural doubles its singular; but this is conceded: *the Father and the Son are like and equal*; therefore the Father is like; I ask: like whom? either to himself, or to another. Not to himself: therefore to another.

### Conclusion.

> *'Like' and 'equal' are said in the divine according to a mutual relation, insofar as they simply express agreement in quantity and quality; but not insofar as they superadd a ground of origin.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *like* and *equal* are taken in two ways: either insofar as they express agreement in quantity or quality, or insofar as, beyond agreement, they add imitation or perfect expression. In the first way they are relatives of equivalence (*aequiparantiae*), and are said with convertibility, according to which the reasonings adduced second prove [their point]. In the other way, *like* and *equal* add upon this a ground of origin — whence *equal* is said as if *adequated*, and *like* as if *assimilated* — in this way it [only] applies to him who is from another, and in this way the first reasonings proceed, [namely] that the Father is not called the *likeness of the Son* by imitation, nor is he equated to the Son by emanation from another, but rather equates the Son to himself.

**To the arguments:**

*1.* As to what Dionysius says, that we do not admit reciprocation, etc.; he is speaking of *cause* properly, insofar as it differs from its effect by essence: but in this way the Father is not the cause of the Son; rather, there is indeed a relation (*habitudo*) of the Son to the Father, just as conversely; and so all [the points] are clear.